With both people and government : ʿĀdil Imām and the renegotiation of national consensus by Juchelka, Jan
i 
 
 
 
 
 
With both People and Government 
 
ʿĀdil Imām and the renegotiation of national consensus 
 
 
 
Jan Juchelka 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 
in the field of Arabic Language (60 credits) 
 
Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
Nov 2009 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
My gratitude and thanks goes first of all to my supervisor Stephan Guth at the University of 
Oslo for insightful tutoring and guidance. He always had time for me and my inquiries. 
Thanks also to the Catholic Centre for Cinema in Cairo for giving me access to their archive 
of newspaper articles. Without them this thesis would not have been possible. I would also 
like to thank my ex-colleague Anne Birgitta Nilsen for her encouragement; my employer for 
giving me time to work on this thesis, and my friend Jacob Høigilt for his stimulating 
feedback.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
Abstract 
 
For the last thirty years the comedian ʿĀdil Imām, has been the most popular star of the 
Egyptian film industry. On the one hand his films claim to be bold: they take the side of the 
ordinary Egyptian, denounce corruption and suppression, and stand up against nouveaux 
riches, police, power and government. Simultaneously ʿĀdil Imām has also supported the 
regime, especially in their fight against ‘Islamist terrorists’. The support ʿĀdil Imām offers 
the regime is often seen as contradictory to the social and political criticism apparently 
present in his films. 
In this thesis I am therefore asking to what extent ʿĀdil Imām’s films really are 
critical. By analysing his films starting from 1991 and up to present, I have attempted to 
show that his political and social criticism, although it is bold and confrontational, always is 
morally and nationalistically based, and that his films by criticising, not the system but, 
deviations from it, contribute to, and uphold dominant cultural and political concepts and 
thus don’t challenge hegemony. My argument is that the ideology in his films is modernist 
and based on a specific value-system. In accordance with this value-system positively 
charged ‘traditional’ values are combined with western knowledge and education. 
Deviations are accordingly criticised for lacking one, or both, of these two factors; either 
sound traditional values or knowledge. I claim that this enlightened but also thoroughly 
conservative discourse constitutes a ‘cultural hegemony’ in Egypt, and that the way ʿĀdil 
Imām’s films contribute to this hegemony can serve as an illustration of Gramscian ideas on 
how a modern state’s power is upheld through consent rather than force. 
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Notes on transliteration 
 
All Arabic names, words and titles will be given in transliteration. Although some titles are 
in Egyptian Arabic I have chosen, as far as possible, to give all titles and names in Modern 
Standard Arabic. Egyptian Arabic will only be used when citing oral sources. 
With the exception of the Arabic letters ذ ,ث ,خ ,ش  and غ, in my transliteration I will 
adhere to the principle of one sign for each Arabic consonant. 
ء ʾ  د d  ض ḍ  ك k 
ب b  ذ dh  ط ṭ  ل l 
ت t  ر r  ظ ẓ  م m 
ث th  ز z  ع ʿ  ن n 
ج j or g*  س s  غ gh   h 
ح ḥ  ش sh  ف f  و w 
خ kh  ص ṣ  ق q  ي y 
 
* I will keep the Egyptian pronunciation of the Arabic letter ج as ‘g’ in the 
transliteration of Egyptian names and titles. The letter will be reproduced as ‘j’ in the 
transliteration of other Arabic words and terms. 
  
Long vowels:    ā, ī and ū. 
Diphthongs:   aw and ay (ō and ē may occur when transliterating Egyptian) 
The definite article:  al- (will not be assimilated) (il- when transliterating Egyptian) 
Tāʾ marbūṭa:   -a (in plausal form) / -at (in iḍāfa) (-it in iḍāfa when trans- 
literating Egyptian) 
Nisba-ending:   -ī (masc) and –iyya (fem) 
Hamza:   will not be written when initiating a word. 
 
Names and titles: As I consider the stage-names of Egyptian stars and actors trademarks, 
they will always be in transliteration and fully spelled out. It will therefore always be ʿĀdil 
Imām and never only Imām. Concerning the names of scholars and sources I will follow the 
usual practice for academic writing and only give the complete name at its first occurrence. 
As for the titles of films and songs, I will always place the English name in italics. The 
original Arabic title will only be given in brackets when I mention the film for the first time. 
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Introduction 
 
For over thirty years the comedian ʿĀdil Imām, the Boss (al-zaʿīm) or The Star of Stars (nigm 
al-nugūm), as he is often called in Egypt, has been the biggest and best-paid star in Egyptian 
cinema. Not infrequently his films have proved controversial. He has been tackling issues 
such as Islamism, corruption, fraud at parliamentary elections, Egyptian-Israeli relations 
and, lately, Coptic-Muslim relations. Several of his films have been scripted by writers who 
are usually identified as leftists, pitting ʿĀdil Imām against nouveaux riches, police, power 
and government. Many would therefore see his films as dealing with contemporary socio-
political issues in a bold and confrontational way. But while, in one way or another, most of 
his films are anti-establishment, making fun of government officials and the system as a 
whole, he is increasingly being perceived as one of the regime’s most loyal supporters. 
According to business tabloids he can pick up the phone and dial up the interior minister 
(Stephen Negus, 1997). But even though he has become a part of the same establishment as 
many of his films make fun of, or bitāʿ al-ḥukūma (belonging to the regime) as it would be 
termed locally, it doesn’t seem that his popularity with audiences has suffered any harm. 
Although he has had his downs, he remains, at an age of seventy years, the best- paid actor 
in Egypt. A question many ask themselves is, therefore, how he has managed to remain the 
most beloved star of the people for thirty years while at the same time managing to please 
the regime. How can this be possible? How is he balancing the scales? What are the 
ideological messages he is projecting that apparently make both people and regime feel 
good about his social criticism? Are there changes or developments in his approach and, if 
so, to what factors can these changes be ascribed? Can his films be read as counter-
hegemonic – an impression they indeed sometimes give – or do they, as might be expected 
from a popular culture industry in an undemocratic environment, rather operate as 
mediators of dominant national, cultural and political discourses, and if so, what are these 
discourses? The question is therefore to what extent do the films of ʿĀdil Imām disseminate 
dominant cultural values and ideology or, more specifically, support the current regime? 
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Thesis 
 
In order to answer the above questions, I will examine the ideological messages that are 
conveyed through both ʿĀdil Imām as a star and his films. In order to highlight the close 
connection between politics and art in Egypt I will do a contextual reading of different 
aspects of his films, as well as discuss relevant extra-textual aspects of ʿĀdil Imām’s persona, 
in order to place them in their proper socio-political framework and see what kind of 
representation of contemporary Egypt and its predicament these films project. 
My hypothesis is that his films can be read as an attempt to renegotiate a national 
consensus, to find common ground in an era when it could seem that former ideologies like 
Nasserism and Arab socialism are being replaced by structural adjustment, and in which 
Islamism and globalisation have become serious competitors to developmental modernism. 
By analysing his films from the early 1990s to the present, I will attempt to show that, in 
most of them, he points out deviations from the system, that he draws up lines against 
internal and external others and that, by situating himself between these various 
deviations, he points out a ‘middle road’ based on enlightened but conservative values. I 
further hold that he presents himself as a voice of both reason and patriotism and that, by 
recollecting the scattered pieces of a fragmented nation, pointing out its ‘rotten’ pieces and 
calling on their reform, he projects a picture in which, after all, social harmony can be 
regained or maintained within the national community. 
In doing this I will show how nationalism and patriotism have remained a bridge 
over the gap between regime, common people and cultural elite, and that ʿĀdil Imām, who 
initially was perceived as a ‘subversive’ figure, from the early 1990s again has become a 
carrier of this hegemonic discourse. I will attempt to explain this as a result of the regime’s 
cultural policy and need for support by its cultural players on the one hand, while on the 
other hand I will take into consideration cinema’s own commercial interests and its need to 
make films that bring in revenues. I hope this thesis can contribute to a better 
understanding of both the relationship between politics and cinema in Egypt in particular, 
and of the important role popular cinema indeed plays in disseminating and negotiating 
political discourses generally, and especially in Egypt. Egypt’s large cinematic production is 
potentially one of the regime’s most important means of influencing the population and 
ʿĀdil Imām plays an important role within this system. 
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Sources and Approach 
 
The thesis will basically concentrate on analysing the films in which ʿĀdil Imām starred 
during the period concerned. These films (16 in total1) will be my primary sources. I will 
also support my analysis with newspaper articles, reviews and interviews from the local 
press. My thesis will be heavily based on Walter Armbrust’s notion of modernism as a main 
paradigm through which Egyptian popular culture can be viewed. Armbrust (1996, p. 7) 
claims that modernity “is the key to mediated popular culture” in Egypt. I will add to him 
Gramscian terms of ‘hegemony’ and ‘dominant culture’, taking Armbrust’s modernism as 
‘dominant culture’ while its opposite has the potential of being ‘subversive’ or challenging 
this ‘dominant culture’. Due to restricted space, I will not be able to deal with all of ʿĀdil 
Imām’s films with the same amount of detail, and I will therefore concentrate on those films 
that are most relevant to my thesis or that, due to their box-office success and popularity, 
must be taken into account. Although I know that ʿĀdil Imam’s fame probably rests equally 
much on his plays as on his films,2 I have decided to basically leave his plays out of this 
study. The plays are initially seen by a much narrower audience – his later plays also seem 
to adhere to a largely non-Egyptian Arab audience – and it is only after they have been 
taken off the stage and released on video or shown on television that they become known to 
the general public. I will therefore concentrate on the films and only take the plays into 
consideration as an extra-textual aspect when the need arises. 
In analysing the films in question I will consider them as ‘texts’ and therefore look at 
the normal literary aspects such as plot, character and narrated space and time. I will also 
look at symbols and metaphors and try to relate the messages to, and explain them on the 
background of, their socio-political contexts. The focus will be on what main messages can 
be extracted from these films and how these messages relate to the regime’s policy and 
interests on the one hand and the way modernism is reflected in them on the other. The 
intertextual aspect of my analysis will be a comparative work concentrating on how these 
films relate to each other and, more especially, to other ʿĀdil Imām films that precede our 
period of study. This will enable me to detect ruptures, changes and continuations in 
relation to his older films. My goal will be to attempt to extract a coherent structure in 
these films’ ideological outlook and political criticism, and see how this relates to that of the 
regime and the elite. 
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Contexts 
 
General 
 
Cinema is a powerful tool of cultural production. Moreover, Egypt is the only Arab country 
that has a cinema industry in the true sense of the word. It is therefore likely that, 
specifically in Egypt, cinema plays an important role in shaping identity and disseminating 
ideologies. Benedict Anderson (1983) stressed the centrality of the role of the 
‘communicative space’, and especially the role of the novel, in the process of nation 
formation. Eric Hobsbawm (1990) adds to this argument that communication functions not 
only in the creation of a nation, but also in maintaining it (Lina Khatib, 2006, p. 167). Ella 
Shohat and Robert Stam (1994, p. 103) claim that “cinema partly inherited the function of 
the novel” noted by Anderson. “The Cinema’s institutional ritual of gathering a community 
– spectators who share a region, language and culture – homologizes, in a sense, the 
symbolic gathering of the nation” (ibid). While a novel is consumed in solitude, a film is 
enjoyed collectively. Cinema can therefore “play a more assertive role in fostering group 
identities” (ibid). Moreover, “cinema is not premised by literacy” (ibid) (an important point 
in Egypt with its small reading public) and is therefore, as a popular entertainment, more 
accessible than literature (ibid). In this sense, cinema becomes a space for the creation, 
maintenance and re-envisioning of a nation or the ‘imagined community’. 
 
Popular culture 
 
Having established cinema’s potential role in shaping the collective imagination and in 
disseminating ideologies, a much-debated question is whether popular or mass culture – of 
which these films are definitely part – is inherently conservative, or whether it can be 
subversive as well. In their 1943 essay The Cultural Industry Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer argue that, by its very nature, popular culture consolidates hegemony. They 
see popular culture as an industry producing “safe, standardised products geared to the 
larger demands of the capitalist economy” (Simon During, 1993, p. 29), and they would 
probably have denounced these films as ‘bread and circus’ – cultural goods to manipulate 
the masses into passivity. Joanne Hollows for her part claims that “popular culture should 
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not be seen simply as either the means by which dominant groups impose their ideas on 
subordinate groups, or the way in which subordinate groups resist domination” (Hollows, 
2000, p. 27, cited from Viola Shafik, 2007, p. 3). Building on the thoughts of Stuart Hall she 
instead defines popular culture as “a site of struggle, a place where conflicts between 
dominant and subordinate groups are played out, and distinctions between the cultures of 
these groups are continually constructed and reconstructed” (ibid). 
There is thus always a political dimension to popular culture. While popular culture 
can be a way for, in our case, the state or the elite to impose their world view on the masses, 
forms of popular culture – in our case the films of ʿĀdil Imām – must necessarily also 
respond to the widespread needs of the public and, in order to be ‘popular’, cannot be 
completely unauthentic. In my analysis of ʿĀdil Imām’s films, and in order to form an 
opinion of the extent to which his films reinforce ‘hegemony’ or whether, at times, they 
also resist domination (i.e. to what extent he is an artist of the government (fannān al-
ḥukūma) or an artist of the people (fannān al-shaʿb)), I will keep this perspective of his films 
being a site of ‘struggle’ or ‘negotiation’ in mind. But even though his films are a site of 
‘negotiation’ and do include subversive messages or jabs in the side of the regime, I will 
concentrate on the structure of his films’ social and political criticism. Meaning is naturally 
communicated not only through a narrative’s bits and parts, but also through the structure 
as a whole. If these films do have a dominant structure that represents hegemony, the 
subversive bits and parts of them would naturally be isolated and lost in the general 
structure. 
 
Modernism as dominant ideology 
 
According to Walter Armbrust (1996) the central ideology underlying all mass-mediated 
popular culture in Egypt is that of a particular notion of Egyptian modernism. This 
modernism is understood to consist of selected elements of Egyptian cultural heritage 
(turāth) and western cultural and technological influences, held together socially by an 
imagined alliance between the enlightened, reformist middle class and the uneducated, but 
decent, ‘common man’ (ibn al-balad3). Progress through modern schooling is the 
intermediary connecting the two. Egyptian modernism is thus a juxtaposition of western 
technique/high art with Egyptian characters and an element of progress, synthesising the 
elements into a new middle-class identity. Modernism in Egyptian cinema is in many ways a 
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‘patterned narrative’ – a kind of myth known throughout the culture and presented in 
many versions by many tellers (John G. Cawelti, 1979, cited from Armbrust, 1995, p. 82), a 
common language for both commercial and art productions (Armbrust, 1995, p. 83) and a 
cultural framework in which these films carry meaning. Protagonists are rooted in 
positively evaluated tradition and morality and transformed by modern institutions. Using 
Gramscian terms here, we could call Armbrust’s definition of ‘Egyptian modernism’ as a 
‘dominant ideology’: a ‘cultural hegemony’ where power is upheld by consent rather than 
by force and where popular culture is seen as a site of conflict between hegemonic forces of 
incorporation and resistance of subordinate groups. Antonio Gramsci’s argument is that 
“the system’s real strength does not lie in the violence of the ruling class or the coercive 
power of its state apparatus, but in the acceptance of the ruled of a ‘conception of the 
world’ [Weltanschauung] which belongs to the rulers” (Fiori 1970, p. 238). The rulers’ or the 
ruling class’s philosophy or worldview “passes through a whole tissue of complex 
vulgarizations to emerge as ‘common sense’ (ibid). The ‘philosophy of the ruling class’ is 
internalised by the majority and becomes the ‘philosophy of the masses’, who accordingly 
“accept the morality, the customs, the institutional rules of behaviour of the society they 
live in” (ibid). As cinema in Egypt started in the early 1930s, a period of emerging Egyptian 
nationalism, and since the group behind this nationalism was the educated elite, it was only 
natural that modernism, as Armbrust claims (2002b, p.221), was to be the dominant 
narrative of Egyptian cinema from its beginnings until the 1970s. The ‘common sense’ was 
the identity of the bourgeoisie, and it was promoted through modernism. Modernism, the 
‘imagined alliance’ between the educated reform oriented elite and the common man, is an 
alliance suited to uphold existing power structures. It claims to speak on behalf of the 
‘common man’, the ‘ibn al-balad’ shall be polished and elevated in order to become the focal 
point of identity, and this shall take place under the modernising elite’s leadership. 
Moreover the ideology legitimises the ruling classes by rooting the western educated elite 
in Egyptian values. 
But the early 1970s witnessed the breakdown of this modernism as the meta-
narrative of national identity in Egyptian cinema. There was what could be called a change 
of paradigm, a switch from a modernist meta-narrative to one which could be called anti-
modernist. Although there is no clean dividing line and modernism continued to thrive in 
official state media, it faded away in commercialised media, where individuals are free to 
choose what to consume (ibid, p. 240). ‘Dominant ideology’ was being questioned and cracks 
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appeared in the ‘cultural hegemony’. Several reasons for this change of paradigm may be 
pointed out. 
Most commonly cited is the devastating blow that Egypt had received in the 1967 
Arab-Israeli war, the importance on the cultural scene of which cannot be underestimated. 
This defeat shattered trust in the regime and its ideology and caused many to question the 
old cultural formulas (Armbrust, 2002b, p. 240). Even though Egypt managed – as its own 
state propaganda puts it – to ‘restore national prestige’ in the October War in 1973, new 
shocks were to follow. Regional power shifted away from Egypt towards the oil-producing 
countries and al-Sādāt’s ‘open door’ (al-infitāḥ) policy was seen by many as an economic 
surrender to the west, not to speak of the social turbulence it caused. While “before 1967 
Egypt, in its own estimation and in the opinion of many outsiders, seemed to have been on 
an inexorable path to modernity; after 1973 the pace of change has, if anything, accelerated, 
and yet it had become more difficult to discern a unifying logic beneath the 
transformation” (Armbrust, 1996, p. 7). In addition to all these ‘sour pills’ came the peace 
negotiations with Israel and Egypt’s banishment from the Arab League. 
The era of al-Sādāt also saw contradictory cultural policies. On the one hand there 
was a gradual democratisation of the cultural field. Advance-censorship on the press was 
lifted in 1974 and that on books in 1977 (Richard Jacquemond, 2008, p. 22). In the wake of 
the 1970s the regime also reinstated the right of independent contractors to produce in the 
film, theatre and music industries (ibid, p. 42). The period also saw the emergence of new 
technology that made centralised control of media more difficult (Armbrust, 2002b, p. 240). 
The state was building down the cultural institutions of the Nasserist regime, breaking with 
ʿAbd al-Nāṣir’s nationalist ideology and replacing the previous drive towards modernism 
with a kind conservatism which may be summarised as ‘village morality’ (akhlāq al-qarya) 
that al-Sādāt used to praise. These new policies gradually led to a ‘divorce’ between the 
cultural elite and the state, which can be considered completed with al-Sādāt’s journey to 
Jerusalem in 1977, which sealed the break between the authorities and the bulk of the 
intelligentsia (Jacquemond, 2008, p. 24). Gramsci’s theory states that ‘hegemony’ consists of 
‘domination’ plus intellectual and moral direction (Fiori, 1970, p. 243). Direct political 
dominance or power is only the ‘front-line trench’; the ‘fortress’ being cultural dominance 
(ibid, p. 245). While ʿAbd al-Nāṣir in his drive towards modernity had both ‘dominated’ 
(exercised power) and ‘ruled’ (exercised intellectual and moral direction), it could be said 
that al-Sādāt lost the moral leadership and increasingly had to rely on ‘domination’. The 
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break between state and intelligentsia, which under ʿAbd al-Nāṣir had been united in a drive 
to uniformity imposed by nationalist ideology, led to the re-emergence of the conflict 
between ‘high culture’ and ‘vulgar art’ (Jacquemond, p. 42), and this emergence of ‘vulgar 
art’ or ‘anti-modernism’ was especially to be felt in mass-mediated cultural products such as 
music and cinema. In the music industry there was a gradual shift symbolised by the rise of 
urban working-class shaʿbī-singers like Aḥmad ʿAdawiyya and the death and retirement of 
the old stars of the Nasserist period; in the film industry films appeared which Armbrust 
(2002b, p. 240) describes as centrifugal: films in which Egypt is torn apart. ʿĀdil Imām was a 
key player in this kind of cinema (Armbrust, 1998, p. 296). After the 1970s the modernist 
hero has been either beleaguered or humiliated. These new films were a negation of the old 
middle-class ideal. As the regime abandoned modernism (the philosophy of the ruling class) 
and substituted it with conservative ‘village morality’ the intellectuals were left in limbo. 
The new ‘anti-modernist’ films therefore didn’t construct any alternative ideology. They 
only described the void left lamenting what was gone. The vacuum that emerged was 
culturally filled by Islamism, an ideology that gradually was emerging as a new 
‘Weltanschauung’ penetrating the minds of the governed. 
In the early 1990s, as Armbrust points out, “some Egyptian films began to revisit the 
sort of modernist narrative common before the 1970s,” and ʿĀdil Imām was again “a 
conspicuous part of this movement” (Armbrust, 2002b, p.241). He points out that ʿĀdil Imām 
was by now again projecting a picture of social harmony (Armbrust, 1998), and therefore, as 
I see it, has transformed himself into a proponent of ‘dominant ideology’. Simultaneously 
the low opinion that the ‘official’ cultural elite, the carriers of that ‘dominant culture’, held 
of ʿĀdil Imām changed, but Armbrust claims that this change may have been only 
temporary (Armbrust, 2002b, p. 241). One of my secondary aims in this thesis will therefore 
be to show that modernism and patriotism not only temporarily, but permanently, have 
returned and become a main trait in the films of ʿĀdil Imām. 
 
Stars 
 
As opposed to most film scholars, commercial film audiences view films through their 
actors or stars and not through their directors. This is also the case in Egypt, where films 
are recognised by the names of the star performers involved and where locating a film in a 
video store is achieved by searching for its lead player and not by the name of the director 
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(Shafik, 2001, p. 711). With a few exceptions, notably the late Yūsuf Shāhīn, who have 
become celebrities in their own right, in Egypt directors are unknown to the general public. 
It was Richard Dyer’s Stars (1979) that laid the groundwork for star analysis within 
film studies. While previous studies had largely remained within the domain of fandom 
focusing on personal biographies, or taking a sociological approach focusing on stars as 
industrial marketing devices, Dyer in his approach combined semiotics and sociology, 
introducing the notion of the ‘star text’. His approach is to analyse stars as an intertextual 
construct producing meaning over a range of media (Christine Gledhill, 1991, intr.: xiv). 
Stars are ‘texts’ that demand analysis in their own right. So while it is true that stars are 
products of mass culture and an industrial marketing device, they are also social signs, 
carrying cultural meanings and ideological values (ibid, intr.: xiiii). Viewed from this 
perspective, stars become an issue in the circulation and negotiation of meaning. 
In Egypt stars have become an integral part of public life. Their names and products 
feature in magazines and newspapers, postcards and posters are sold by street vendors, and 
huge posters advertising the latest CD or film decorate the cityscape. Film stars are also 
constantly being re-circulated in other media: they do advertising, feature in TV interviews 
and take part in talk shows; several of them also periodically host talk shows in Egyptian 
and other Arab, especially Gulf, TV stations. Thus stars also tend to become a part of daily 
life’s public and private gossip, and many Egyptians and Arabs possess an almost 
encyclopaedic knowledge of their stars’ real and imagined lives. Stars are talked about and 
discussed, and everybody has an opinion about them. 
Stars tend to personalise social meaning and ideologies (ibid, intr.: xiv). They are 
markers of identity. In Nagīb Maḥfūẓ’s novels people eagerly discuss the singers 
Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and Umm Kulthūm. In doing so they positioned themselves in 
the ideological completion at the time, between traditional values personalised in Umm 
Kulthūm and modernism represented by ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. 
Personalising social meaning and ideology as they do, stars are also likely to become 
symbolic agents of a people’s imagined community (Shafik, 2001, p 712), thus operating as 
mediators of prevalent cultural discourses. If this is so, stars can be valuable assets in a 
state’s project of self-representation and in shaping and educating its community. This 
importance of cinema and stars has not escaped the varying regimes in Egypt. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm 
Ḥāfiẓ in particular came to embody the youthfulness and modernity of Nasserist ideology, 
while Umm Kulthūm, with her more traditional approach and pan-Arabic appeal, toured 
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the Arab world holding solidarity concerts to collect donations for the state after the 1967 
defeat; and there are many indications that ʿĀdil Imām has been accorded a similar role in 
Egypt today. Given these varied roles acquired by stars, it becomes interesting to question 
exactly which ideological messages and cultural concepts different stars stand for. 
From a very early stage Egyptian films not only served the national market, but the 
country’s stars also attracted audiences all over the Arab world, projecting images of Egypt, 
its ideology and identity. Egyptian stars are therefore not only symbolic agents of the 
Egyptians’ ‘imagined community’; they have just as much relevance for non-Egyptian Arab 
audiences – periphery and centre in the Arab World are bound together through mainly 
Egyptian stars. It is a commonly held truism that Umm Kulthūm is the only thing Arabs can 
agree upon. Similarly, ʿĀdil Imām’s films are just as popular in other Arab countries as they 
are in Egypt, and his later plays (as is the case with most commercial theatre in Egypt, his 
plays are staged only in the summer season, when the city is flooded with Arab tourists) 
seem largely to appeal to a non-Egyptian audience. The presence of stars has subsequently 
remained essential in promoting both Egyptian films and Egyptian identity in Egypt, as in 
the rest of the Arab world. 
Egyptian film-stars are commonly categorised in a pyramidal structure, divided into 
three categories based on wages and the actor’s role in the narrative (Shafik, 2001, p. 714). 
For the last twenty years, the very top of this structure has been occupied by ʿĀdil Imām. 
Stars of this top category have a great potential influence on film production itself. Part of 
this influence derives from their control over the script. The star has to agree to the script 
before the fund-raising process4 can start, and many stars often make a point out of how 
many scripts they have refused (Shafik, 2001, p. 714). ʿĀdil Imām claims that “An actor’s 
most important quality is to be able to say no when producers offer you large amounts of 
money to make you accept a role” (Hāla Sarḥān, 2006). If a star accepts the screenplay, he 
will still often have the power to impose himself and his character on the script. ʿAlī Idrīs, 
the director of several of ʿĀdil Imām’s recent films, admits that even though they had 
agreed upon everything before starting to film Morgan Ahmed Morgan (2007), several 
disagreements about the way certain scenes were to be filmed occurred; but he explains 
that, after seeing the final version, he had to admit that ʿĀdil Imām was right (Mishēl Nabīl, 
2007).5 Stars in the top category also occasionally request scripts from scriptwriters, as was 
the case with, for example, Bakhit and Adila II (1997), which, according to ʿĀdil Imām, was 
written at his request (ʿAlī, 1997). ῾Ādil Imām also plays an active role in choosing his co-
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stars and actors for the secondary roles,6 and he is also known to include new and 
secondary comedians in his films. 
 Therefore not only the popular audiences’ inclination to see films through their 
stars, and stars’ importance in disseminating meaning and ideology, but also the 
importance of the stars and their influence on the production itself, legitimise making a 
star like ʿĀdil Imām the focal point of this study and in consequence considering the films as 
an expressions of his, rather than just the director’s or scriptwriter’s, outlook. 
 
Censorship and limitations to the sayable 
 
Looking at film in an ‘unfree society’, as Egypt is in many ways, a few words need to be said 
about censorship. There are, of course, limits to the sayable. But these limits have been 
shifting, and the system has become increasingly unpredictable, especially as a result of the 
fragmentation of the censorship system and the various players claiming the right to 
censor. Generally speaking, censorship in Egypt is organised around a sort of ‘law of 
decreasing freedom’, which states that the greater the audience that can be reached by the 
means of distribution chosen, the greater the censorship (Jacquemond, 2008, p. 39).7 
The need for censorship is generally agreed upon in Egypt, and those demanding its 
complete abolition are few (ibid). The question is rather who should have the right to 
censor. There are several players in the field. The official censorship authorities, 
representing the state, are above all concerned with holding direct political criticism at bay 
and controlling the image of Egypt that reaches the outside world. But here they are often 
joined by oversensitive and nationalistically minded intellectuals (ibid, p. 40) who not only 
agree upon the censoring of artistic productions, but who often even pressure the 
authorities to censor productions. This is certainly the case with many products of popular 
culture where, as has been pointed out, for several reasons the conflict between ‘high’ and 
‘vulgar’ culture resurfaced in the 1970s. In addition to the state and the cultural elite there 
are other players eager to impose their right to censor. These independent players, 
journalists, lawyers, MPs, independent ʿulamā’ but also parents, often with a conservative 
leaning, have led to the growing unpredictability of the system. These independent players 
are collectively referred to as ‘street censorship’. 
Moreover, as Egyptian films are being marketed throughout the Arab world, 
producers’ fear of losing profits, or of being unable to distribute their products in other 
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Arab countries, is an additional factor that sets limitations to the sayable.  But it is not only 
the Gulf area, an increasingly important market for Egyptian films, which is conservatively 
inclined; Egyptian audiences are also perceived as being increasingly conservative. Purely 
commercial interests are therefore just as important as direct censorship in shaping the 
limits of what can be said, and how. These different variants of censorship and self-
censorship are therefore important aspects that need to be taken into account when 
considering the films’ role in ‘shaping the community’. 
 
Pre 1990s ʿĀdil Imām biography 
 
As has been explained, the stars in commercial cinema are, in themselves ‘texts.’ These 
texts are gradually being built up through the audiences’ association of the star with his 
previous roles and gossip about his real or imagined life. In his analysis of the star-saturated 
Egyptian classic Candy Floss [Ghazal al-Banāt]8 (1949) Armbrust (2000) shows how each actor 
played on his/her established star persona and previous private and professional 
relationships with each other, to the extent that some even acted themselves. According to 
Armbrust, the film was ‘intensely reflexive’; it was really not about anything but itself. The 
casting of a particular star, bringing this star’s ‘luggage’ into a film, is in itself an 
intertextual act that is appreciated by the audiences. This intertextual appreciation of the 
star, and the self-referenciality of Egyptian films, is naturally one of the first aspects lost to 
a foreign audience. To facilitate a better understanding of ῾Ādil Imām’s character and of his 
films from the 1990s to the present, I will start with a survey of some of his defining roles 
preceding the period of study – especially the characters of Disūqī Affandī, Bahgat al-Abāṣīrī 
and Ragab – and relate them to the paradigm of modernism and anti-modernism. In the 
following main analysis of his films from the 1990s to date, I will, at several junctions, refer 
back to these characters insofar as this serves my analysis. 
 
Disūqī Affandī – a lone voice protesting against modernism 
 
The first role to bring ʿĀdil Imām to public notice was in the play Me, Him and Her [ana wa-
huwwa wa-hiyya] (1963), a vehicle for comedian Fuʾād al-Muhandis and his wife Shuwaykār, 
the most successful comedy-duo of the day. ʿĀdil Imām played the role of a minor character 
called ‘Disūqī Affandī’, a ‘simple’ uneducated man who is remembered for the line balad 
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shahadāt, ṣaḥīḥ (This is really a country for holders of certificates). Ḥilmī Sālim (1991, pp.67-
69) describes Disūqī Affandī as an ordinary citizen in search of a living, but still a citizen 
who refused to accept humiliation to attain that living. On the contrary, he had his pride, 
and was convinced that it was circumstances that were against him. In a country where 
only school certificates count, and where nobody cares about actual abilities, he fought to 
prove that he was just as able as ‘those with certificates’. 
The role earned ʿĀdil Imām a reputation, and when the play was shown on television 
the following year it became famous all over Egypt. Disūqī Affandī’s lone protest over being 
left out, in a country which only cares about certificates, sums up the whole middle-
class/clerk bias and exaggerated modernist ideology of Gamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir’s policy of 
nationalisation. With Disūqī Affandī, ʿĀdil Imām had established himself as a character actor 
in Egypt and he started to get minor roles in films. 
 
The School of Troublemakers and the change of paradigm 
 
But his real breakthrough was the play The School of Troublemakers [Madrasat al-mushāghibīn], 
which ran from 1971 to 1974, a play that was to become symbolic of the change of paradigm 
from a modernist narrative to its opposite. 
The play revolves around a female teacher’s efforts at the School of Noble Morals 
(madrasat al-akhlāq al-ḥamīda) to tame a number of wild, undisciplined students. But 
primarily she has to come to terms with the students’ ringleader (al-zaʿīm) Bahgat al-Abāṣīrī, 
played by ʿĀdil Imām. In the end she manages to convince them of the value of education, 
Bahgat loses his self-confidence, asking: “Am I a fake leader (zaʿīm awanṭa) or what?”, and 
she succeeds in transforming them into useful citizens. The play thus still paid lip service to 
modernist concepts, although as a play the actors (ʿĀdil Imām, Aḥmad Zakī, Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ and 
Yūnis Shalabī) hijacked the script, turning a 90-page script into a four-hour-long play 
mocking key modernisation institutions like the education system in a way bordering on 
contempt and even making jokes about the recently deceased ʿAbd al-Nāṣir and the free 
market economic policies of al-Sādāt (Armbrust, 2002b, pp. 229-30). The play expressed the 
alienation felt by the younger generation after having lost faith in the future. These 
students broke the silence and rebelled (Muḥammad al-Rifāʿī, 1988). 
 The critics hated the play and most reviewers ignored ʿĀdil Imām and concentrated 
instead on praising the schoolteacher’s efforts to civilise the boys (Armbrust, 2002, p. 230). 
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Even ʿAlī Sālim, the writer of the play, refused to have anything to do with it and accused 
the actors of having destroyed his script. “This was a beautiful play but the actors destroyed 
it. For three months it was played in the proper way but then the actors started to add by 
themselves as they saw fit” (ʿAlī Sālim, cited from ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Sibāʿī, 1997, p. 40). 
This play was definitely subversive. It draws its popular appeal precisely from its 
expression of disrespect for the imposed lessons of educated taste. It clashed with dominant 
concepts of ‘good taste’ and a certain elitism prevalent amongst a cultural elite who felt 
that its hegemonic position was under threat and thus “led to interventions from every 
kind of intellectual, in which criticism of ‘vulgar art’ was accompanied by calls for its 
censorship vigilance or severity” (Jacquemond, 2008, p. 42). The play is an example of how, 
at certain moments, popular forms of culture can function as anti-cultures. The play has 
since come to stand for everything that is wrong in Egypt. The famous ‘cassette-preacher’ of 
the 1970s, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Kishk, is known to have lamented the state of the nation by saying: 
“We have been waiting a just imām (imām ʿādil), but what we got was ʿĀdil Imām.” The play 
has been accused both of destroying the Egyptian education system – especially since pupils 
took expressions, notably those of Bahgat al-Abāṣīrī, picked up from the play into their 
classrooms – and corrupting Egyptian youth generally (al-Rifāʿī, 1988). Some, like Aḥmad al-
Sanhūrī (2008), even go as far as to claim that the whole play is a Jewish conspiracy to break 
down the Egyptian social fabric. Allegedly, the play was for many years denied TV 
screening. But interestingly – because of its huge popularity – it has become a symbol for a 
whole generation and, because it is so rarely shown on television, the regime seems to have 
screened the play in times of crisis. During the 1977 bread riots the play was shown on state 
television in an attempt to distract the people’s attention (Muḥammad al-Bāz, 2005). 
Recalling the riots, the novelist Maḥmūd al-Wardīnī writes that he “had slept through most 
of the day and that it was only when he turned on the TV at night and found an 
unscheduled broadcast of a popular play starring ʿĀdil Imām that he felt something was 
wrong” (al-Wardīnī, 2007). The regime knew that Egyptians would watch the play, and that 
was what happened (al-Bāz, 2005). Here the subversive play became a traditional ‘bread and 
circus’ play, used as a tool by the regime to reinforce hegemony. 
This play not only established ʿĀdil Imām’s reputation but it also foreshadowed the 
character he was going to develop in the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, a character built 
on absurdism with a strong dose of nihilism and cynicism (Armbrust, 1998, pp. 289 and 299: 
footnote 11) or fahlawa (cleverness). From then on ʿĀdil Imām was the rebel. The play was 
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also the starting point of the career of all four actors, whose future screen personalities to a 
large degree was to build on the roles they had acted in the play, thus accounting not only 
for ‘a change of paradigm’ but also a generational shift in the Egyptian comedy scene. 
 
The Ragab Trilogy and centrifugal cinema 
 
ʿĀdil Imām got his first lead role in cinema in Looking for Trouble [al-Baḥth ʿan al-Faḍīḥa] in 
1973 and has played the lead actor in his films ever since, most of which, if not all, took the 
‘anti-modernist’ message of School of Troublemakers further. “When the catastrophe of 1967 
struck, it was only natural that figures that expressed the special circumstances of loss and 
fragmentation should emerge,” and “ʿĀdil Imām was the artist that came to express this 
new reality” (Sālim, 1991, p. 63). The 1970s were the era of the infitāḥ, which, according to 
Sālim, was “an earthquake that turned the social pyramid in Egypt upside down” (ibid, p. 
87). He claims that the era saw a new kind of character emerging, a character that Egypt 
had not known before:  the millionaire who starts from zero and in a few years earns 
millions; and that it was this era that produced Ragab (ibid, p. 86). It was the Ragab trilogy 
(Ragab on a Hot Tin Roof [Ragab fawq Ṣafīḥ Sākhin] (1979), Shaaban below Zero [Shaʿbān taḥt al-
Ṣifr] (1980) and Ramadan on the Volcano [Ramaḍān fawq al-Burkān] (1985))9 that finally 
established ʿĀdil Imām’s subversive character as the cynical fahlawī, and it was Ragab that 
made ʿĀdil Imām top actor at the box office in Egypt. The film remained running for 33 
weeks (Armbrust, 2002b, p. 237). Ragab, the ignorant and naive fallāḥ, arrives at Cairo 
Central Station with a bag full of money. His fellow villagers have entrusted him with their 
money so that he can buy a new tractor for his village in Cairo. At the train station Ragab is 
entrapped by the clever fahlawī Bulbul (Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ), who cheats him and takes his money. In 
itself this is nothing new. The naive villager whose naivety is exploited in the big city has 
long been a stock subject in Egyptian cinema. What is new is that when Ragab – who in the 
film ends up in prison – is finally released, he emulates Bulbul: he goes to the same train 
station to find another naive villager and cheat him (Sālim, 1991, p. 88). The film expressed 
the ‘zeitgeist’: in these new circumstances (the era of the infitāḥ) hard and honest work 
could no longer succeed in bringing wealth (ibid). It was the era of the quick million; the era 
of cheating and cleverness. Cleverness (fahlawa) was the new and only valuable qualification 
(ibid, p. 89). 
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Armbrust (1996 and 2002b) analyses the Ragab trilogy and compares the films with 
the modernist/nationalist productions of earlier periods. Comparing Shaaban Below Zero 
with the classic film If I Were Rich [law kunt ghanī] (1942), of which Shaaban Below Zero was a 
remake, Armbrust observes that something had definitely changed. He explains that “The 
difference is that these new films were anti-modernist – they no longer assume a 
transformation of the simple ibn al-balad into a modern man. Unlike the critics, these films 
do not blame lower-class victims for falling into immorality due to their ignorance and 
backwardness. Ragab, Shaaban, and dozens of other films, plays, and songs produced since 
the mid-1970s are not even primarily about the immorality that critics condemn. Instead, 
they are about humiliation of the common man and the failure, corruption, or simple 
nonexistence of modernist institutions that are supposed to prevent it” (Armbrust, 1996, p. 
217). From now on variations of Ragab were recurrent themes in ʿĀdil Imām’s films. From 
now on ʿĀdil Imām’s characters fight off the unfair circumstances that stand in their way 
and exploit their cleverness (fahlawa) to become rich (Sālim, 1991, p. 69). Sometimes they 
succeed, but often they are outwitted by even more powerful crooks. The notion of fahlawa 
has ever since been an integral part of ʿĀdil Imām’s screen personality. 
The ʿĀdil Imām character that emerged at the end of the 1970s and which was 
arguably the key for his success, was a sympathetic, but in many ways naive and corruptible 
hero who falls prey to the system, but who also knows how to  be clever (fahlawī) and play 
the systems game on his own premises. In attempting to show the whole range of society’s 
immoral survival strategies, from petty theft to high-level fraud, ʿĀdil Imām frequently 
dismissed the whole system as corrupt and inefficient (Shafik, 2007, p. 306).  But on his way 
towards corruption he always retains some sympathetic feature - his ibn al-balad behaviour 
(ibid, p. 305) he is loyal, generous and honest towards those who deserve it – family and 
friends – and audiences sympathise with him. He exploits his cleverness (fahlawa) to achieve 
what is rightfully his, but what circumstances prevent him (and maybe also the audience) 
achieving through honourable means. 
ʿĀdil Imām’s lower-class approach and alleged vulgarity in the late 1970s and early 
1980s not only clashed with the elitism of the cultural gatekeepers – in this period ʿĀdil 
Imām became the vulgarian every intellectual loved to hate – but also with a new 
conservative trend that arose in a kind of reaction to the morally liberal 1970s, and that 
made itself felt with increasing demands for morality on screen. Several of his films in this 
period were attacked by conservative and nationalistically inclined third parties, i.e. street-
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censorship. In 1983 a furious press campaign against ʿĀdil Imām’s film Gate Five [Khamsa 
Bāb]10 forced the Ministry of Culture to withdraw the film’s licence and prohibit further 
screening. The pretext was that the film was so sleazy that it had damaged ‘Egypt’s 
reputation’. ‘Egypt’s reputation had at the time become a ‘catchword’ and an ‘excuse’ to 
condemn and censor anything that was deemed either too sleazy or vulgar, or which simply 
did not conform with dominant concepts of ‘good taste’; but also to cover up any kind of 
embarrassing issues that might have presented Egypt in an unfavourable light. That the 
accusation of damaging ‘Egypt’s reputation’ was so commonly directed towards ʿĀdil Imām11 
by both intellectuals and conservatives confirms ʿĀdil Imām’s subversive character at the 
time. While it seems that ʿĀdil Imām’s films ran into trouble with the cultural elite because 
of their ‘vulgarity’, and with conservatives because of their sleaziness, it also seems that his 
films have only rarely been censored for purely political reasons.12 
 
Action hero and underclass desperado 
 
During the 1980s the additional element of action was added to ʿĀdil Imām’s repertory. In 
1981 Samīr Sayf directed The Suspect for ʿĀdil Imām. This marked the beginning of a fruitful 
collaboration through which ʿĀdil Imām gradually turned to action and gangster films. He 
became a kind of lower-class desperado fighting other crooks but often being outwitted by 
even more powerful and professional gangsters. The position of the ‘tough guy’ in Egyptian 
cinema that had been held by Farīd Shawqī during the 1960s and 1970s was completely 
taken over by ʿĀdil Imām in the 1980s (Shafik, 2007, p. 305). 
In the 1980s ʿĀdil Imām became the ‘lawyer’ of the poor, the tough guy who gave the 
rich a beating (al-Bāz, 2005). Al-Bāz mentions the film The Ghoul from 1983 as an example. In 
this film ʿĀdil Imām, having despaired of the law for not helping him to obtain his rights, 
takes the law into his own hands and kills the corrupt businessman. ʿĀdil Imām becomes the 
avenger who turns the poor people’s impotence into strength on screen. ʿĀdil Imām was a 
‘healing balsam for the weak’. “He was their beloved hero who on their behalf did all they 
dreamt of but were unable to do. He calmed them down and made reality easier to accept” 
(ibid). Bilāl Faḍl remembers how, as a youth, he used to watch ʿĀdil Imām and identify with 
the protagonist by laughing, and with the rest of the audience, students, workers, artisans 
and clerks, cheering every time one of the evil guys was given a hammering by ʿĀdil Imām’s 
puny fists (Faḍl, 1996). The transformation into an action-hero helped ʿĀdil Imām gradually 
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to transform his subversive figure into a less ambiguous, and more potent, hero (Shafik, 
2007, p. 305), until finally, in the late 1980s, he emerged as the unambiguous ‘good hero’. In 
The Leopard and the Woman [al-Nimr wa-l-Unthā] in 1987 he had the role of an undercover 
policeman and in Shams al-Zinati [Shams al-Zinātī] in 1991 he played a fictive national hero 
(ibid, p.307). 
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Main Section: the post-1990 films 
 
The consciousness of the nation 
 
Although the intellectual elite despised his alleged vulgarism and criticised him for his 
lower-class approach, by gradually converting his character into a more unambiguous ‘good 
hero’, from the end of the 1980s ʿĀdil Imām started to act in films that were perceived as 
socially and politically conscious, thus ingratiating himself with the cultural and political 
establishment. Seemingly without losing his grip on his audiences, he gradually emerged as 
the hero of the secular state (Armbrust, 1998, p. 296). This media transformation started in 
1991 with Playing with the Grownups13. “This film was received by the critics unlike anything 
else ʿĀdil Imām had appeared in during the previous twenty years” (Armbrust, 1998, p. 296). 
This film, together with the following ones, Terrorism and Barbecue (1992), The Forgotten One 
(1993) and Sleeping in Honey14 (1996), was no longer ‘centrifugal’ and could therefore account 
for another ‘change of paradigm’ on behalf of ʿĀdil Imām back to pre-1970s hegemonic 
discourse of modernism. These four films – all written by the scriptwriter Waḥīd Ḥāmid15 
and directed by the young director Sharīf ʿArafa – are seen by many as a quartet dealing 
with the state of the Egyptian citizen in the 1990s. For various reasons, an additional film by 
the same artistic trio, Birds of Darkness (1995), is probably not part of this quartet.16 
In the following sections I will therefore take a closer look at these four films. I will 
show how modernism has returned and how, unlike many of ʿĀdil Imām’s films in the 1970s 
and 1980s, they display a patriotic and moral outlook. Through analysis I will attempt to 
extract the patriotic and moral discourse of these films, closing the chapter with some 
thoughts on why this type of discourse may again became relevant at this point in history. 
 
Egypt is in danger – a patriotic alliance against corruption 
 
In all four films ʿĀdil Imām is a more or less unambiguously ‘good hero’. Even though the 
character in the first film, Playing with the Grownups, is the one of the four which has 
retained most from his previous subversive persona, the film was immediately perceived as 
the beginning of a new era in ʿĀdil Imām’s career. Hishām Lāshīn, for example, writes: “For 
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years Egyptian cinema has besieged us with quantities of films of which the protagonists 
were thieves, murderers and parasites. These ‘beloved’ protagonists were also the role 
models that the producers of cinema wanted our youth to take after, and here lies the real 
catastrophe of these films. But with Playing with the Grownups the honourable protagonist, 
the patriot who loves his country and defends it in spite of all its faults, has returned” 
(Lāshīn, 1991). The film itself also includes a marker that can be read to indicate that we 
now have to do with a different ʿĀdil Imām. In a dialogue in which the officer Muʿtaṣim al-
Alfī (Ḥusayn Fahmī) asks Ḥasan Bahlūl (ʿĀdil Imām) why he is always fired from every job he 
has? al-Alfī asks: “So you are a troublemaker (mushāghib)?”, to which ʿĀdil Imām answers: 
“That was at school” (da kān ayyām il-madrasa), making us understand that Bahgat al-Abāṣīrī 
from the play The School of Troublemakers [madrasat al-mushāghibīn] has grown up and 
definitely changed. But I would claim that this piece of dialogue – which could also be just 
an intertextual joke – not only has the function of distancing his new character from the 
subversive Bahgat al-Abāṣīrī, but that it also does the opposite. It reminds the audience of 
ʿĀdil Imām’s artistic past by bringing this ‘baggage’ into the film and telling them that he is 
still the same ʿĀdil Imām, thereby giving them a hint as to exactly how they should read 
him in this film: Even though he now ‘loves his country’ and is going to defend it in spite of 
all its faults, he is still a fahlawī. 
Another trait common to these four films is that they all give the impression that 
Egypt is in some kind of danger: they seemingly call people to wake up from their slumber 
and speak out. This is probably most clearly stated in the very last scenes in Playing with the 
Grownups, where Ḥasan comes running to the telephone exchange only to find that his 
friend ʿAlī has been killed. He kneels beside his friend’s body, crying: “We are so small and 
so miserable (ghalbānīn)” before he furiously interconnects all the telephone lines to wake 
up the city. All phones in Ṭalʿat Ḥarb Square ring simultaneously and Ḥasan shouts: “ʿAlī al-
Zahhār died, he died because he was dreaming!” The screen then freezes in a final shoot-out 
in which Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī and Ḥasan stand side by side. Ḥasan screams: “I will continue to 
dream!” while the police officer continues to fire at those sent to kill them. 
Fredric Jameson sees all postcolonial narratives as allegories of the nation claiming, 
that “the telling of an individual story cannot but ultimately involve the whole laborious 
telling of the experience of the collectivity itself” (Jameson, 1986, pp. 85-86). This view has 
been criticised for being a ‘hasty totalization’, but Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (1994, p. 272) 
point out that this “allegorical tendency available for all art becomes exaggerated in the 
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case of repressive regimes, perhaps especially where intellectual filmmakers, profoundly 
shaped by nationalist discourse, feel obliged to speak for and about the nation as a whole.” 
It seems clear that the artistic trio behind these films felt such an obligation, and the 
allegorical tendency is clearly present in all four films. 
Ḥasan Bahlūl claims to ‘dream’ about future incidents threatening Egypt’s security. 
When he ‘dreams’ that a plastic factory at kilometre 38 on the Desert Road is going to burn 
down the next day at 10.30, he informs State Security (amn al-dawla). His case is dealt with 
by the enlightened officer Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī: an officer who, contrary to what is expected of 
Egyptian State Security, rejects what he calls ‘old methods’ and torture, which according to 
him have never brought results. When the factory burns down exactly at the time Ḥasan 
had claimed, the officer has to take Ḥasan’s ‘dreams’ seriously. Together the two form a 
team: the ‘wakeful eyes’ both of the people (ʿayn al-balad) and of the government (ʿayn al-
ḥukūma), the consciousness of the nation guarding the public interest, opening fire at all 
who play with Egypt’s destiny and economy. People and government hand in hand: a 
complete body, with two watchful eyes.17 Whereas the helping hand of the modernist 
institutions elevating and protecting the ‘common man’ were absent in the Ragab films, and 
the popular hero had to indulge in immorality and corruption to avoid humiliation, in 
Playing with the Grownups the ‘common man’ and the state stand together to fight immorality 
and corruption in the name of the nation. 
In Playing with the Grownups this patriotic quest of fighting evil is linked to symbols of 
national identity. While this connection was non-existent in the Ragab films, it is re-
introduced in this film. Ḥasan meets his friend ʿAlī al-Zahhār (Maḥmūd al-Gindī) – the real 
source of his ‘dreams’ – at the Sound and Light Show below the Pyramids, in front of the 
Sphinx. ʿAlī is a telephone operator working at the Cairo telephone exchange, where he taps 
phone calls. With the Pyramids in the background, Ḥasan repeats after the Sphinxes in 
classical Arabic: 
“I am the faithful guardian in the hands of my master 
Guarding him ... Close to him 
Sacrificing myself for him 
Even my face carries his features 
I am the keeper of Pharaoh. I am the Pharaoh (lifting his hand as if swearing an oath) 
People have idolised me since the dawn of history 
Although my names have differed over the ages” 
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Ḥasan is a ‘faithful guardian’ in the hands of his master. Like the Sphinx stand guard 
in front of the Pharaohs’ graves, Ḥasan is always close to, and willing to sacrifice himself 
for, his country. Through this scene his mission is connected with the ‘glorious past’ of the 
Pharaohs: he even ‘carries their features’. It is as if he is part of an unbroken chain of 
guardians to whom the covenant, the ‘eternal cause’ of the nation, has been passed on. But 
Ḥasan continues to recite, now improvising: 
“I am Ḥasan Bahnasī Bahlūl  
I am the poor in this age 
Surrounded by illusions 
I am the one who if starve, goes to sleep [hungry] 
I am deceived by words” 
If the scene is read as a national narrative, connecting Ḥasan with the Pharaohs, it here 
becomes clear that somewhere the narrative has gone astray. He shouts to his friend: “ʿAlī! I 
have been robbed!”, indicating that the glorious past is no longer there. Ḥasan ironically 
comments that “It is good that [at least] the Pyramids and the Sphinx have not been 
stolen,” and asks: “Does everything in our country have to be of stone [i.e. worthless] if it is 
not to be stolen? Even love and good will (al-rūḥ al-ḥilwa) have been stolen.” Thereafter 
Ḥasan and ʿAlī, determined to fight ‘the robbers’, walk out into the darkness with the 
Sphinx continuing to recite in the background 
“Civilisations are nothing but oases in a desert of ignorance 
Were not their builders but human beings like us, 
who made these monuments so that their names should live 
and their glory defeat everything?” 
The audience is made to understand that Ḥasan is part of a civilising quest. ‘The builders [of 
civilisation] were only human beings like us’, and if the Pharaohs ‘were only human beings 
like us’, the shortcomings must be ‘ours’. The nation is a covenant which has been passed 
down to us, and we have failed to live up to it. In the following scene Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī is 
waiting for Ḥasan in the local coffee shop (qahwa) with the voice of Umm Kulthūm singing 
in the background.18 
But State Security naturally does not believe in Ḥasan’s dreams, and is therefore 
determined to find Ḥasan’s real source of information. A scene in which Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī sits 
with Ḥasan Bahlūl, trying to convince him to reveal his real source of information, is – 
certainly not without purpose – located under the statue of Ṭalʿat Ḥarb in central Cairo. 
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Ṭalʿat Ḥarb was the founder of the Egyptian National Bank (Bank Miṣr) and is one of the key 
icons of Egyptian modernism and national economic development. Ḥasan refuses to reveal 
his source, claiming that even if it were to be revealed it would be of no legal use anyway 
(tapping telephone lines is, of course, illegal), and that “To follow the law in many cases is 
in the criminal’s interest.” He then rhetorically asks the officer: “How many corruption 
cases have failed because of mistakes in procedure?” Ḥasan thereafter attracts the attention 
of a poor street sweeper. “Tell him!” he says. He then looks up at the statue, now as though 
complaining to Ṭalʿat Ḥarb himself: “Tell him, Uncle Ṭalʿat!” He then jumps onto a 
municipal vehicle which, just as Ḥasan wants to clean Egypt of corruption, cleanses the 
streets of Cairo. Before walking away into darkness he tells the officer: “You’d better ask the 
law-makers how they can make dreams a legal asset (sanad qānūnī) acceptable in court.” 
Here the dream not only refers to the information Ḥasan ‘dreams’ and passes on to State 
Security, but also alludes to all of his class’s dreams of social justice, and ultimately to 
Egypt’s collective dream of progress: a dream which is greater and more just than the 
details of law. These scenes clearly place duty and responsibility over rights. So although 
the film is sympathetic with, and expresses the plight of, the common man, the focus is on 
encouraging him to increased loyalty. 
Through these scenes Ḥasan’s cause is linked with the long history of national 
progress. Continuity, or a chain, is established from the Pharaohs, the cradle of the Egyptian 
nation, through the modernisers of the nahḍa, represented here by Ṭalʿat Ḥarb and Umm 
Kulthūm, to Ḥasan Bahlūl and the people. In a typical fashion of Egyptian modernism 
elements of the Egyptian heritage (turāth) endow Ḥasan, the decent common man, with 
legitimacy. The police officer Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī represents the ‘educated modern man’. Thus 
with the ‘element of progress’, all elements (the imaginary alliance between the common 
man with his values and the modern educated man through heritage and progress) of 
Egyptian modernism are united. But while this kind of modernism was an implicit discourse 
underlying earlier pre-1970s films, it is explicitly stated in a bold and confrontational 
manner in Playing with the Grownups. Ḥasan Bahlūl and Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī are, in the words of 
the Sphinx, ‘nothing but oases in a desert of ignorance’. Egypt is in danger and moving in 
the wrong direction, and the modernist alliance does not take its ultimate triumph for 
granted. It is a defensive alliance intending to save what is left, blow life into a dead body 
and recoup modernism in order to put Egypt back on the right track, that of progress. 
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Who has caused Egypt to deviate from its path towards modernity and turned the 
country into a ‘desert of ignorance’ or, in Ḥasan’s words, who are the thieves that have 
robbed him and Egypt of their dream? In Playing with the Grownups their identity is not fully 
revealed, but looking at the threats that Ḥasan is reporting to State Security can provide 
some hints. The burning of the plastic factory was ordered by a large wholesale importer 
wanting to get rid of local competition, thus destroying national production and hampering 
Egypt’s industrialisation. Thereafter they avert a planned assassination of a political 
refugee: something that would have damaged Egypt’s self-perception as ‘an island of peace 
and stability’ in a turbulent region; and they arrest an Egyptian MP who arrives at Cairo 
airport with his suitcase full of heroin. In Playing with the Grownups the identity of the really 
‘big sharks’ or the grownups who are behind these threats remains undisclosed. They are 
seen only briefly in a scene following the arrest of the MP. Two of these big ‘sharks’ are 
jogging at the Gazīra Club in Zamālik. As they are only seen from behind, their identity 
remains undisclosed. They discuss the case of the arrested parliamentarian: “He really 
shouldn’t have entered parliament on the majority list. He should have been on the list of 
the Opposition, so that when trouble like this happens we could have claimed that it was a 
governmental conspiracy.” These ‘robbers’, who stole ‘the dream of Egypt’, seem to be 
within and above both regime and people. They are all those who place their personal 
interest above that of the nation and thus hamper its progress. But both among the people 
and within the regime there are also honourable and loyal people, represented here by 
Ḥasan Bahlūl and Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī. 
The identity of the ‘robbers’ is more greatly elaborated upon through Asʿad Bēh 
(Karam Muṭāwiʿ), the multimillionaire businessman and his gang in the film The Forgotten 
One. I would suggest that Asʿad Bēh represents the same category of people. Celebrating his 
birthday party at his countryside estate, he plans to sell a prominent invitee from the Gulf a 
factory. To conclude the deal he tries to force Ghāda, his secretary, to prostitute herself to 
his guest. Selling off national industries for personal profit – here even through pimping – 
or burning them down for the same reason, as in Playing with the Grownups, is morally the 
same. 
The world of the wealthy is decadent, westernised and egoistic. The foreignness of 
this class is emphasised from the very beginning of the film. When Ghāda presents her boss 
with lists of people to be invited to the birthday party, Asʿad Bēh is interrupted by a 
telephone call. He answers in fluent Italian. When they discuss the lists, Asʿad Bēh protests 
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at her suggestion of inviting some ex-ministers. According to him, “Ministers in our 
country are like matches: they only light once,” indicating that personal profit is the only 
thing that counts: once a minister is out of office he is no longer of use. The Minister of 
Religious Endowments (awqāf) is also unwelcome. Asʿad Bēh comments: “You want to invite 
the Minister of Religious Endowments to a party like ours?” Obviously the party is going to 
be a decadent affair. This becomes even clearer as Asʿad Bēh adds that Ghāda should not 
forget to invite three or four homosexuals: they ‘spice up any party’ (fakhit kull ḥafla). 
Asʿad Bēh is not only westernised, decadent and egoistic. He is also disloyal to his 
nation and has nothing but contempt for both the government and the common people. 
Not only does Asʿad Bēh plan to sell a factory to a rich businessman from the Gulf for 
personal profit, he also cares nothing for the government. Asʿad Bēh clearly expresses this 
contempt. He calls al-Mansī’s (ʿĀdil Imām) signal box a rubbish bin, and when al-Mansī 
reminds him that the signal box is government property and that calling it a rubbish bin is 
an insult to the government, he explodes, shouting: “To hell with the government!” 
Galāl Amīn (2000) writes that “the rich in The Forgotten One look upon the signal man 
with real hatred and fear.” He contrasts this with the old upper classes, as represented in 
the old films of Nagīb al-Rīḥānī. These old upper classes were confident and viewed social 
differentiation as a part of the natural order of things. They regarded the poor either with 
genuine sympathy or with complete indifference. The upper class in this film are no longer 
land-owners; their wealth is now from more dubious activities, ranging from brokering to 
pimping. Not only is the new upper class unproductive, their source of income is in itself 
unproductive and morally tarnished (Amīn, 2000, pp. 141-42). While, as we have seen, pre-
infitāḥī patriotic capitalists like Ṭalʿat Ḥarb in Playing with the Grownups were part of the 
national story of progress – they allegedly ‘cared’ for the people and the nation – these new 
‘unpatriotic’ and morally tarnished capitalists feel only contempt towards al-Mansī and call 
him and his likes gnats (hāmūsh) and worthless (halāfīt). 
This class of ‘leaches’ is contrasted with al-Mansī (in The Forgotten One) and Ḥasan (in 
Playing with the Grownups), who embody Egypt and Egyptian values. In sharp contrast to 
Asʿad Bēh’s disloyalty, al-Mansī stands steadfast at his signal box – if he were to leave his 
post the trains would collide (as Egypt would collide if the honest elements failed to remain 
steadfastly at their posts) – and he only takes up the fight with Asʿad Bēh and his gang after 
having ensured that his boss, the Minister of Transport, to whom he is loyal, is not among 
those invited. His chivalry and courage in helping Ghāda and protecting her against Asʿad 
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Bēh’s much stronger gang is contrasted with their pimping and the presence of 
homosexuals at the party. Thus these films draw up a dualism based on values. Asʿad Bēh’s 
disloyalty is contrasted with al-Mansī’s loyalty and patriotism, his greed with al-Mansī’s 
content and humbleness, his pimping with al-Mansī’s traditional ‘ibn balad’ male values. 
Al-Mansī and Ḥasan Bahlūl are both young men who are firmly rooted in Egyptian 
lower-class identity. Both live in poor, popular areas (al-ḥāra) of Cairo and both embody 
male underclass ‘ibn al-balad’ codes of honour. In that sense they are both clearly a 
continuation of ʿĀdil Imām’s 1980s underclass desperado character. In Playing with the 
Grownups Ḥasan Bahlūl’s relationship with State Security and especially people’s fear of 
them, enables him to win respect in the quarter he lives in. The owner of the local coffee 
shop where Ḥasan spends most of his days constantly asks him for the money he is due, but 
Ḥasan utilises his relationship with State Security to take revenge and harass him. Likewise, 
when his fiancée, after having quarrelled with him, comes driving into the quarter with a 
rich new man, he turns into an underclass bully defending his and his quarter’s honour. He 
calmly sits with his water-pipe in the middle of the street with his feet on the front of the 
car, before climbing onto the Mercedes and dancing on the roof, with the neighbourhood 
standing around him clapping enthusiastically. He then pulls her new fiancé out of the car 
and makes him run, to his fiancée’s delight and the neighbours’ encouraging shouts. Also al-
Mansī attains a similar role in The Forgotten One: like an underclass avenger, he forces his 
way into the villa where the wealthy have their party, pours petrol over the ‘honoured’ 
guest from the Gulf, and threatens to set him alight unless he is allowed to take Ghāda with 
him back to his signal box. He comes to revenge his and his class’s honour and to save 
Ghāda, who sought his help, from the dishonour of Asʿad Bēh’s pimping. 
In The Forgotten One these two worlds of contrasting values are allegorically 
separated by a waterway. On the one side is al-Mansī’s signal box – the world of fantasy and 
dreams, of the deprived and forgotten, who only have their dreams left – while on the other 
side we find the villa of the multimillionaire businessman Asʿad Bēh – the world of ‘reality’, 
of those who have, but don’t dream. The first world is covered in darkness, while the second 
is lit up in a cold, artificial light. The waterway separates the worlds of two social classes 
and thus functions as an allegory for the social dualism that separates Egypt into these two 
classes: one rich, decadent, westernised and egoistic, the other poor and deprived, but 
firmly rooted in Egyptian tradition and identity. These two worlds are again allegorically 
connected by the railway line.19 Asʿad Bēh, whose party and deal have been spoiled, comes 
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with his bullies along this railway line, seeking revenge. They raise their guns to shoot al-
Mansī, who has saved Ghāda and sent her away with the morning train, but as dawn breaks 
and some fallaḥīn appear they are unable to commit the crime. Al-Mansī seeks refuge with 
the people – confirming that he is not only an individual but also represents all the 
forgotten ones – and the businessman has to depart with his mission unaccomplished. 
But the railway line also symbolises all the lost chances: all the missed trains, or 
unrealised dreams. When Ghāda realises that al-Mansī is still unmarried, she asks him: “So 
you missed the train of (chance of) marriage?” and al-Mansī answers: “As if that was the 
only train I missed. I’ve missed all the world’s trains. […] I lost the chance to play with the 
other children, even the train of youthful naughtiness passed by without even slowing 
down. And here I am now, working for the railway, and a lot of trains pass by every day 
without even noticing me.” The protagonists in both films are deprived, and in many ways 
humiliated. A central aspect of their deprivation is their inability to marry and become 
‘complete men’ for financial reasons. But it is not the deprived and humiliated character 
that is new to ʿĀdil Imām. While their miserable situation and unrealised dreams had 
usually made his protagonists turn to all kinds of immoral survival strategies and indulge in 
the same corruption that was responsible for their humiliation, to achieve social ascent, in 
these two films they hold steadfastly to their morally superior position. Al-Mansī in The 
Forgotten One seems to accept his poverty, believing it to be his destiny. He is no 
opportunist, he doesn’t crave wealth, and, as he himself says, “I have never taken anything 
that I know is not rightfully mine”. Al-Mansī prefers to escape into his dreams and create 
his own world at his lonely signal box.20 He dreams of marrying, of a place of his own to live, 
and of a meaningful job, and as Naẓmī (1993) writes: “It is as if he dreams on behalf of all the 
forgotten ones whose existence is on the margins of life”. He satiates his sexual frustrations 
by borrowing cover-girl magazines from the local newspaper seller to entertain himself on 
his long nightshift. He visits the Cairo Film Festival to watch nude scenes21, and in his 
dreams he marries whoever he wants. 
But that al-Mansī seems content with, and has accepted his own miserable situation 
does not mean that he is not sarcastic. Naẓmī (1993) comments that the censors in this film 
have provided ʿĀdil Imām with space to criticise the regime. When al-Mansī tells Ghāda 
about his dreams; how every night (in his dreams) he marries the girl he wants, how he has 
worked in countless professions and how he has even been president, he climbs the stairs of 
his signal box and, as if speaking to the audience, holds a parody of a presidential speech. 
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When he stops, not knowing what to say and having started with ‘Verily we’ (innana) four 
times, an imaginary listener asks: “Verily we what, Mr. President?”, upon which ʿĀdil Imām 
orders his imaginary guards, “Take that guy away and put him in shit (zift)!”22 But still, 
although al-Mansī is sarcastic and these scenes were perceived as bold, he remains loyal and 
does not question or confront any system. When, in order to defend his honour, he does 
confront, he is not confronting the system but a deviation from it. He is thus upholding the 
values on which the system is based. 
In Playing with the Grownups Ḥasan Bahlūl has a more ambivalent character. He is not 
only sarcastic but has also retained some of the fahlawa of the previous subversive ʿĀdil 
Imām-character. He refuses to become a toy in the government’s hands, insisting that he is 
the people’s eye and not that of the government. He utilises his fahlawa to play his own 
game. His relationship with State Security, and his game of concealing his source of 
information from them, provides plenty of opportunities not only to expose the State 
Security’s ways but also to make fun of this much-feared institution. When Ḥasan is taken 
into its premises and led through its corridors, we can hear prisoners being beaten in the 
neighbouring rooms. But Ḥasan exploits his newly won importance. When he is tired, he 
lets them carry him to the VIP room; and when Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī brings in Bahlūl’s fiancée, 
and leaves the two alone in the office in the hope that he will confess to her, so that he can 
listen to them from the next room beside, his plan fails as it turns out that rather than 
confess they use the chance of finally being alone to make love. “Ḥasan! Have you forgotten 
where we are?”, his fiancée exclaims, upon which Ḥasan explains: “We are at the most 
secure place in the country. We are at State Security.” The premises of this feared 
institution are thus turned into their love nest. The poor citizen, rather than being 
exploited by the State Security, as would have happened in real life, uses them for his own 
ends. 
 Although Egyptian critics in general praised the film for its patriotism, many of 
them didn’t appreciate these ‘vulgar’ scenes23 of what I would call ‘underclass 
empowerment’ or dream fulfilment, both in relation to the ‘new rich’ and the State 
Security: two groups that are perceived as being able to cause the common man trouble. I 
would claim that these scenes, rather than just being an unnecessary remnant of ʿĀdil 
Imām’s fahlawa, as some critics claimed, are an important element of the film’s popular 
aspect. Social roles are turned upside down and ʿĀdil Imām, the poor but honest underclass 
Egyptian with whom the audience identifies, not only has the upper hand for a moment but 
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also gets away with it. The film thus gives the audience the impression that ʿĀdil Imām is 
indeed ‘their man’. 
῾Ādil Imām (cited from Maḥmūd Saʿd, 1991) claims that Playing with the Grownups “is a 
call for people to resist”. Egypt is in danger. I would suggest that the films can be read as a 
call to re-conquer the ‘dream of Egypt’: the dream of progress towards modernity, harmony 
and social justice. This dream has been lost sight of, or, as Ḥasan complains to the Sphinx, 
stolen. Both films draw up a Manichean dualism between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in which Ḥasan 
Bahlūl and al-Mansī embody the ‘good’: people, government and nation. Ḥasan Bahlūl or 
Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī, ʿAlī al-Zahhār and even al-Asyūṭī (Muṣṭafā Mutawallī), an officer who tried 
to make Ḥasan reveal his source by traditional means of torture, are, according to 
scriptwriter Waḥīd Ḥāmid, “me and you. They are real: people who reject and resist 
corruption, but each in his own way. Egyptians can keep silent and endure, but they will 
never give in” (cited from Saʿd, 1991). The Forgotten One completes this picture, clarifying the 
identity of ‘evil’. In both films ‘evil’ is the same: corruption embodied in ‘evil capitalists’. 
Even though both of these films are ‘confrontational’, fighting governmental corruption, 
and both contain sarcastic comments on state and power, as seen in al-Mansī’s parody of a 
presidential speech in The Forgotten One and the mocking of the practices of the State 
Security in Playing with the Grownups, they hardly represent an ‘attack on the system’. It is 
not the system that is corrupt, but it is infiltrated or maybe even dominated by evil and 
corrupt individuals. The discourse is one of morals, calling for a patriotic alliance of 
morality to cleanse Egypt of this corruption. 
 
Social chaos / Social harmony 
 
According to Armbrust (1998, p. 283) Terrorism and Barbecue was a film that caught 
everyone’s attention. It was praised by the critics. The public flocked to see it and the film 
was even noticed in the west. The film was seen as being bold. It seemingly criticised both 
the state and its Islamist opponents, and as Armbrust (ibid, p. 284) points out, it was 
selected for exhibition in the west on the assumption that it transcended the usual generic 
conventions of Egyptian cinema: i.e. that it said something that could not be said before. In 
Egypt too, the film was perceived as bold. Naẓmī (1992) salutes the censorship, claiming that 
the fact that they licensed this film shows that our censors are enlightened. Ḥusn Shāh 
(1992) also praises the censors, declaring that such a film would not have been permitted 
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previously. And in the state newspaper al-Jumhūriyya we read that “the film again confirms 
that we are living in an extraordinary atmosphere of freedom and democracy” (N. N., 1992). 
I would agree with Armbrust when he suggests that the film “in fact did not convey 
any bold new social and political criticism, but rather a bold neo-conservatism that 
attempts to recoup notions of modernity and national community that had fallen out of 
favour” (Armbrust 1998, p. 284); and I would claim that both this and the following film, 
Sleeping in Honey, remain firmly within the accepted limits of criticism. Moreover, I would 
claim that even though Terrorism and Barbecue and Sleeping in Honey differ from the other 
two in several ways – unlike Playing with the Grownups and The Forgotten One, which were 
discussed in the previous section, the two films in question here don’t draw up the same 
Manichean dualism between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – the discourse of morality and patriotism in 
these films is very similar to that of the two previous ones. 
A certain realist-reformist paradigm has dominated Egyptian fiction since the 
beginning of the 20th century – since Muḥammad al-Muwayliḥī’s Ḥadīth ʿĪsā Ibn Hishām. In 
his introduction to the 1907 edition al-Muwayliḥī wrote that he was “exposing the manners 
and customs” of his contemporaries, describing the vices that should be avoided and the 
virtues that should be respected (Jacquemond, 2004, p. 45). I would claim that this is not 
very unlike what ʿĀdil Imām is doing in these films. And as with al-Muwayliḥī, the ‘exposing 
of the manners and customs’, or the description of reality, is closely linked to morality in 
the way that ʿĀdil Imām in these films, through his recent transformation to the 
unambiguous good hero, embodies the virtues exposing vices and malfunctions. 
Moreover, the government has a long-established tradition of allowing a measure of 
political dissidence or sarcastic commentary, and as long as it stays within the limits of the 
above-mentioned ‘realist-reformist paradigm’, it is not only accepted but probably also 
encouraged. The comic criticism of government policies as seen in Terrorism and Barbecue 
and Sleeping in Honey, the two films that will be discussed in this section, not only ‘lets off 
steam’, helps the regime to retain a respectable democratic façade (as the above-mentioned 
critics who praised the censorship would indicate) and re-bolsters its modernist image, but 
politics as a kind of ‘safe topic’ also allows for the avoidance of more dangerous issues, as, 
for example, freedom of faith, rigid value systems and sexual orientation. “To ‘let off steam’ 
against the government is thus much easier than challenging rigid value systems and 
showing aspects of society that neither the audience nor the censors would like to see” 
(Sarah Enany, n. d., p. 64). 
 31 
 
 
In Terrorism and Barbeque ʿĀdil Imām is the ordinary loyal middle class citizen Aḥmad 
Fatḥ al-Bāb.24 His loyalty is above question. As he says himself: “All my life I have done what 
the government tells me to do: this one, the one before and the one before that again, and 
also the coming one I will do what it tells me to do.” The vices and malfunctions are 
exposed through him going to the Mugammaʿ25 for the supposedly simple task of obtaining a 
permit to move his son from a school far away to one closer to home, a task that proves a 
veritable ‘mission impossible’. The claustrophobic congestion of the Mugammaʿ – clearly an 
allegory for Cairo’s overpopulation – is only the first obstacle. Aḥmad has to squeeze 
himself into a lift and is hardly able to breathe. On the seventh floor he is swept along by 
the crowd until he is finally able to squeeze himself clear and stumbles into the office he 
wants. Except for two employees, a woman constantly speaking into the phone giving her 
maid orders about how to cook, and a man totally absorbed in prayer, the office is empty. 
When Aḥmad, having given up on the woman, is at last able to get through to the male clerk 
by interrupting him between two prayers, he is rudely informed that the clerk he needs is 
away for a week on a training course (dawra tadrībiyya), and that he must come back again 
after a week. Back at the Mugammaʿ the week after, the needed clerk is still away – this time 
he is not on a training course (dawra tadrībiyya) but on the toilet (dawrat al-miyāh)! But, as he 
is told, the clerk, whose name is Midḥat, is a refined person who therefore doesn’t use the 
toilets in the Mugammaʿ, which are far too dirty. Aḥmad thus has to search for Midḥat at the 
toilets of the neighbouring high-class institutions - the Ramses Hilton Hotel, The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and The Arab League, in all three of which he is thrown out and humiliated.  
In 1991, the year preceding the film, Egypt had signed a Structural Adjustment 
Program with the World Bank and the IMF to speed up the privatisation policies that had 
started during the infitāḥ period. The welfare state and bureaucracy were scaled down at an 
ever-increasing speed. The exposure and criticism of the inefficiency of the oversized state 
bureaucracy of the Mugammaʿ therefore fit perfectly into the regime’s agenda of economic 
reform and modernisation. But this liberalisation had naturally produced its own set of 
winners and losers. The civil servant (muwaẓẓaf), the epitome of Egyptian modernity, was 
becoming increasingly marginalised, and many Egyptians have since the early 1970s come 
to feel that their economy has been in a state of depression and that society in general has 
been on a downward spiral. 
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On the bus, on his way to the Mugammaʿ, an old man sitting next to Aḥmad is reading 
a newspaper. Aḥmad asks the man whether there is any news of anything becoming 
cheaper. Everything has grown so expensive. The old man responds: “A lot of things will be 
cheaper and their prices will be dirt cheap: me, you and that gentleman over there and all 
of you.” At home Aḥmad, who represents this class of marginalised civil servants, is hardly 
able to provide for his family’s basic needs. To make ends meet he has to work at two jobs: 
in the daytime he works for the government and in the evening in a shawarma shop. In the 
early 1990s government salaries had sunk so low that they barely sufficed to keep a family 
above the poverty line, and by then the taking of an additional job to supplement one’s 
income had become the very symbol of a marginalised Egyptian middle class. This is 
definitely no longer ‘a country for the holders of certificates’, – as Disūqī Affandī had 
complained in the early 1960s. In Egypt in the 1990s Aḥmad, the loyal middle-class citizen, 
is humiliated in every aspect of life. Late at night, when he is carrying home two pounds’ 
worth of state-subsidised bread, two girls sneer at him: “Look at that guy with the loaves.” 
Exhausted after long a day’s work, he comes home late Thursday night with a bottle of beer 
to celebrate the weekend. But his wife, who is just as exhausted as he is, has already fallen 
asleep and shut the world out with a pile of blankets. He sings ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ḥāfiẓ songs, in 
an endeavour to wake her up by evoking ‘the good old days’, but to no avail. When she 
finally wakes, she is not in the mood. The beer bottle explodes, she screams something 
about just having washed the floor, and the children wake up. 
 Aḥmad’s bottle of beer is only one of several signs in the film that can be 
interpreted as indicating that the pressure on the Egyptian citizen has become intolerable, 
and that this could explode into social chaos. How much more can the Egyptian citizen 
endure? Is he never going to explode? When the afore-mentioned old man tries to squeeze 
himself out of the overcrowded bus, he yells at the passengers to let him through, telling 
them that they, and especially the women, should stand sidewise and not crosswise on the 
bus. The passengers all burst out laughing at this sexual comment – women should have 
their bums against the wall in order to avoid sexual harassment – upon which the old man 
angry turns around yelling: “My God! You enjoyed that silly joke! I know, but when it’s 
something serious you pout your lips! May a calamity befall you, you and your generation! 
(gatku l-bala fīku wi fi ayyamku). Soft-drink bottles lined up in their crate are better off than 
you. Still, if someone puts pressure on them, they explode” – just like Aḥmad’s bottle of 
beer. “That’s because they are filled with gas,” one of the passengers comments. “And what 
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are you gentlemen filled with?” the old man goes on. “Curdled milk or cottage cheese? 
Cowards! You, whose voices are only heard [when you talk about] trivialities (fi l-fargha). 
Just stay like that! Raise your children, enjoy yourself Thursday night, perform your ritual 
ablutions Friday morning and go and pray. To stand behind the imām invoking God’s 
blessings is all you are good for!” As in Playing with the Grownups, in which Ḥasan 
interconnects all phones in Cairo to make them ring simultaneously and exhort Egyptians 
to wake up and pay attention to the fact that Egypt is in danger, Terrorism and Barbecue 
similarly calls people to wake up from their slumber. The film gives the impression that the 
Egyptian citizen of the 1990s is in a ‘coma’, accepting everything that is done to him. But 
Aḥmad, the Egyptian middle-class citizen, is not ‘filled with cottage cheese’, and back at the 
Mugammaʿ for a third time he can bear no more. He explodes, loses his temper and starts a 
fight with the religious clerk. Security is called in, and in the turmoil that follows he 
suddenly finds himself with a gun in his hand and a handful of scared hostages. Everybody 
else, including the guards, run for their lives. 
The same predicament of the increasingly marginalised and powerless middle-class 
clerk that in Terrorism and Barbecue explodes into the seizure of the Mugammaʿ – the very 
symbol of the malfunction and inefficiency of the system – is in Sleeping in Honey allegorised 
as a general state of impotence. Shohat and Stam (1994, p. 272) single out ‘allegories of 
impotence’ as one of the types of exaggerated national allegories commonly expressed by 
formerly colonised nations, where the allegory expresses the social, political and economic 
predicaments of Third World nations. 
In Sleeping in Honey26 ʿĀdil Imām is the chief of police investigation in Cairo, Magdī 
Nūr. He has to deal with an epidemic of mass impotence spreading from central areas 
throughout the city.27 The narrative of the film is driven forward through impotence as a 
form of cultural shame – it is there but nobody dares to speak about it. No one is willing to 
admit the calamity, not to mention address the matter. Magdī Nūr’s boss just laughs at him, 
saying: “We are a people with shame. To speak about these things is shameful.” The refusal 
to deal with the calamity also turns Sleeping in Honey into a comment on ‘Egypt’s reputation’ 
– the catchword that has become an excuse for covering up and refusing to deal with all 
kinds of embarrassing issues, and which has often been used as an argument to censor 
cultural products that present Egypt in an unfavourable light. In one scene a bored and 
impotent man sitting together with a group of prostitutes in a bar declares that “respect is 
the most important thing’ and now “there is nothing left but respectability”. As everybody 
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is by now impotent and illicit acts are no longer possible, the whole country has become 
‘respectable’. The film thus subverts the argument of ‘respectability’ and ‘Egypt’s 
reputation’, transforming it into an argument in which ignorance and the refusal to expose 
the real state of things is what threatens ‘Egypt’s reputation’. 
 Exactly what the impotence in Sleeping in Honey allegorises is made clear by several 
pieces of dialogue. “People are enduring a lot. Their burden has become very heavy”, Magdī 
Nūr’s driver tells him. Although the film does not mention the dismantling of the welfare 
state directly, it does so implicitly. “Sex,” Magdī Nūr explains, “is something for free. People 
do it and are happy and they go to bed satisfied. If it is taken away from them [several other 
pleasures have already been taken away] they will not keep silent.” But the film makes 
additional statements. Consulted by Magdī Nūr, the doctor Aḥmad al-Ayyūbī explains: 
“Television programs sometimes result in frustration, reading newspapers causes 
frustration, constantly listening to lies and misinformation engenders frustration, and fear 
for the future can paralyse the whole body.” The mass impotence is thus not only a result of 
hardship and overcrowdedness – the economic and social predicament – but also of the 
manipulation of people’s will by the political establishment, and maybe even of the lack of 
openness and, as Kamran Asdar Ali (2003) claims, democracy – the political predicament. 
In the streets of Cairo, people are getting more and more desperate as a result of this 
governmental neglect. Mosques and churches are full, drugs prices are quadrupling and 
anything is being sold as a cure for desperate people. People are resorting to illusions, 
witchcraft and charlatanism, and, as in Terrorism and Barbecue, social chaos threatens. 
According to Salmā ʿAṣfūr, the female journalist who assists Magdī Nūr in researching the 
case, people blame the government. “They say that it has brought in a gas with neither 
colour nor smell. Once you breathe in the gas, you are afflicted. People claim the 
government does this to reduce population growth.” A reduction of the population was 
often presented as a solution to reduce development expenditures, thus putting less 
pressure on the state to provide for education, health care and jobs (Ali, 2003). But, as Magdī 
Nūr comments:”I don’t think any government would do something like that to its people.” 
While the film thus comments on the deteriorating state of the Egyptian citizen in a period 
of IMF-guided structural adjustment, the film clearly acquits the government of this 
conspiracy. This does not mean, however, that the film doesn’t discuss the government’s 
role. Magdī Nūr claims that “The citizens’ wellbeing is a public responsibility.” The film thus 
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calls on the government to assume responsibility for its citizens. When Magdī Nūr speaks in 
parliament, this call is clearly stated: 
“In this honoured assembly you discuss all kind of matters […] but you don’t 
discuss the citizens’ situation (aḥwāl al-muwāṭin). 
[...] If the people have lost hope, we should give them hope [music], hope on 
which they can live. 
If the people have forgotten how to sing, we should play for them so that they can  
sing again. 
I imagine that these things can bring us back to our natural state again, instead of  
being governed by fables and superstition and being a people driven around 
like mules (shaʿb shīīī āāāāā).” 
To me it seems that ʿĀdil Imām here takes upon himself a role analogous to that of the 
‘official’ opposition parties: on the one hand he points out malfunctions, shortcomings and 
deviations in government policy while on the other upholding and reinforcing the 
discourse of national identity. 
So what, according to the film, is the solution for Egypt’s predicament, or the 
nation’s impotence? Magdī Nūr finds his own private solution. To escape from the over-
crowdedness and pollution, he goes out into the desert. There, under the naked sky, he 
manages to make love with his wife and overcome his impotence. “Going out into the desert 
has recently become a preferred solution to many intractable problems. It has been the 
prescription for problems such as over-population and unemployment of the government’s, 
or more accurately, of the official media” (Reem Saad, 1999, p. 27). But Magdī Nūr comments 
that “not everybody can leave and go into the desert”. The scene could therefore be a 
reflection of the easy solutions being prescribed by the establishment. 
“So what is to be done?” Magdī Nūr asks the same doctor. “What is to be done? al-
ʿilm!” (knowledge or science) the doctor answers. Knowledge or science is the solution. In a 
typically modernist way knowledge (ʿilm), the factor that will bring progress, is here 
through Magdī Nūr – the name itself (Magdī means ‘glorious’, while Nūr means ‘light’) 
implies that he is a representative of enlightenment – assisted by the doctor, presented in 
contrast to ignorance (jahl), which the desperate, ignorant people being ignored by their 
government are resorting to. Knowledge (ʿilm), as opposed to ignorance (jahl), is connected 
with nūr (light) as opposed to darkness. The editor of Salmā’s paper asks himself whether 
we should illuminate (ninawwar) the case: i.e. uncover and publish, or darken it (niʿattimha): 
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i.e. cover it up; tell the truth or lie. After this theme has been presented, the Minister of 
Health becomes the voice of ignorance, darkness and lying contrasted with Magdī Nūr, who 
represents knowledge, (en)light(enment) and truth. The Minister manages to convince 
Parliament that the whole story of mass impotence is only an evil rumour set out to weaken 
the nation, and they vote to close this embarrassing case. The Minister covering up the case 
then appears on television, and in a parody of the stupid and ignorant minister he claims 
that all you have to do is to stand in front of the mirror and tell yourself that you are strong 
and that everything is fine. 
Magdī, the representative of enlightenment, resigns from his position in protest 
against the state’s or the modernising institutions’ failure to reach out their hands to ‘the 
common man’ and release him from his predicament. He returns to the people in the streets 
and asserts he has the cure: “If you want to be healed, follow me!” Storming out of mosques 
and churches, leaving their ignorant preachers perplexed, the people follow their hero, who 
leads them towards Parliament, shouting “āh” – an exclamation of pain and distress. In 
front of Parliament they are met by the riot police, led by Magdī’s former superiors, who 
order him: “Magdī! Your place is not there!”, to which he responds: “I am in the right place, 
together with the people: a people who for years haven’t expressed their pain.” The state’s 
right place is with the people and not opposed to them. He walks towards the perplexed 
MPs who have come out to see what’s afoot and proceeds to address them: “Honoured MPs. 
Here you have the people. Deal with them as best you can.” Magdī has handed the people 
over to their proper representatives in an orderly manner. He has thus restored unity and 
bridged the gap between people and government. 
Terrorism and Barbecue also ends on a similar note of social harmony. Much as in 
Sleeping in Honey, the film first exposed the bureaucratic inefficiency and intolerable 
conditions that the ordinary Egyptian has to endure, showing how these flaws in society 
threaten to explode into social chaos, before it moves on towards reconciliation. Together 
with the hostages; the civil servants of the Mugammaʿ, including the ‘fundamentalist’ clerk, 
who, through the events, come to sympathise with ‘the terrorist’, form ‘a community’ of 
humiliated citizens who hold off the might of the government until morning. But as the 
government decides to storm the Mugammaʿ, and with no hope of a favourable solution, 
Aḥmad, who is no evil ‘terrorist’ but a goodhearted citizen who does not want to harm 
anyone, decides to let his hostages go. Reluctantly they start to leave, but suddenly one of 
them commands them to stop. The hostages have come to like Aḥmad, and they take him 
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with them. He is one of them and together they march out of the Mugammaʿ. Outside, 
Aḥmad is asked by a journalist if he had seen the terrorist and what he looked like. Aḥmad 
explains that “he was neither tall, nor short, I mean he was neither very tall nor very short, 
he was neither very fat nor very thin, neither black nor white. Just like us, kind of,” and 
when the security forces storm the building, they find no terrorists. The next morning it is 
business as usual, as if nothing has happened. The film thus ends with everybody friends, 
even the Islamist walking out side-by-side with the secularist ʿĀdil Imām. All the characters 
end up in their proper places. Society looks workable if everybody tries just a little harder 
and does his duty to the full without neglect. 
In the course of the night ʿĀdil Imām has transformed the people into ‘useful 
citizens’. Initially, Aḥmad, who has become a ‘terrorist’ by accident, and his new-found 
allies are unable to formulate any demands that can be translated into collective action. “So 
what about some kabāb and kufta?” Aḥmad suggests to the hostages, a suggestion which is 
received with an enthusiastic “allāhu akbar!” When the government wishes to negotiate and 
proposes “three pieces of Kentucky Fried for each” (i.e. a meagre IMF diet), they rise in a 
demonstration inside the Mugammaʿ, shouting “We want meat! If not we’ll make life hell for 
you!” For a short while ʿĀdil Imām puts the government at the people’s service and has 
waitresses from the nearby Cairo Semiramis serve them five-star kabāb by. ʿĀdil Imām wins 
the people’s hearts, and they in turn gather around their popular hero, who becomes their 
mouthpiece. In a long monologue he puts their grievances into words. “Every day I go to 
work crammed [in a bus] and I return in it just as crammed. I am happy when I ride the 
bus.” He then looks up at the fundamentalist clerk and says sarcastically: “Praise the Lord 
who hath put this [i.e. the over-crammed bus] at our disposal,” before continuing: “Prices 
are on fire [i.e. skyrocketing] (il-asʿār nār)… But so what? The whole world is on fire. I don’t 
have a lot of children. I observe my family planning as the government tells me to. I have 
only one son and one daughter, and thank God they are fine and doing well at school. Yes, 
it’s true that their class has eighty-four students and that they come home worn out, dizzy 
and with their faces sallow from overcrowding and air pollution in the classroom. But, 
thank God, they are okay. Nothing troubles me but the task of obtaining bread (mafīsh ḥāga 
taʿbāni ghēr ghirīf il-ʿēsh). I have to stand in a long queue, suffering to find it, and I suffer 
when I eat it. I am just like you: trying to stay out of trouble (māshi gamb il-ḥēṭ), content and 
humble” and reformulates their demands: “I’m only demanding my humanity. I don’t want 
to be humiliated. I don’t want to be humiliated at home, at work or in the street.” 
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I would contend that in these four films ʿĀdil Imām and the filmmakers have taken 
upon themselves a kind of consciousness-raising project. The ‘people’ have to shake off 
their apathy, let their voice be heard and so contribute ‘positively’ to society. In Sleeping in 
Honey the ‘people’ are led towards Parliament to voice their grievances in an orderly 
demonstration, thus avoiding the threat of disorder and chaos. I would therefore agree with 
Ali (2003), who claims that the film could be read as a contribution towards constructing a 
responsible citizenry of self-disciplined subjects who respond to their social problems 
through ‘proper’ political channels. People are first made aware of the fact that Egypt is in 
danger and then that everybody is obliged to take responsibility. Playing with the Grownups 
and The Forgotten One exposed the selfishness of the ‘evil capitalist’ who profited at the 
expense of the nation. The films drew up a dichotomy based on values foregrounding 
virtues like unselfish patriotism and traditional Egyptian values, as opposed to the vices of 
selfishness and decadence. What Terrorism and Barbecue and Sleeping in Honey do is similar, 
but here it is not a selfish and decadent ‘other’ who is confronted, rather the films seem to 
blame vices such as ignorance and laziness, and call on everyone to stand steadfastly by his 
duty. Like al-Mansī, who stood steadfastly at his signal box so that the trains would not 
collide, society and the system would have worked and the Mugammaʿ not been seized had it 
not been for the widespread neglect. The outlook in these films is therefore moralistic and 
patriotic and it put the blame on individuals and not the system itself. If everybody did 
what is in the nation’s interest, if both the people and those in government observed their 
patriotic responsibility, society would be harmonious and order would be maintained or re-
established. 
The Minister of the Interior (Kamāl al-Shinnāwī), who is in charge and has to resolve 
the hostage situation, is, in fact, just as frustrated as the rest of the citizens over the 
widespread negligence and malfunctioning. When he first hears about the seizure of the 
Mugammaʿ by terrorists, he complains: “Is it impossible to get even half an hour’s rest? 
Never any good news? Only catastrophes, fires, armed robberies and terrorism. Other 
ministers lie back in their offices and listen to music, and they appear on television more 
often than pop stars,” and when the ‘terrorists’ demand a packet of medicine (one of the 
hostages, a poor old woman can’t afford this expensive medicine), he exclaims that 
“medicine is the responsibility of the Minister of Health! It seems we are destined to take 
responsibility for the shortcomings of the other ministries.” 
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In a scene in which the Minister of the Interior is taking part in prayer at the 
Makram ʿUbayd Mosque opposite the Mugammaʿ, the sheikh ends the prayer with the 
standard, but in this context ambiguous, supplication: “May God save us from what the 
idiots (al-sufahā’) amongst us did.” “Who do you think he means by ‘idiots’,” the minister 
asks his assistant. The way the sheikh fixes his eyes on the minister’s would indicate that 
‘the idiots’ are the government, but the minister’s assistant assures him that it must be ‘the 
terrorists’. Perplexed, and not really convinced, the minister accepts that it must be the 
terrorists that were meant. In fact both Aḥmad, the Egyptian citizen turned terrorist, and 
the minister himself are victims of what ‘the idiots amongst us’ did, which here again means 
all those individuals who, either because of egoism (as in Playing with the Grownups and The 
Forgotten One) or out of irresponsibility, laziness and ignorance (as in this film and Sleeping in 
Honey) fail to do their duty and so hamper Egypt’s development. Corruption and neglect 
have brought about the crisis that led to the seizure of the Mugammaʿ and a ‘clash’ between 
people and government, both of whom are victims. 
These films again are therefore no real ‘attack on the system’. The system would be 
workable if everybody would just do his job properly. The discourse is as in the two 
previous ones, again moralist, attacking those who don’t do their duty. These individuals 
are again to be found both amongst the people (the clerks in the Mugammaʿ) and, as the 
minister complains, in the government. The Islamic Fundamentalists get their share of 
blame. They are turning the priorities upside down. Not only does the religious clerk in the 
Mugammaʿ pray instead of work, but when he starts to complain about his situation as a 
hostage, Aḥmad or ʿĀdil Imam blames him directly: “You shut up! It is you who are the 
reason for all this!” But exaggerated religious practice also prevents the minister doing his 
duty. When the minister takes up position on the minaret of the Makram ʿUbayd Mosque 
facing the Mugammaʿ to get an overview of the situation, the call comes for prayer. 
Naturally the minister doesn’t find this the right time to go down to pray (wa huwwa da 
waʾtu!), but he has no choice, because as his assistant advises him: “What would people say if 
they knew that the minister was standing on the minaret when the call for prayer came and 
refused to go down to pray?” 
ʿĀdil Imām might be boldly testing the bounds in these films by, for example, using 
the presence – at that time unrecorded – of the Minister of the Interior as one of the main 
characters in Terrorism and Barbecue, the government lying in the media, both in Playing with 
the Grownups and Terrorism and Barbecue, and the simple Egyptian who dreams of being 
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president in The Forgotten One, would indicate, and this was probably the reason why these 
films were perceived as being so bold. On the other hand they all remain firmly within the 
‘traditional mode of intervention’ described by Jacquemond. They point a finger at all that 
is wrong – corruption, administrative malfunctioning, apathy and repression – and call for a 
change. In that way their cause is not rebellion, but reformist and conservative. The 
‘change’ is a ‘change back’, to bring Egypt back to the right path towards modernity. Egypt 
is in danger. It has deviated from the right track and the films point out corruption and 
negligence as the dangers. These again are caused by individuals’ selfishness and ignorance. 
The selfishness of the evil capitalists is confronted by patriotism and loyalty, while the 
ignorance of individuals, both amongst the people and in government, is confronted by a 
rhetoric of knowledge, speaking out, and enlightenment, and although the films claim to 
speak on behalf of, and let the audiences identify with, the common citizens’ predicament, 
the focus here is one of duty more than of rights. None of these four films are any longer 
what Armbrust described as ‘centrifugal’. They all project a picture of a threatened, yet 
possible, social harmony. Through reproducing social values and calling for solidarity and 
responsibility these films may aim at coercing people into loyalty. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It may seem that films of this kind, projecting social harmony and calling for duty and 
solidarity, again gained relevance in the early 1990s, and that they very much represent the 
mood of the time. Armbrust (1998) suggests that increased violence, crime and social chaos, 
in addition to a widespread fear prevalent at the time that the political violence and culture 
war between the regime and its Islamist opponents might spin out of control and lead to a 
civil war, probably again made such cinematic visions of social unity relevant. The first half 
of the 1990s was the highpoint of the Islamist terror campaign that was threatening to tear 
society apart. Even though these films can be linked only indirectly to the opposition to 
Islamist terrorism, it seems that modernism and patriotism have re-emerged in these films 
as the imagined glue that holds society together against this threat. 
These films are very much an expression of the regime taking control. The regime 
realised that “it could no longer entrust the ideological struggle with the Islamist 
opposition to institutional Islam alone” (Jacquemond, 2008, p. 26). “In its efforts to 
constrain the Islamists, the Egyptian state attempted to reconstruct a ‘modern’ image for 
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itself by enlisting the secular players in the cultural field” (Samia Mehrez, 2001, p. 10). It can 
therefore seem that the state in the early 1990s made a conscious decision to not only 
‘dominate’ politically through coercion, but that it from now on also attempted to regain 
intellectual and moral hegemony. The regime thus reached out a hand to the leftist 
intelligentsia. Ideologically in a vacuum after the collapse of the communist bloc and the 
second Gulf War, and embattled by the growing interference by men of religion, this 
intelligentsia accepted the alliance. Thus Minister of Culture Fārūq Ḥusnī enlisted the 
country’s major cultural players under the banner of enlightenment (ibid, p. 13) – 
‘enlightenment’ (al-tanwīr) was re-launched to combat ‘darkness’ (al-ẓalām) – and it seems 
quite probable that ʿĀdil Imām was one of these ‘cultural players’. With his huge popularity 
and with his audience the same as that from which the Islamists recruit, i.e. the lower urban 
middle classes, ʿĀdil Imām was a valuable asset for the regime in its confrontation with the 
Islamists. It therefore seems clear that modernism and nationalism ‘returned’ to Egyptian 
cinema, and especially in the films of ʿĀdil Imām, simultaneously with, and as a response to, 
the regime losing patience with the Islamic opposition. Augustus Richard Norton (2005, 
cited from Kandil, 2008, p. 8) considers the parliamentary elections of 1990 the beginning of 
the end of Mubārak’s tolerance with Islamism. It is therefore not unlikely that the regime, 
after a lengthy period of co-opting the Islamist opposition, would accompany its sudden 
sledgehammer attempt to suppress it with a strategic use of nationalism and that these 
films were a part of this campaign. 
 
Fundamentalism as the enemy 
 
Having established the re-emergence of patriotism, social unity and modernism in the films 
of ʿĀdil Imām, and pointed out the likelihood of this ‘return’ being related to the ‘Islamist 
threat’, in this chapter I will take a closer look at how this threat is being dealt with in ʿĀdil 
Imām’s films, and how this is related to the regime’s own policy on the issue. I will attempt 
to extract the anti-Islamist rhetoric present in these films and show how patriotism and 
modernism – on the one side enlightenment and on the other sound traditional values – are 
the main elements of the discourse. The following analysis will primarily concentrate on 
The Terrorist (1994) and Birds of Darkness (1995), ʿĀdil Imām’s principal anti-Islamist films, but 
I will also bring in elements from other of his films, in addition to his real-life appearances. 
In the second part of this chapter I will make a detour to the discourse of ‘national unity’, 
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which from its very beginning has been a central aspect of secular Egyptian nationalism. 
This discourse is heavily present in The Terrorist and is the main theme in Hassan and Murqus 
(2008). I will conclude the chapter with some remarks on how this patriotic anti-Islamist 
discourse relates to the government’s own domestic strategy alternating between 
appropriation and exclusion and how the films’ discourse is related structurally to the 
Islamists’ own discourse. 
The ‘new morality’ of the early 1980s and Saudi financial influence on cinematic 
distribution had caused the industry, including ʿĀdil Imām, problems with the censors. 
Moreover, the Islamic trend, in its quest for morality and the Islamisation of society, had 
developed a discourse against the entertainment industry in general and particularly the 
performance of women. Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, for example, used to cite the arts in 
the same breath as atheism and prostitution; and the influential TV-preacher Shaykh 
Mutawallī al-Shaʿrāwī was negative to female artists, for “they incite sexual instincts” 
(Tadros, 1994, pp. 28-30, cited from Shafik, 2001, p. 716). The regulation of public morality 
emerged as an area of convergence among various Islamist groups (Salwa Ismail, 2003, p. 
59). Several female performers responded to the pressure; they donned the veil, retreated 
and denounced the whole industry as sinful. The controversy surrounding the veiling of 
female stars in the 1980s was accompanied by attacks on, and the burning of, cinemas and 
video shops and the defacing of cinema posters. This, combined with direct threats against 
cinema stars, led to a general feeling of embattlement and fear. The climate of 
confrontation reached its climax in the first half of the 1990s. It is therefore only natural 
that certain figures in the industry should have felt compelled to take a stand against this 
threat. The fact that the regime offered the leftist intelligentsia an ‘alliance’, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, is therefore not to be taken to mean that certain ‘cultural players’, 
or the cinema industry, were simply being used by the regime in their fight against the 
Islamist threat; we may rather talk about congruent interests. Both ʿĀdil Imām and the 
scriptwriter Waḥīd Ḥāmid have earned themselves a reputation for their anti-Islamist 
stand, and as for ʿĀdil Imām this reputation precedes the above-mentioned alliance. 
 
 Asyūṭ appearance 
 
In 1988, in the Upper Egyptian city of Asyūṭ, Islamist students had been rioting at university 
against the traditional music and theatre program at the end of the academic year, forcing 
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the program to be cancelled (van Nieuwkerk, 1996, p. 65). The incident was a perfect 
opportunity for ʿĀdil Imām to enter the stage and register his protest against the 
strangulation of art by the fundamentalists by staging his play Sayyid the Servant [al-wād 
sayyid al-shaghghāl] in Asyūṭ. 
ʿĀdil Imām had tried to arrange a cultural sponsorship for his and his theatre 
troupe’s visit, but when the officials at the University of Asyūṭ were reluctant (Raymond 
Baker, 1995, p. 23) – according to ʿĀdil Imām they were too scared (cited from Sarḥān, 2006) 
– he did not hesitate to contact the Minister of the Interior, Zakī Badr, who arranged a 
formal invitation from the Governor of Asyūṭ (Baker, 1995, p. 23). The city of Asyūṭ has a 
large Christian minority and relations between the two communities had deteriorated in 
the 1970s, with sectarian clashes erupting in the surrounding villages; and in 1981 the 
assassination of al-Sādāt coincided with an uprising in the province which was put down by 
the government. The setting in the City of Asyūṭ, with all the meaning it carries of 
confrontation with violent Islamic fundamentalism, was therefore a perfect site to stage 
such a national clarion call to resist the alleged strangulation of culture (ibid, p. 20). The 
regime was thus able to choreograph the confrontation in Asyūṭ as a spectacle with 
meaning for the entire nation (ibid). The cast of characters – vulnerable artists, protective 
security forces and violent radicals – made plausible the improbable assumption that the 
most serious threat to freedom came from extremists rather than from the state (ibid, p. 
21). Absent from the scene were any forms of centrist Islamic alternative (ibid). It was a 
drama between good and evil. Background conditions such as the long neglect of Upper-
Egypt, the dismal state of public services, the lack of infrastructure and the high 
unemployment rate in the area, a void into which the Islamists had stepped, were absent 
from the scene (ibid). 
ʿĀdil Imām himself reinforced the government reading by insisting that he didn’t 
intend to play a political role (ibid, p. 22). In a short speech he gave at a reception for him 
and his theatre troupe, held by the governor, Abd al-Ḥalīm Mūsā, he declared that he was 
not acting in opposition to any group but rather in order to stand up for his art, “For a 
country with no art, is one with no conscience” (Rūz al-Yūsuf, 06.06.1988, cited from Baker, 
1995, p. 22; Sarḥān, 200628). Journalists and literary figures of the Left rallied behind the 
slogans, and the story was presented as an abstract metaphysical confrontation between 
good and evil: freedom versus mindless violence. The journal Rūz al-Yūsuf led this campaign, 
and reports were often cast in a very militaristic and confrontational language, as “When 
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ʿĀdil Imām heard the clatter of the chains in Asyūṭ trying to strangle Art there, he travelled 
with his company of actors to perform his play in the heart of Asyūṭ ignoring the fire of the 
extremists” (Ṣabāḥ al-Khayr 19.03.1992, cited from Baker, 1995, p. 22). 
 
Cinema confronting fundamentalism 
 
But as a theme dealt with by cinema in Egypt, fundamentalism was slow to emerge. ʿAlī Abū 
Shādī (1998, p. 152) ascribes this to the fear and atmosphere of intimidation prevalent at the 
time. Already in the early 1980s ʿĀdil Imām had started to take on the Islamist trend. In 1983 
he had forwarded a film script with the title The Imām ʿĀdil or The Just Imām (al-Imām ʿĀdil). 
But the script, which was ʿĀdil Imām’s own idea, was never turned into a film; it was 
rejected by the censors on the ground that it mocked religious authorities (ʿAbd Allāh, 
1999). But although the fear of offending religious sensibilities that seems to have guided 
the censors prevented this issue moving to centre-stage, the occasional mocking of 
Islamists or oblique scenes that disapproved of incursions of religion into domains which 
the state designated as secular had, from the government’s point of view, long been 
unproblematic (Armbrust, 1998, p. 297).29 
Terror [al-Irhāb] (1989), directed by Nādir Galāl and starring Nādiyā al-Gindī, was the 
first film to take terrorism as its title. But although the script was about Islamist terrorists, 
the film did not yet dare to be so explicit. The ‘terrorists’ were turned into a simple gang of 
criminals without any specific identity (Abū Shādī, 1998, p. 137). ʿĀdil Imām’s Terrorism and 
Barbecue (1992) not only had the word ‘terrorism’ in its title, but also subtly blamed the 
fundamentalist character Rashād, who spends his day praying instead of working, for the 
malfunctioning of government services. Moreover, the film contrasts his pious appearance 
with his constantly staring at, and even trying to seduce, the call girl. But despite all these 
hesitant attempts, it was ʿĀdil Imām’s The Terrorist (1994) that was going to be Egyptian 
cinema’s first frontal attack on Islamic fundamentalism and the film was to set the 
standards for how this issue was going to be dealt with by cinema in the following years. 
 
The Terrorist 
 
Being the first of its kind, The Terrorist has to be read against the background of a change of 
policy which gave the film the regime’s explicit moral backing. In 1993 Ṣafwat al-Sharīf, the 
Minister of Information, announced a new policy of confronting terrorism with media  (al-
 45 
 
idhāʿa wa-l-tilifizyōn 03.04.1993, cited from Lila Abu Lughod, 2005, p. 175). The campaign 
included a television serial called The Family [al-ʿĀʾila30] that was broadcast during Ramadan 
(February 12th to March 14th) 1994. After The Family, the program Confession by a Repentant 
Terrorist31 was broadcast (Armbrust, 2002a, p. 924), followed by the opening of the ʿĀdil 
Imām film The Terrorist during ʿĪd al-Fiṭr. Released to a blizzard of critical acclaim, The 
Terrorist was the crown jewel in the campaign (Armbrust, 2002a, p. 924). It is not unlikely 
that a film like The Terrorist would have experienced difficulties before this explicit change 
of policy. The screenplay for Waḥīd Ḥāmid’s television serial The Family had allegedly been 
held back by the censors for three years, for fear of offending fundamentalist sensibilities, 
but after the above-mentioned change of policy it was produced to a great fanfare (Abu 
Lughod, 2005, p. 167). This indicates that by 1993 the regime had moved some borders of the 
possible in relation to fundamentalism on screen. 
It has been pointed out that this change of policy was less a response to terrorism 
than to non-violent, but threatening, political challenges posed by Islamists (Ahmed 
Abdalla, 1993). The regime, together with the secular opposition at the time, was losing 
ground to the Islamists in elections for both local councils and professional associations. 
Starting in 1992, the regime had again resorted to repressive measures against the non-
violent Brotherhood, and in January 1993 Mubārak proclaimed at the Cairo International 
Book Fair that he intended to spare Egypt the fate of Algeria, capitalising support from the 
‘opposition’ both from the right and the left, indiscriminately targeting all brands of 
Islamists, not only ‘terrorists’ (ibid). 
A film released in coordination with a government campaign naturally leads to 
questions regarding not only the regime’s explicit support, but also in regard to direct 
government involvement. But there are also other indications. The film was shot under 
heavy police protection (ʿĀdil Imām, cited from Ṣabrī Ṣaqr, 2006). There are also rumours 
that ʿĀdil Imām and the director, Nādir Galāl, might have struck a deal with the government 
(Armbrust, 2002a, p. 927).32 An older ʿĀdil Imām film, Gate Five (1983), also directed by Nādir 
Galāl, which had been banned for its alleged smuttiness, was re-released the same ʿĪd. Of a 
total of 48 theatres, 18 were reserved for The Terrorist and 15 others for Gate Five, giving ʿĀdil 
Imām and Nādir Galāl a total domination over the cinemas that ʿĪd. The suspected deal here 
is, of course, that ʿĀdil Imām and Nādir Galāl got the dust of their banned film while the 
government got its anti-Islamist film: a deal that in itself recalls the congruent interests of 
the regime and the cultural players. There is also a lot of ambiguity around the funding of 
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the film. The credits list ‘Pop Art Film’, which is owned by the late Muṣṭafā Mutawallī, the 
character actor who plays Hānī, the Coptic neighbour in the film and who is also ʿĀdil 
Imām’s brother-in-law. This has led many to suspect that the film, which was a relatively 
big production at the time, was funded by ʿĀdil Imām himself 33 (ibid, p. 930: footnote 21). 
But suspected government involvement in the film does not necessarily mean that 
the film team was not sincere in what they were doing, or that they were simply rendering 
the government some kind of service by making a straightforward propaganda film. ʿĀdil 
Imām had at that time – as his ‘visit’ to Asyūṭ shows – already gained himself an anti-
Islamist reputation. The film takes up the theme from Asyūṭ. ʿĀdil Imām says that “When I 
returned from Asyūṭ, I wanted to convert my protest into a film” (cited from Sarḥān, 2006); 
and when he explains how the film came about, he applies the same kind of metaphysical 
rhetoric of destiny he did in Asyūṭ. ʿĀdil Imām explains that his wife tried to convince him, 
for the sake of their children, not to make the film. It was only after an attempt on the life 
of the prime minister, ʿĀṭif Ṣidqī, in December 1993 by al-Jihād al-Islāmī, when a young girl 
was killed by a stray bullet in class (in ʿĀdil Imām’s words, “while she was in the greatest of 
places receiving learning” (wa-hiyya fi aʿẓam makān tatalaqqā al-ʿilm). Note the typical 
modernist discourse used by ʿĀdil Imām here. He juxtaposes ʿilm (knowledge) and jahl 
(ignorance), implying that those who kill a girl while she is imbibing ‘knowledge’ must be 
‘ignorant’), that she changed her mind, saying that “For the sake of our children, you must 
make that film” (ibid). The film placed ʿĀdil Imām in the midst of confrontation again. 
Cinemas showing The Terrorist witnessed intense security measures (Sackur, 1994, cited 
from Khatib, 2006, p.184) and ʿĀdil Imām was declared an enemy of Islam and received 
death threats (Faksh, 1997, cited from Khatib, 2006, p. 184). 
The Terrorist is a conversion narrative (Armbrust, 2002b, p. 924) revolving around an 
injured militant Muslim fundamentalist, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir (ʿĀdil Imām), hiding from the 
police. Circumstances enable him to hide in a sumptuous villa inhabited by a modern liberal 
bourgeois Muslim family, who do not know his true identity. In the course of the film the 
terrorist has a change of heart and is converted to secularist nationalism. He is eventually 
unmasked, and when his comrades set out to smuggle him to Afghanistan he tries to escape 
and return to his host family, so that he can explain himself and prove his conversion. But 
his erstwhile terrorist associates have been watching him, and the film ends with them 
murdering their repentant brother. 
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As a conversion narrative the film very much resembles the well-known nationalist 
film There is a Man in our House [fī baytunā rajul] (1961) by Henri Barakāt. The film, starring 
ʿUmar al-Sharīf, is to this very day shown on Egyptian state TV every 6th of October. In the 
1961 film a nationalist fugitive who has killed an Egyptian collaborator converts his host 
family to the nationalist cause. While the scriptwriter, Līnīn al-Ramlī, denied any 
connection between the two films in an interview with Armbrust (2002a, p. 929: footnote 
10), ʿĀdil Imām confirms the link. He claims that the film’s original title was There is a 
Terrorist in our House [fī baytunā irhābī] (cited from Munā al-Ḥasan, 2007). While the 1961 film 
argues that violence in the nationalist cause is necessary, The Terrorist paints violence in the 
Islamist cause as illegitimate (Armbrust, 2002a, p. 924). The ‘conversion’ of the terrorist 
during a football match between Egypt and Zimbabwe links the film to the nationalist cause. 
This conversion scene stands out as one of ʿĀdil Imām’s most famous. ʿAlī, the secular 
Muslim host family, their Christian neighbours and the anti-Islamist journalist are watching 
the World Cup qualification match between Egypt and Zimbabwe together.34 ʿAlī sits next to 
Hānī, the Christian neighbour. ʿAlī now knows that he is Christian, and also Hānī is aware of 
ʿAlī’s fundamentalist views. They are therefore reluctant to greet each other, but their 
excitement over Egypt scoring the goal needed to enter the World Cup make them both 
forget their enmity and they instantly give each other a hug. The Christian crosses himself 
while the Muslim yells “allāhu akbar” – Egyptians (Muslims and Christians) are inseparably 
united through patriotism (Shafik, 2007, p. 51). 
 
Birds of Darkness 
 
A year later The Terrorist was followed up by Birds of Darkness. The film is about Islamist and 
secular lawyers fighting it out in the courts. At the time the courts had become a major 
battleground for competing ideologies. Islamist lawyers, supported by conservative ʿulamāʾ, 
sought to enforce orthodoxy and public morality through filing so-called ḥisba lawsuits35and 
Cinema generally had become a main target for these lawsuits.36 
Whereas the football match in The Terrorist was the scene of national common 
ground and the conversion of the terrorist to Egyptian nationalism, the football becomes an 
allegory for the Egyptian nation itself in Birds of Darkness. Egypt is suffering from two 
equally evil and unscrupulous ‘teams’. Islamists and government are playing soccer and 
‘Egypt’ is the ball.37 Both of the two ‘teams’ are equally ‘birds of darkness’: opportunists who 
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conduct their illegal business in the dark, away from the public eye. Fatḥī Nawfal (῾Ādil 
Imām), the secular lawyer, represents corruption – the first team – while ʿAlī al-Zinātī 
(Riyāḍ al-Khūlī), the Islamist lawyer represents fundamentalism or even terrorism – the 
second team. Fundamentalism and corruption: which of the two will succeed in destroying 
society? Fatḥī and ʿAlī are old friends. They are both from poor backgrounds and graduated 
together. There is also a third friend, Muḥsin Sharīf (Aḥmad Rātib), whose name would 
translate as ‘the honourable beneficent’. He still believes in the slogans of the past, but has 
chosen to retreat to passivity. The director, Sharīf ʿArafa, explains: "We were not just 
talking about the ‘opportunists’ of terrorism, there were government opportunists as well, 
and they are both equally dangerous. And both are terrorists. And the conflict between 
them will ruin the country. So be careful!" (cited from Ṭāriq ʿAṭiyya, 1999). 
The title itself plays on the discourse of enlightenment (tanwīr). Darkness (ẓalām) is 
the opposite of light, and corruption, both in its fundamentalist and government form, is 
the ‘darkness’ threatening the nation and its progress. This ‘darkness’ has its ‘birds’: people 
who, either out of opportunism or moral weakness, lend themselves to these ‘forces of 
darkness’. Even though the film implies that the term ‘birds of darkness’ is directed at all 
who engage in illegal business, it is also rhetorically connected with fundamentalism, in the 
sense that the proponents of enlightenment see the fundamentalists as their opposite: they 
want to take us back to the ‘age of darkness’.38 Moreover, although the film insists that both 
‘teams’ are ‘birds of darkness’ and that Fatḥī Nawfal – his name would roughly translate as 
‘the gifted opener’ – is an opportunist, the film still invites the audience to identify with his 
predicament. One of the film’s most famous sentences is uttered by Fatḥī Nawfal when, 
after having received his first large fee for defending a corrupt politician, he sees Cairo from 
above for the first time. Looking out the window from a suite at the Cairo Sheraton, he says: 
“To see this country from above is not like seeing it from below. To always see it [the 
country] as beautiful, you always have to see it from above.” This sentence summarises the 
popular dream of social ascent: the desire to be on top, not only physically but also 
metaphorically. Here, ʿĀdil Imām’s star persona and ‘classic’ character, the clever underdog 
who utilises all kinds of moral and immoral strategies to make his dreams come true and 
reach the top, is utilised to tip the scales; if you have to choose between two evils, you 
choose the government, not the fundamentalists. 
The film starts with a disclaimer which says that the film is pure fiction and that if 
any characters in the film resemble real characters, it is wholly coincidental. Khatib (2006, 
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p. 187) claims that this ‘self-censorship’ is linked to the emergency laws that allow the 
president to censor any form of expression prior to publication in the name of ‘national 
security’. I would claim that this disclaimer has very little to do with state censorship. 
Indeed, it has the dramatic effect of giving the audience the feeling that what they are going 
to see is actually so close to the real thing that they will be unable to tell fiction from 
reality. If the disclaimer has anything to do with censorship, I would guess that it is 
connected with ‘street’ censorship and that it has been added in order to avoid being sued 
by groups and individuals who feel targeted by the film.39 And indeed, although it is usually 
thought that the ʿAlī al-Zinātī character was based on Muntaṣir al-Zayyāt,40 a lawyer who 
has become famous for defending imprisoned terrorists, it was the notorious ḥisba lawyer 
Yūsuf al-Badrī41 who set out to sue the filmmakers; the case was argued for six years before 
the court finally turned the lawsuit down in February 2001. 
 
The polemic against the fundamentalist 
 
Although several of ʿĀdil Imām’s films after 1994 mock fundamentalists42 it is The Terrorist 
and Birds of Darkness that are his main films combating fundamentalism, and in many ways 
The Terrorist set the standard for how Islamic fundamentalism was going to be represented 
by Egyptian cinema. After The Terrorist, the theme has become increasingly common in 
Egyptian films. But it is still ʿĀdil Imām and Waḥīd Ḥāmid who are best known for their anti-
Islamist stand. In the following discussion I will attempt to extract and describe the polemic 
against the fundamentalist in ʿĀdil Imam’s films. I will mainly take my examples from the 
aforementioned two films, juxtaposing them with other examples of polemic by the regime 
and ʿĀdil Imām’s views outside the films. I will show how this polemic, by ‘othering’ the 
fundamentalist and by centring on the reproduction of social values and the fostering of 
national identity, aims at reinforcing government hegemony in its war on the Islamist 
challenge. 
Generally speaking, we can say that the fundamentalist is essentialized as an 
extreme ‘other’ (Khatib, 2006, p. 188), an ‘other’ whose cause has to be placed firmly outside 
modernity (Armbrust, 2002a, p. 925) and the national mould. There are several strategies for 
this ‘othering’ or creation of distance. One aspect is behaviour. The fundamentalist is often 
made to speak classical Arabic in situations where it is not natural to do so. In Birds of 
Darkness Fatḥī points this out when he tells ʿAlī to “keep that grammatically correct speech 
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for the courtroom. We are now sitting in a coffee shop.” Moreover, the fundamentalists 
differ from normal Egyptians in the way they dress. They usually wear white ‘salafī-
jallābiyyas’ and are bearded. Only when they need to infiltrate society do they look like 
other Egyptians. ʿAlī in The Terrorist gets rid of his beard to enable him to commit his 
terrorist attack in Cairo. And in Birds of Darkness we see non-bearded fundamentalist lawyers 
allied with ʿAlī al-Zinātī. 
Space is another aspect. In many of the films, the fundamentalist is linked to Upper 
Egypt or the desert. The Terrorist starts off in the Upper Egyptian countryside – a 
stereotypical site of backwardness. Birds of Darkness has an Upper Egyptian connection and 
the fundamentalist in The Yacoubian Building is sent to a terrorist training camp in the 
desert. Thus the fundamentalist is represented as living on the edge of society, both 
physically and mentally. The Terrorist, for example, constructs a stark opposition between 
modern enlightenment, here associated with the upper-class bourgeoisie host family living 
in a spacious villa and enjoying a standard of comfort that is fabulous by Egyptian 
standards, and the fundamentalists’ backwardness linked to suffering and deprivation 
(Armbrust, 2002a, p. 924). According to reviewers this dichotomy was heightened by the use 
of warm and cold light (ibid). The contrast between the room where ʿAlī is being hidden by 
his fundamentalist comrades and the room where he is being treated by his host family 
illustrates this point. The first room is empty and silent: there is only a bed, a rug and a faint 
light bulb hanging from the ceiling. Under the bed there is a grenade chest, and on the wall 
a small calligraphy with the word al-ṣabr (patience). ʿAlī turns off the light. His room 
becomes a reflection of his dark existence. It isolates him from the outside world (Khatib, 
2006, p. 34) and its temptations. The room is for him a retreat from the pleasures of society. 
The closed space of the room becomes an analogy of ʿAlī’s closed mind (ibid). In contrast, 
the room at his host family’s house is warm and light: it is fully furnished, and on the walls 
are posters of American film stars kissing, and leftist symbols like Lenin and Che Guevara. 
The door is mostly open and family members are coming and going. 
President Mubārak constantly portrayed Egyptian Islamism as a product of outside 
forces, especially alluding to Iranian involvement43 (Barry Rubin, 2002, p. 156). The regime 
thus minimised any domestic problem. Hints at foreign involvement are therefore common 
in Egyptian films dealing with fundamentalism. In Birds of Darkness ʿAlī claims that they [i.e. 
the fundamentalists] are being financed through “honest sources: donations from pious and 
god-fearing people” (ahl al-birr wa-l-taqwā), but also “by countries that are zealous about 
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Islam” (ghayūra ‘alā al-islām). That the fundamentalists are supported from outside, places 
them firmly outside the national discourse and implies that they do not have the nation’s 
interests in mind. This is an important element in countering the Islamists’ claims, 
especially since they are often perceived as being the ‘real’ heir of the Egyptian anti-
colonial national struggle following the ‘failure’ of Nasserism. ʿĀdil Imām employs the same 
polemic in interviews, and asks rhetorically: “Who funds them [i.e. the Islamists]? We are 
funded by the people [alluding to the box-office success of his films]” (cited from ʿAmr 
Khafājī, 1995). Legitimacy is derived from the Egyptian people. The fundamentalist, on the 
other hand, is outside, and financed by foreign sources. He lacks this legitimacy and is thus 
a threat to the nation. 
The fundamentalist is not only represented as a threat to the nation but also to the 
arts and freedom in general. This was the theme in Asyūṭ in 1988, and in The Terrorist ʿAlī 
attacks and smashes both video stores and local Christian jewellery stores: scenes that had 
become all too familiar from newspaper headlines at the time. In Birds of Darkness ʿAlī and 
his fundamentalist colleges are conspiring to curb freedom. We see the fundamentalist 
lawyers planning to sue the Ministry of Culture for allowing immoral film posters in the 
streets (exactly as Yūsuf al-Badrī did in 1993). The meeting is filmed from above in order to 
increase the feeling of conspiracy.44 
In The Terrorist, the anti-fundamentalist agitator and journalist, a friend of ʿAlī’s host 
family and a person ʿAlī had tried to kill, is the defender of this freedom. 45 He is represented 
as a brave patriot who is willing to risk his life for his beliefs, and even though he receives 
death threats he refuses even temporarily to leave the country for safety. His only weapon 
is the pen: because according to him, “the ignorant [i.e. the fundamentalist] fears only 
knowledge”. One day the host family’s youngest daughter comes home in high dudgeon. 
She has been given a tape, with an extremist sermon – such tapes were very widespread at 
that time – exhorting her by intimidation to repent, take the veil and give up her, according 
to the fundamentalists, sinful job. ʿAlī suggests that they could all at least listen to the tape 
to see what it has to say, and the journalist, who is committed to freedom of speech, 
naturally agrees. But to ʿAlī’s surprise, they are all non-receptive to the tape’s 
fundamentalist rhetoric and the whole family bursts out laughing when they hear the 
nonsensical hate speech. 
  Another main theme in most of the films is that the fundamentalist discourse is 
hypocritical. From the way these films play on the hypocrisy of the fundamentalist 
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discourse it would seem that they suggest that we have to do with two categories of 
fundamentalist, both of whom are to be equally condemned. As Lina Khatib (2006, p. 187) 
points out, we have ‘fake’ fundamentalists – they are in charge, but are there merely for 
economic and political power. On the other hand we have ‘true’ fundamentalists – they are 
stupid, blind followers who can’t tell right from wrong, and are exploited by the ‘fake’ 
fundamentalists and let down when they are not useful any more. These two kinds of 
fundamentalist clearly lay beneath the following dialogue from The Terrorist where ʿAlī’s 
host family are discussing the phenomena: 
Mother: I have no idea where they [i.e. these terrorists] come from. They can’t  
possibly be Egyptians. It just can’t be that they have drunk from the 
Nile. 
Muḥsin:  It’s politics, Mama. They are people who have sold themselves to 
foreign countries. They are hiding behind religion only to achieve 
power. They are collaborators [i.e. ‘fake’ fundamentalists]. 
Father:  Not all of them, Muḥsin. There are also poor people amongst them 
that have fallen under the influence of these groups because of their 
emptiness (farāgh) and ignorance [i.e. ‘true’ fundamentalists]. 
ʿAlī, in Birds of Darkness, is an example of a ‘fake’ fundamentalist. At university he used to be 
a communist, but has changed his allegiance to the Islamists because of money. As Fatḥī 
explains, “The communists are weakly financed nowadays; the Brothers [i.e. the 
fundamentalists or Muslim Brotherhood], though, their [financial] sources are wide open.” 
ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, in The Terrorist, on the other hand, is a ‘true’ fundamentalist46. It is 
because he is ‘true’ and not ‘fake’ that he can be converted to liberal nationalism, and 
modern liberal education – the quintessential element of Egyptian modernism – in this film 
by transferring the fundamentalist from a fundamentalist environment to a liberal 
educated environment and exposing him to liberal national ideas and feelings of love that 
pave the way for his conversion. 
ʿAlī exposes his ignorance on several occasions. He does not know what grapefruit 
and niskafēh are, and he has never heard of Che Guevara, but is attracted to his beard. The 
‘true’ fundamentalists’ stupidity and ignorance is also shown in Birds of Darkness. Fatḥī visits 
ʿAlī in his new Islamist lawyer’s office in Cairo. He delivers blessings to a group of Islamists 
sitting in the waiting room, to which they respond with a parrot-like ‘amen’. He then goes 
on ‘blessing’ them by saying, “May God separate you,” to which they respond with the same 
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‘amen’.47 ‘True’ fundamentalists are brainwashed and brainwashing is therefore an 
important element for portrayal. In The Terrorist we see the emir Sayf indoctrinating 
children by telling them not to watch state TV or read newspapers. He constantly rebuts 
any question by ʿAlī with “Don’t discuss and don’t question”. 48 In both The Terrorist and The 
Yacoubian Building specific tracts of fundamentalist propaganda were presented. When, in 
The Terrorist, ʿAlī has to contact his comrades through coded speech, he asks for a book in a 
bookshop: 
ʿAlī:   Do you have Torment of the Crypt? 
Bookseller: Do you want Torment or the Crypt? 
ʿAlī:   There is already torment. Where is the Crypt? 
Torment of the Crypt [ʿadhāb al-qabr] is a collection of prophetic traditions, Qur’anic passages 
and commentaries on Heaven and Hell, with the emphasis on Hell. In the eyes of the official 
media it was a brainwashing tool, but because it was basically a collection of orthodox 
statements, it was difficult to criticise.49 The use of Torment in the film therefore contributes 
to portray the fundamentalists as death-obsessed fanatics (Armbrust, 2002a, p. 925). In The 
Yacoubian Building Ṭāhā al-Shādhilī (Muḥammad Imām50) is indoctrinated by the 
fundamentalist leaders, who exploit his frustrations. Gradually his personality changes into 
that of the fundamentalist. He lets his beard grow and dons the characteristic white salafī-
jallābiyya. His relationship with his non-fundamentalist girlfriend Buthayna al-Sayyid (Hind 
Ṣabrī) sours as he moves further and further away from society. Instead of praying in the 
small local mosque (zāwiya), he now prays in a remote fundamentalist mosque. Also in this 
film Islamic literature is an aspect of this brainwashing process. Ṭāhā tries to take Buthayna 
with him on the fundamentalist track by giving her books.51 The camera focuses enough on 
the books to show the titles. But Buthayna, who is a life-loving girl, is just as non-receptive 
of this kind of literature as ʿAlī’s host family in The Terrorist were of the tape. When Ṭāhā 
later gets arrested in an Islamist student demonstration52 – the fundamentalist leaders 
apparently preferred to stay safe behind the curtains, and to give Ṭāhā a leading role in 
these demonstrations – State Security searches his home and confiscates his books. Ṭāhā is 
severely tortured by State Security and his books form part of the evidence against him.53 
Spinning further on the theme of hypocrisy, the fundamentalist discourse is also 
represented as contradicting human nature itself. Both ʿAlīs in The Terrorist and Birds of 
Darkness have to suppress their human nature and lusts to conform with their 
fundamentalist morals. Analogous with the importance of fundamentalists’ sexual and 
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moral discourse in de-legitimising cinema and entertainment, these films make their own 
use of sexual morals to rebut the fundamentalist position (Shafik, 2007, p. 202). The theme 
of the fundamentalist being hypocritical about sexuality was developed in Terrorism and 
Barbecue, where the fundamentalist character Rashād’s excessive praying was contrasted 
with his gazing at, and attempting to seduce, the call girl. 
In The Terrorist this sexual morality becomes a major point around which the 
ridiculing of the fundamentalist revolves. ʿAlī’s sexual desire renders his whole religious 
credibility questionable (ibid, p. 203). When he is being led through the bustling backstreets 
of Cairo, which are full of temptations, we see him gazing at the wriggling bottom of a 
woman walking in front of them. Locked up in his hideout, the above-mentioned empty 
room, we see him fantasising about the neighbour woman, who he can hear laughing and 
singing outside. ʿAlī fantasises about the woman next door – a metaphor for all the 
pleasures he desires but is denied (Khatib, 2006, p. 35) or has denied himself. He is torn 
between religious commitment and his voyeurism. At the home of the host family ʿAlī is 
unable not to stare at the youngest daughter. She works in the fashion business, is not 
ashamed of her body and practises gymnastics to the music of Michael Jackson. Being 
convinced by his emir that the ‘possession’ of infidel’s women is permissible, he does not 
hesitate to make a sexual move against her, but is blatantly rejected. The use of morality 
was also central in Confession by a Repentant Terrorist, where the repentant ʿĀdil ʿAbd al-Bāqī 
directed his attack at the deviant morality of his former associates (Ismail, 2003, p. 67). 
One of the most memorable scenes in The Terrorist, which took place at Sawsan’s 
birthday party, played very much on ʿĀdil Imām’s capabilities as a comedian. ʿAlī, the 
ignorant terrorist, is completely unaccustomed to the conventions of this kind of social 
gathering. Being afraid of being recognised by an invited security officer, he loudly declares 
that he is a communist and that he is usually to be found at nightclubs. To be convincing, he 
pours down drinks and, of course, gets drunk. Here ʿĀdil Imām is in his true element. He 
dances and hugs whoever he comes over of the opposite sex and, as if he considers them a 
spoil of war, loudly declares, “Welcome Franks and what is left of the Crusaders” while 
embracing two foreign women, before stumbling up the stairs and, as if from a pulpit in a 
mosque, delivering a parody of an Islamist hate-speech, addressing the audience with “Oh 
you people of heresy and hellfire!” (yā ahl al-bidʿa wa-l-nār), before passing out and falling 
down the stairs. 
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But sexual morals and gender roles are also utilised on another level in the 
contrasting of fundamentalist women and ‘normal’ Egyptian women. The fundamentalist 
women, covered up in niqābs, are usually silent (The Terrorist, Morgan Ahmed Morgan54 and 
Yacoubian Building). If they do say anything, it is always in the most submissive way, as in 
The Terrorist, where, when the emir Sayf presents ʿAlī to his future wife, she only says “As 
you like, master”. Additionally, the fundamentalists are represented as treating their 
women badly: they marry them off to each other as if they were commodities (The Terrorist 
and The Yacoubian Building55). This point was also made by ʿĀdil ʿAbd al-Bāqī in Confession by a 
Repentant Terrorist56. And in The Terrorist we see the emir shouting and gesturing at his wives 
as he would do with animals (Khatib, 2006, p. 195) and hushing them away once ʿAlī knocks 
on the door. This is contrasted to ‘normal’ Egyptian women, who are represented as active, 
working outside the home and taking part equally in conversations with the men, as seen in 
ʿAlī’s host family in The Terrorist. 
Also in Birds of Darkness, the sexual aspect is made use of. ʿAlī, here a ‘fake’ 
fundamentalist, is not ridiculed in the same way as his namesake in The Terrorist. On the 
contrary, his fundamentalism makes him a bore. When the prostitute Samīra wants to give 
ʿAlī a hug to thank him for having defended her at court, Ali tries to escape and we get the 
following dialogue: 
Fatḥī:   You know he doesn’t like being kissed. 
Samīra: What does he like then? 
Fatḥī:   He actually doesn’t like anything at all. 
When Samīra serves them food, ʿAlī refuses to eat. He doesn’t want to eat food that is illicit 
(ḥarām), thus recalling Islamist protests and boycotts of the serving of ifṭār-meals financed 
by famous belly dancers who, for fundamentalists and many ordinary conservatives, are to 
be likened to prostitutes. In reply Fatḥī sarcastically remarks that she is innocent in the 
eyes of the law.  But ʿAlī is not a bore by nature; it is his fundamentalism that makes him 
one. He was different before he became a fundamentalist. He used to play the Oud and sing. 
At emotional moments, when he expresses his real feelings and not his ‘fake’ ones, he 
sometimes still does. When Fatḥī says: “Hope you haven’t quit playing. If you have, you 
would really be a bore,” he plays and they sing together Slowly, slowly! Swing! [yā wāsh yā wāsh 
yā Murgīḥa].57 Music and song, despised by some fundamentalist groups for their alleged 
sexual temptation yet ruled as not contradictory to Islamic law by al-Azhar, are in several of 
these films contrasted with fundamentalism. When ʿAlī in The Terrorist is asked by his host 
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family whether he prefers ʿAmr Diyāb, ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ḥāfiẓ or Michael Jackson – an essential 
question aimed at cultural distinction in the secular liberal bourgeoisie class – he replies 
that “for God they are all the same.” ʿAlī thus places himself outside that community. But 
after his conversion, we see him in the shower for the first time, singing Why are you 
wronging me? [bituẓlumūnī lēh?] by ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ḥāfiẓ, before he again suppresses his real 
feelings with “I ask God’s forgiveness!” (astaghfar allāh al-ʿaẓīm). It is again no coincidence 
that it is a ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm song he sings. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm is not only a symbol of love and 
nostalgic longing but also an icon of secular Nasserist nationalism. 
Moreover, the Islamic fundamentalists are corrupt and hypocritical in their 
participation in national politics. Since they can’t run for elections themselves – the regime 
refuses to legalise any religious political parties – they are, as can be seen in Birds of 
Darkness, backing certain ‘secular’ candidates in exchange for favours (Khatib, 2006, p. 186). 
Fatḥī comments: “You [i.e. the Islamist here alluding to the Brotherhood] are a movement 
which is unable to become a party while we [i.e. the NDP] are a party which is unable to 
become a movement.” So the secular lawyer Fatḥī needs ʿAlī’s help in mobilising the 
support of the fundamentalists for his corrupt candidate. When ʿAlī protests by saying that 
the candidate is corrupt, he is told that “It’s this corruption that lets you [i.e. the Islamists] 
exist.” The fundamentalists are actually dependent on the government and are only able to 
act in the political field because of the government’s goodwill. But the government doesn’t 
come off any better here. The anti-Islamist theme in ʿĀdil Imām’s films is integrated into his 
anti-corruption line – the other main leitmotif of most of his films. Fatḥī reminds ʿAlī that 
“The government is clever. It has left you the mosques. Let you publish books, hold 
interviews, all this to prove that it is democratic,” to which ʿAlī replies: “and we are very 
pleased with that kind of democracy”. In an interview with a foreign journalist ʿAlī is asked 
to explain the Islamic movement’s position on violence. Here the hypocrisy is again 
exposed, as he answers very vaguely. The fundamentalists, even when acting in ‘non-
violent’ fields, are usually connected to terrorism. In Birds of Darkness the fundamentalist 
lawyer ʿAlī defends imprisoned brothers. He visits them in prison and facilitates 
communication between them and terrorists outside through an Islamic investment 
company. All this on orders from a man in western dress addressed as ‘master’ (mawlānā). In 
this way the film implies that they all – the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic investment 
companies and Islamist lawyers – are equally involved in terrorism, thus strategically 
blurring the lines between different aspects of the Islamic trend. 
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But denouncing and mocking Islamists is only one strategy. In confronting 
fundamentalism, these films also try to recapture religion for the nation or to put forward 
an authentic positive alternative version of religion. The regime has constantly asserted 
that it is composed of believing Muslims loyal to the message of the Prophet. In a similar 
way ῾Ādil Imām claims: “I also belong to ‘the Islamic trend’ and I am also zealous about my 
religion” (cited from Khafājī, 1995). ʿAlī’s host family in The Terrorist is tolerant and liberal. 
Although the fundamentalists would call them infidels, they are just as good Muslims as 
anybody else. Their Islamic identity is confirmed when ʿAlī is about to take farewell with the 
family, just before his true identity is exposed, by the mother giving him an amulet with the 
‘throne verse’.58 When she discovers his true ‘terrorist’ identity, she says, “My son, religion 
[is supposed to be] easy (al-dīn yusr) and [full of] mercy (raḥma).” The well-known ḥadīth ‘al-
dīn yusr wa laysa ʿusr’ (Religion is easy, not difficult), together with the focus on ‘mercy’ 
instead of ‘torment’, sums up the liberal version of Islam, as opposed to that of the 
fundamentalists. Religious belief is supposed to make life easier and not complicate matters 
for the believer. In its sound enlightened version religion is no obstacle to development. In 
the film, the same position of Islamic enlightenment is also clearly stated by Muḥsin when, 
at the hospital, he sees all the new imported equipment and comments: “When are we going 
to catch up with the world [i.e. the west]? Instead of progressing we are quarrelling about 
whether we should enter the bathroom with the right or the left foot first.” So although it 
denounces fundamentalism, the film contends that religion is an integral part of the 
Egyptian national identity. In the same interview in Rūz al-Yūsuf ʿĀdil Imām states that “The 
Prophet loved his country, he loved Mecca and when he was driven out of it he wept” (ibid), 
thus emphasising how patriotism and religious belief are two sides of the same coin. 
Thus Egyptian anti-Islamist films do not fall into the trap of becoming anti-Islamic, 
as several Hollywood films are perceived to be. Tolerant, enlightened Islam is an integral 
element of Egyptian nationalism, while fundamentalism is represented as a moral 
aberration (or, in religious terms; bidʿa - heresy) from this kind of sound religious belief, an 
aberration caused by ignorance (i.e. the ‘real’ fundamentalist) and egoism/opportunism (i.e. 
the ‘fake’ fundamentalist) that does not shrink from using criminal methods, and that is a 
threat to the nation. Fundamentalism is not only an aberration but also a corruption of 
‘true’ Islam. In this way it is the fundamentalist understanding of religion that becomes 
bidʿa and not society, as many fundamentalists claim. Fundamentalism is thus linked to 
corruption, as can be seen in, for example, Birds of Darkness. Fundamentalism is only one side 
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of the same coin, corruption being the other. “We are against all that is corrupt,” ʿĀdil Imām 
explains (ibid). In this way the ‘real’ fundamentalist is analogous to corruption caused by 
greed (fasād al-jashaʿ): the source of both is selfishness, while the ‘fake’ fundamentalist could 
be linked to corruption caused by need (fasād al-ḥāja). The glue that holds the nation 
together, and which makes up the alternative to these two kinds of deviations, is Egyptian 
patriotism in its enlightened version. Sound traditional Egyptian values countering egoism 
and selfishness are combined with modern education and enlightenment countering 
ignorance. 
 
The discourse of national unity 
 
The discussion of the perceived fundamentalist threat against the modern Egyptian secular 
state is closely connected to one of the basic concepts of Egyptian nationalism – the 
discourse of national unity. This is a discourse in which Christians and Muslims are always 
referred to as ‘the two elements of the nation’. Unity here means the unity of these two 
elements: the Crescent and the Cross. Thus if there were no Christian there would be 
nothing to unite. Therefore the Christian as an abstract assumes some importance. 
The Muslim fundamentalist, because he allegedly places religion over nation, 
threatens this national unity. This discourse of national unity must not be confused with 
Coptic nationalism, as Khatib seems to do, when she says that “these films seem to prefer a 
selective integration, celebrating the nationalism of the Copts while portraying Islamic 
fundamentalists as intolerant of people from other religions” (Khatib, 2006, p. 191). Coptic 
nationalism, in the sense of Coptic separatism, is – although in The Terrorist maybe in a more 
subtle way – excluded in the same way. In the same way as ʿAlī in The Terrorist fables about 
establishing a purely Muslim fundamentalist state that excludes Christians, the wife of the 
film’s Christian character Hānī, ʿAlī’s host family’s neighbour, harbours very similar 
opinions. She constantly harasses her husband Hānī with religious obligations. He is not 
allowed to drink or watch television, he has to listen to sermons, and she wants him to quit 
his job because she considers it inappropriate in relation to religion. She even threatens 
that if he fails to comply, she will leave for America. Her fundamentalism is thus connected 
to the Coptic lobby in the USA, which many Egyptians perceive as the Christian side of the 
same fundamentalist coin. The film therefore implies that not only Islamic fundamentalism, 
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as has been mentioned, is financed from outside, and is thus foreign to the Egyptian 
national body, but that also Christian fundamentalism has a strong foreign connection. 
    These films, therefore – and this is true of all Egyptian films that include Coptic 
characters – rather than ‘celebrating Coptic nationalism’ silence any difference  between 
‘the two elements of the nation’ other than the difference in worship: Crescent / Cross and 
church / mosque. That is why, in The Terrorist, the Islamic fundamentalist character ʿAlī 
initially doesn’t even recognise Hānī as Christian: in Egyptian cinema, the ultimate sign of 
the presumably even national fabric (Shafik, 2007, p. 51). Only later, when ʿAlī is sitting with 
Hānī’s little daughter on his knee, does he discover that she is wearing a cross under her 
pullover. ʿAlī, who had perceived Hānī to be a good and religious person, is thoroughly 
shocked and disappointed and he hushes her away and refuses to talk to her any more. 
The film also explicitly idealises Hānī’s patriotism and noble character. He is not 
merely a passive ‘element of the nation.’ He took part as a doctor in the October War, and 
when ʿAlī, after his true identity has been exposed, seeks refugee from the police in Hānī’s 
house and takes his daughter and wife as hostages, he not only saves him from the police 
but also volunteers to give him medical treatment. The scene in which ʿAlī is ‘converted’ to 
Egyptian nationalism also reconciles ‘the two elements in the nation’, as both of them stand 
up, give each other a hug and congratulate each other on the goal. 
The host family and their neighbour Hānī both represent the ‘sound’ elements of the 
nation. Hānī’s fundamentalist wife and ʿAlī, on the other hand, are its rotten or corrupted 
components. Thus honour and blame are equally distributed between ‘the two elements of 
the nation’ and national unity retained. Hānī’s comment that “if everybody [i.e. Christians 
and Muslims] would just stick to their religion, we would have solved most of our 
problems,” plays into the same rhetoric. By ‘stick to their religion’ is here meant not to 
deviate into a corruption of that religion, i.e. fundamentalism, but to keep to the sound and 
healthy beliefs. 
The Terrorist is somewhat exceptional for its time in that it accords the Coptic 
element such a large role in the film. Although several of Egypt’s most distinguished film 
makers are Christians, explicit Coptic characters in Egyptian cinema have been few and far 
between. The fact that historically the Copts have refused to claim minority status, instead 
cementing themselves into a national identity discourse, while on the other hand seeking to 
forge a separate space for themselves that excludes the dominant Muslim other, has 
affected their willingness to openly represent their own community (Mehrez, 2008, p. 192). 
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In this way the film is typical, in that the Coptic element’s raison d'être in Egyptian cinema is 
to project national unity and thus bring about balance, showing that fundamentalism is a 
problem in both religions. The Terrorist, being not only an anti-Islamist but also a nationalist 
film, explains the need for including the Christian element. Birds of Darkness, on the other 
hand, being basically a film about corruption, in which fundamentalism is only one aspect 
of this corruption, therefore does not need a Christian element. Another reason why it was 
timely to provide this anti-Islamist film with a message of national unity was that in 1994, 
the same year that the film was released, a conference on minorities in the Middle East, in 
which Egyptian Copts were supposed to take part, was to be held in Egypt. The conference, 
which was organised by the Private Ibn Khaldoun Centre headed by Saʿd al-Dīn Ibrāhīm and 
the Minority Right Group in London, gave rise to a highly charged debate in the media and 
had to be moved to Limassol in Cyprus. One of the conference’s most forthright critics was 
Muḥammad Ḥasanayn Haykal, and the controversy centred upon the idea that the Copts 
were a minority. It touched the very core of the Egyptian national discourse of national 
unity in which Muslims and Copts are always addressed as ‘the two elements of the nation’, 
never alluding to the Copts as a minority. 
On the other hand sectarian disturbances and alleged persecution of Copts in Egypt, 
combined with the lobbying by the exile Coptic community in the U.S., caused the Egyptian 
government considerable embarrassment. The terrorist attacks on Christians in Egypt not 
only threatened to break up the national unity but it was also feared that it would pave the 
way for foreign intervention; and, indeed, in Haykal’s opinion the conference was just the 
first step towards foreign intervention in Egypt’s internal affairs. The Terrorist was therefore 
not only an attack on the Muslim fundamentalist threat but also a reconfirmation that 
secular Egyptian nationalism was still going strong and that Egypt would not accept any 
foreign interference, be it from Muslim fundamentalists financed from abroad or Coptic 
fundamentalists seeking support from the USA. 
 
Hassan and Murqus 
 
With the escalation of confrontations between Copts and Muslims throughout the 1990s, 
and especially in the aftermath of the sectarian violence in the village of al-Kōsha in 2000 
that claimed 22 lives, the government decided to take Coptic representation on the screen 
into its own hands (Mehrez, 2008, p. 192). This resulted in the Ramadan serial Time of Roses 
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[Awān al-ward] (2000) written by Waḥīd Ḥāmid, a serial that called for national unity and 
solidarity and that was intended as a lesson in ‘moderate’ religious values for both Muslims 
and Christians. But with its symbolic representation of national unity through the, from a 
Coptic point of view, socially and religiously unacceptable marriage between a Coptic 
woman and a Muslim man, it backfired. The serial outraged many in the Coptic community, 
and rather than promoting national unity it caused controversy along sectarian lines. The 
pressure forced the script of the final episodes to be changed and the Coptic woman was 
made to recognise that her marriage to a Muslim was a mistake. This incident shows the 
dangers that this thorny issue represents. 
It therefore seems reasonable that ʿĀdil Imām, when he decided to take the theme of 
‘the two elements of the nation’ on screen in the film Hassan and Murqus in 2008 would take 
care to avoid falling into the same pitfall as Time of Roses. If anything, sectarian violence had 
only increased in recent years, and controversies of national proportion like the ones 
surrounding Time of Roses and the film I love Cinema [Baḥibb al-Sīma] (2004) had moved the 
issue onto centre-stage in the national consciousness. The example of Iraq, with its 
increasing sectarian violence following the U.S. invasion of the country, was an additional 
reminder of the danger that sectarianism posed. ʿĀdil Imām states: "[It] is a threat to our 
national security, and we can't stand still” (N. N., 2007). 
And again, as The Terrorist was Egyptian cinema’s first frontal attack on Islamic 
fundamentalism, so Hassan and Murqus was the first Egyptian film to take the thorny issue of 
sectarianism as its main theme. In focusing on and parodying the mutual distrust between 
‘the two elements of the nation’ rather than simply projecting a picture of unity, and by 
acknowledging that the problem had reached such a magnitude, the film definitely pushed 
some limits. But The Terrorist confidently confirms a strong Egyptian nationalism in the face 
of both an external and an internal, fundamentalist threat, Hassan and Murqus seems to set 
out to reconfirm or re-establish the same national unity – a unity that appears to be under 
severe threat – placing its hope in the coming generation. 
In one of the first scenes we are at the inaugural session of the 51st Conference of 
National Unity, one of the frequent official conferences held to foster the supposed feelings 
of love and brotherhood between Muslims and Christians. But as we watch the priests and 
imams enter the scene, the camera focuses first on two priests and then on two imams, and 
we see them both complaining about the other. “What’s the point with conferences, we 
[Christians] can wait another hundred years without getting our rights,” says one of the 
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priests. “We are not able to build churches, nor even renovate a toilet, without asking for 
permission from the Ministry, which takes ages to get. That’s how it is. Can any of our sons 
obtain important positions in the government? Tell me, how many Christian ministers are 
there? Only kisses, hugs and conferences. You can change what I say but not what I think 
(illi fī l-qalb fī l-qalb yā kinīsa).” “Persecuted, they say? It is we [Muslims] who are persecuted,” 
complains an imam. “Every time we build a mosque, they have to put up a church right in 
front of it. Three-quarters of the country’s money is in their hands. Is there any job they 
have not taken? Bank managers, presidents of administrative councils and large companies, 
they are all Christians. Have you ever seen a Christian beggar? And then they complained 
that their feasts were not official holidays until they all became official holidays. Our feasts 
with their feasts, the whole year has become a holiday and there’s nobody working 
anymore.” 
Inside the conference again we see the same priests and imams hand in hand, as 
people are accustomed to see them in the official Egyptian media, shouting “Long live, the 
Crescent with the Cross.” The film is definitely bold in breaking this taboo and admitting 
that sectarian hatred is ripe in Egypt, something that the government has always tried to 
deny. But this is also the only bold thing about the film. The film as a whole insists on 
avoiding touching on any taboos which could have undermined the message of unity, and it 
therefore refuses to leave the standard script of national unity. 
The film aroused controversy already before shooting began. I guess that in the light 
of the Coptic community’s recent active involvement in fending off intrusions into, and 
perceived misrepresentations of, their separate space, ʿĀdil Imām took the script to the 
Pope Shanūda, allegedly for approval. In doing so, he broke with the long-established 
consensus among the secular cultural players of excluding any third parties, by which is 
meant religious individuals and institutions, from the process of censorship. ῾Ādil Imām 
later retreated, claiming that it was only to learn about Christian religious practice in order 
to represent it correctly in the film, though he admitted that the Pope had demanded the 
change of his role from priest to religious preacher because under no circumstances can a 
priest put on other clothes (cited from Munā ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, 2008). 
The film is a comedy of mixed identities. Būlus (ʿĀdil Imām) is a Christian preacher 
and professor of theology who believes in national unity. He is being threatened by 
Christian extremists and has to escape. The State Security give him and his family new ID-
cards. He becomes Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār and has to live under cover as a Muslim. In the meantime, 
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but independently, a similar story is unfolding with Shaykh Maḥmūd (ʿUmar al-Sharīf). To 
escape Islamic fundamentalists, who are threatening him because he refuses to become the 
leader of their group, he too is given a new identity. He becomes the Christian Murquṣ ʿAbd 
al-Shahīd. Both men end up in opposite flats in the same building and they become friends, 
of course without either knowing the other’s true identity and both thinking that they 
belong to the same religion. 
Because of the sensitivity of the subject the film is very concerned with retaining the 
balance between ‘the two elements’. If the first scene is a mosque, the next scene has to be a 
church, and a scene with a Christian fundamentalist has to be balanced against a Muslim 
one. It is also this concern for balance that demands the presence of an actor of the calibre 
of ʿUmar al-Sharīf as ʿĀdil Imām’s opposite number in the film. In its concern with balance 
the scenario’s credibility seems to suffer. And as Midḥat Bishāy (2008) comments, a 
Christian preacher having a bomb planted in his car by Christian fundamentalists, 
especially when the film gives no hint of him having broken with any of the Church’s 
traditions,  is not very convincing. On the other hand, a Shaykh who refuses to become an 
extremist group’s leader is hardly a strategic target for a terrorist attack. These scenes can 
only be interpreted against the background of the balancing act between the two sects to 
avoid falling into the pitfall of being biased towards one or the other of the two. 
 Būlus, Maḥmūd and their respective families are an allegory for ‘the two elements’ 
of the Egyptian nation. They are patriotic, of high morals and both are anchored in sound 
and enlightened religious beliefs, while the society around them is afflicted by sectarianism, 
fundamentalism and religious hatred. The two protagonists are destined to remain 
together. The film is full of allusions to their shared destiny: “Where are we heading, 
Ḥasan?” “It seems that our destiny is one, Murquṣ”, and on the film’s billboard we see them 
standing beside each other, handcuffed together. To live together as ‘two elements’ is 
destiny and a moral imperative; sectarianism, on the other hand, is a moral deviation. 
Like The Terrorist, this film set moderate, enlightened religious values up against 
fundamentalist extremism and ignorance. In the opening scene we see Shaykh Maḥmūd 
praying. “My God, help me with what you taught me, and teach me what helps me. Increase 
my knowledge.” Simultaneously Būlus and his son are praying in church, “King of Peace, 
give us your peace.” These prayers, focusing as they do on knowledge, love and peace, are 
contrasted with the ignorance, hate and sectarianism of the fundamentalists in both 
religions. Būlus and his family, after having changed their identity, are first sent to al-Minyā 
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in Upper Egypt by State Security. Again Upper Egypt is the stereotypical site of 
backwardness. Here he is mistaken for a famous Islamic fundamentalist preacher and soon 
finds himself with a large group of blind followers. He is forced to lead the community in 
prayer and heal childless women – a sign of superstition and ignorance – and the local State 
Security accuse him of being a member of al-Qāʿida. In the mosque Būlus is put to answering 
legal inquiries from the local community. Lacking all knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, 
he tosses the questions over to the local imam, asking him, “So what does religion have to 
say about this issue?” and the ignorant community shouts “allāhu akbar” in satisfaction at 
the answers. Only one question does he answer himself. A man who is being beaten by his 
wife asks for a fatwa, and Būlus answers: “A woman like that doesn’t need a fatwa, she 
should be handed over to the public prosecutor.” Būlus thus reinforces the state’s role over 
that of religion. 
Another common strategy the film employs in dealing with the Coptic issue is to 
recall the alleged lost paradise of national unity and the golden age of liberalism. The anti-
colonial demonstrations of 1919, with priests speaking in the mosques and the imams in the 
churches, have become a national cliché, made famous through the filmization of Nagīb 
Maḥfūẓ’s trilogy and reproduced and alluded to in several nationalist films. In Hassan and 
Murqus59 the ‘good old days’ are recalled through an anecdote about cinema. In a flat in 
Alexandria the two families, each still unaware of the other’s identity and thinking that the 
other family belongs to the same religion as they do, are watching television, and when 
Nagīb al-Rīḥānī’s musical comedy Candy Floss [Ghazal al-Banāt] (1949), of which they are all 
very fond, comes on screen Būlus comments that “It was the great writer Badīʿ al-Khayrī 
who wrote for Nagīb al-Rīḥānī.” Maḥmūd says, “He was a Christian,” whereupon Būlus 
explains: “Well, that was what al-Rīḥānī also thought. But when Badīʿ al-Khayrī’s mother 
died and he went to offer him his condolences, he found Qur’an-recitation at the funeral. So 
he asked: ‘What is this? You are a Muslim!?’ ‘Yes,’ he said. ‘So why didn’t you tell me?’ And 
Badīʿ answered: ‘Because you didn’t ask me’.” The point is, of course, as Būlus explains, 
“That was how it was in the past, in the good old days,” when one could not differentiate a 
Christian from a Muslim. But unfortunately this is not how it is today. So Maḥmūd inquires 
anxiously “So Nagīb al-Rīḥānī was a Christian?”, which Būlus confirms, and Maḥmūd – who 
is Muslim – does not seem at all happy about learning that his beloved al-Rīḥānī has turned 
out to be a Christian. In contrast to the golden age even our protagonists are inflicted with 
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sectarianism, but hope can be placed in the coming generation, who we see in love, gazing 
into each other’s eyes. 
The neighbours, on the other hand, are suspicious of a Christian family that 
befriends a Muslim. And when a Christian boy, who has fallen in love with Fāṭima, 
Maḥmūd’s daughter, who he, of course, thinks is Christian and called Maryam, discovers 
that she goes out with Girgis (Muḥammad Imām), Būlus’ son, who they all think is a Muslim 
and is called ʿImād, the whole neighbourhood clashes in a street brawl between the Muslim 
and Christian neighbours. Here the film touches on one of the thorniest issues of 
sectarianism in Egypt: the issue of mixed relationships. It was this kind of ‘unacceptable’ 
relationship that was the main point of controversy that forced the script of Awān al-Ward 
to be changed. But the film refuses to involve itself in the problem, and neatly solves it 
without getting lost in forbidden territory. At first both families welcome the relationship. 
They cannot be blamed, as they both think it is totally uncontroversial, because, with their 
mixing of identities, they think the others share the same religion as them. But when Girgis, 
Būlus’ son, intends to propose to Fāṭima, who he thinks is Christian like himself, they have 
to reveal their true identities. They are both shocked and disappointed, and back home we 
see them with their respective families. Fāṭima and her mother now have their ḥijābs and 
niqābs back on, and their parents are blaming the other family for having lied and cheated 
them. These scenes, in which the sectarian hatred grows in them, are juxtaposed with 
Christian and Muslim preachers holding hate speeches against the other sect in churches 
and mosques, before the masses storm out to battle each other in the name of the Cross and 
the Crescent. As the clashes erupt, both families have already decided to leave for Cairo 
again. Now that it turns out that he is a Christian Būlus is no longer to be trusted, and like a 
real fundamentalist Maḥmūd now locks his wife and daughter in their room in order to go 
to the station and buy the tickets. But on his return Maḥmūd finds that a street battle has 
broken out and a Molotov cocktail has put the two families’ flats on fire. Būlus manages to 
save Maḥmūd’s daughter and wife from the fire. Sheikh Maḥmūd reaches out his hand to 
Būlus and the camera focuses on the two hands holding each other tightly: national unity is 
re-established and the two families walk out, leaving the chaos behind them. 
The film is a nationalist statement calling for unity and solidarity in order to save 
the nation. It calls on sound, moderate, enlightened religious values: values that lead to 
unity, as opposed to fundamentalism, which threatens to break up this unity. Destiny and 
morality are called upon to keep the Egyptians on the right national path. In recalling the 
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‘good old days’, setting them up as an ideal and comparing them with the present ʿĀdil 
Imām is following the tradition of al-Muwayliḥī of ‘exposing the manners and customs’, 
thus clearly remaining inside the accepted realist-reformist paradigm of social comment in 
order to reform. The message here is therefore conservative and again concerned with 
bringing Egypt back on the right track. ῾Ādil Imām says he hopes that “Christians and 
Muslims will leave the cinema and embrace and kiss one another” (cited from Yolade Kell, 
2008). For that to happen the film avoids all controversial issues and is obsessed with 
maintaining the balance between the sects. I would claim that the boldness of ʿĀdil Imām’s 
confrontation with sectarianism is of limited value; rather than confront the underlying 
causes, he reproduces and repacks the same traditional hegemonic discourse of national 
unity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Fundamentalism, both in its Islamic and Christian version, is represented as being foreign 
and incompatible with Egyptian identity, and the anti-fundamentalist line is a main 
component of ʿĀdil Imām’s films. In confronting fundamentalism, two main strategies are 
employed. Fundamentalism is contrasted with modernity. This is in line with the 
government’s strategy of restoring its modern image in alliance with secular cultural 
players. On the other hand, fundamentalism is also contrasted with sound religious values. 
This again is in line with the government’s second strategy of confronting fundamentalism 
by challenging its claim to orthodoxy in alliance with orthodox institutional Islam. Both 
strategies are utilised in ʿĀdil Imām’s films. The first dominated The Terrorist while the 
second is stronger in Hassan and Murqus. 
The ‘straight path’ projected in these films is one by which the nation is supposed to 
be progressing on its way to modernity while retaining its religious identity without falling 
into fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is therefore a deviation from this straight path, or a 
corruption. This nationalist discourse is a moral one, in which people are being coerced 
back onto the right track by being shown the vices (fundamentalism) that should be 
avoided and the virtues (sound religious values and modernism) that should be respected, 
very much in al-Muwayliḥī’s tradition of ‘exposing the manners and customs’. This again is 
not unlike the fundamentalists’ own grid of dividing the world into ḥalāl (licit) and ḥarām 
(illicit) and through the concept of ‘al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar’ (to enjoin good 
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and forbid evil) othering deviations and corruptions of their own ‘straight path’ as kufr 
(infidelity) and irtidād (apostasy); morality is the area of convergence between the two 
discourses. 
Armbrust (2002a) compared The Terrorist to another later ‘high-brow’ Egyptian anti-
Islamist film The Closed Doors [al-abwāb al-mughlaqa] (1999), and he concludes that ʿĀdil 
Imām’s film, even with its propagandistic surface, is much more skilfully enmeshed in 
Egyptian history – and I would say political discourse – than The Closed Doors, which could 
seem to be hermetically sealed from broad Egyptian audiences (Armbrust, 2002a, p. 922). I 
would add to this the suggestion that the above-mentioned structural analogy between the 
discourse in these films and that of the Islamists – of course in addition to ʿĀdil Imām’s 
enormous popularity – may be the key to understanding how these films may be much 
more effective and influential than many equally anti-Islamist high-brow films. 
 
Renewed anti-modernism 
 
The string of films written by Waḥīd Ḥāmid and directed by Sharīf ʿArafa, all of which had 
been perceived as embodying serious political undertones, in addition to the outright attack 
on the Islamic fundamentalists in The Terrorist, had definitely transformed ʿĀdil Imām from 
the vulgarian intellectuals loved to hate into a hero of the secular state. If it is true that this 
transformation, and the return of the rhetoric of modernism and patriotism in these films, 
is connected with the ‘Islamist threat’, then it would not be unlikely that this rhetoric 
would lose momentum and be submerged if the threat disappeared. Ali (2003) claims that 
“the mid-1990s were a peculiarly open moment for the security-conscious and autocratic 
Egyptian state. President Ḥusnī Mubārak had been re-elected to his third term in office, the 
Islamic insurgency of the early 1990s had been brutally crushed and the regime was proud 
of its international status in the revived Middle East peace process.” He further asserts that 
the producers of Sleeping in Honey – a film which he claims has a more confrontational tone 
to it than Terrorism and Barbecue – may have taken advantage of this particular opening to 
suggest a more democratic society (ibid). I am not sure whether I agree that Sleeping in 
Honey really calls for a more democratic society, or that the latter half of the 1990s really 
saw some signs of an opening up towards a more pluralistic political system. It must not be 
forgotten that, from the very beginning of his reign, President Ḥusnī Mubārak had 
promised reform and that the promise of reform and economic progress is one of the very 
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pillars on which the regime’s legitimacy rests. The discourse of modernism is in itself one of 
reform, and political discourse in Egypt, on the part of both the government and the 
opposition, is reform-oriented. I would therefore claim that ‘the call for reform’, as long as 
it remains within the accepted limits, is an integral part of the dominant ideology of 
modernism and not necessarily a sign of boldness.  But if it is true that the latter half of the 
1990s saw some openings towards a more pluralistic society, I would still maintain that 
Sleeping in Honey – which, because of ʿĀdil Imām’s enthusiasm for Birds of Darkness, was 
postponed for some time – with its exaggerated allegory of impotence and modernist 
rhetoric of ‘ilm versus jahl elevating and educating the masses, rather belongs to the 
repressive atmosphere of the early 1990s. 
If the ‘new political situation’ of the latter half of the 1990s – a confident regime and 
the failure of the Islamists’ violent strategy – had any influence on ʿĀdil Imām’s films, it 
would seem that it led to some wavering in, and submergence of, the modernist rhetoric 
which he had established through his films in the first half of the 1990s and a return to 
some kind of vulgarity. While his films scripted by Waḥīd Ḥāmid, as has been shown, had a 
patriotic and moral discourse with a focus on duty, those from the latter half of the 1990s 
are a ‘mixed lot’, and it is probably this ‘mixed lot’ that led Armbrust (2002b, p. 241) to guess 
that ʿĀdil Imām’s ‘media transformation’ from the ‘vulgarian intellectuals loved to hate’ 
into the ‘hero of the secular state’, may have been only of a temporary nature. Although 
some of the films from the period were nationalist, the overall picture is a return to 
vulgarity and in many of the films also the pre-1990s formula of failed modernism or anti-
modernism. If ʿĀdil Imām, through his collaboration with Waḥīd Ḥāmid and Sharīf ʿArafa, 
had given the regime and elite the modernist and anti-fundamentalist films they wanted, it 
would seem that ʿĀdil Imām might have thought the time was ripe again to give ‘the people’ 
what they wanted. 
In 1995 the film Bakhit and Adila, written by Līnīn al-Ramlī and directed by Nādir 
Galāl, was released. This film was a comedy supposedly without any political content. “I 
want to see people laugh,” ʿĀdil Imām said (N. N., 1994). But because of the perceived lack of 
any political content, the film was not well received by most critics. Irīz Naẓmī sees the film 
as an unjustified step backwards: to farce and slapstick and a return to comedy for its own 
sake, without any serious message, a kind of comedy that ʿĀdil Imām did over twenty years 
ago (Naẓmī, 1995); and Maḥmūd Saʿd writes “Oh Abū Rāmī60  – you are greater than Bakhīt!” 
explaining that “if comedy for its own sake has become a noble cause then I don’t think I am 
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mistaken when I say that it would be more noble to laugh while at the same time 
contemplating our situation” (Saʿd, 1995). But initially the credit he had earned with the 
critics through his ‘serious’ social comedies made most of the critics accept this deviation as 
a well-deserved break. 
On the other hand the film was very well received by popular audiences. It broke all 
previous box-office records, becoming the – until then – best-selling Egyptian film in 
history; and in 1997 the success of Bakhit and Adila was reinvested, on ʿĀdil Imām’s request 
(ʿAfāf ʿAlī, 1997), in a second Bakhit and Adila film with the sub-title The Bucket and the Teapot, 
which again broke all previous box-office records.61 A third film featuring Bakhīt and ʿAdīla, 
Hello America, was released in 2000. 
These three films are about a couple with the silly-sounding names of Bakhīt 
Hinayda’ al-Mihēṭal (ʿĀdil Imām) and ʿAdīla Ṣandūq (Shirīn), who all of a sudden get their 
hands on a lot of money. In all three they start off poor and deprived. Suddenly ‘a bag full of 
money’ ‘falls’ into their hands, enabling them to start on a tour of ‘exposing’, only to lose it 
all and end up broke again. In the first Bakhit and Adila film the ‘bag full of money’ falls into 
their hands by accident, the result of a switch of suitcases between a drug dealer (Muṣṭafā 
Mutawallī) and Bakhīt on a train. A tour of exposing the rottenness of the rich then begins 
and they are naturally cheated by everyone and end up back where they began. In the 
second film they are again back at zero. Poor and deprived as they are, they are unable to 
marry or even find a flat, and without protection are abused and humiliated by everyone. 
When ʿAdīla hears of the benefits, especially the diplomatic immunity, members of 
parliament enjoy, they decide to nominate themselves for election, and a new tour of 
exposing takes place – this time of parliamentary life and elections. That’s where the sub-
title comes in, the ‘bucket’ and ‘teapot’ being nonsensical symbols which candidates are 
given to enable illiterate electors to recognise them – “Long live the bucket!” “Vote for the 
Teapot!”62 The official candidates are naturally given more meaningful symbols, such as a 
camel or a crescent. A drug gang offers them their support in the election campaign in 
return for future services, and again large amounts of money is handed over in bags. So 
while the social ascent in part one was a means to expose the corruption among the 
nouveaux riches, it here serves the same function of exposing the corruption of 
parliamentary life or ‘the election mafia’, and in entering parliament the film claims to be 
bold. ʿĀdil Imām later explained that it ran into trouble with the censorship authorities. In 
1997, the year the film was released, several members of parliament were under 
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investigation for corruption, and only five years earlier a drugs league in parliament had 
been exposed (Manāl Lāshīn, 1997).63 In the film, the drugs league support Bakhīt and 
ʿAdīla’s election campaign because ‘their man’ in parliament had fallen, thus recalling the 
five-year-old scandal. The last scene of the film is a caricature of Egyptian parliament. 
Bakhīt and ʿAdīla, who themselves have entered parliament only for personal gain, are 
surprised when, as the first session opens, they find themselves surrounded by the three 
most corrupt crooks from the first film. On their left is the businessman (ʿIzzat Abū ʿŪf), 
now a bearded, grim-looking Islamist, who cheated them of their money in the first film, 
and on their right they find the drug dealer (Muṣṭafā Mutawallī) to whom the bag of money 
and cocaine in the first film had belonged. And to complete the picture, the Speaker of the 
Assembly turns out to be the very same bank director (Ḥasan Ḥusnī) who, in the first film, 
had cheated them and run away with the cocaine they had deposited in his bank.64 The film 
thus ends with a conclusion similar to the one in Birds of Darkness of a political life hijacked 
by crooks. 
But was it bold? ʿĀdil Imām himself says that the film only passed the censors after 
the President himself had seen it (al-Shinnāwī, 2007). According to ῾Ādil Imām, the 
President consented to the film by saying: “He who has a wound on his head will keep 
touching it” (illi ʿalā rāsu baṭḥa yiḥassis ʿalēha) (cited from Sarḥān, 2006), which means that ‘a 
crook will always give himself away’. This statement could illustrate the regime’s position 
on corruption. Even though one might suspect that corruption in Egypt is part of the 
system and a necessity for the regime to endure – close supporters are allowed to exploit 
their positions in order, under the threat of prosecution, to ensure their absolute loyalty – 
the government likes to present itself as fighting corruption. The occasional ousting or 
prosecution of corrupt businessmen and members of the regime thus enables the regime 
both to ensure the support and loyalty of its remaining clients and at the same time to 
present itself as the upholder and defender of law and order. In that way ʿĀdil Imām’s ‘anti-
establishment’ films ‘exposing’ and mocking corrupt businessmen and politicians become a 
part of the system. 
The ‘exposing bit’ in these films thus is very similar to, and maybe more clearly 
stated than in, many of ʿĀdil Imām’s ‘consciousness’ rising films from the first half of the 
1990s. All show the negative sides and how things are not supposed to be. But contrary to 
his films from the early 1990s, though like his films of the late 1970s and 1980s, they do not 
project any alternative. Although the narrative takes place in an atmosphere of failed 
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modernism and the films don’t project any modernist solution, the ideology of modernity is 
still implicit understood. These films are therefore hardly anti-modernist in the sense that 
they are against modernism; they mirror modernist ideology by representing and 
‘exposing’ its opposite. The characters Bakhīt and ʿAdīla represent the deprived Egyptian 
masses’ dream of rapid social ascent and the ‘bag full of money’ becomes a symbol of the 
impossibility of attaining that dream. The bags are always from morally dubious sources 
and they always come suddenly or by accident, indicating that the dream can only be 
realised through a good portion of luck and/or immorality. As in Birds of Darkness, not only 
the ‘big sharks’, those Bakhīt and ʿAdīla expose and who eventually cheat them and take 
their money, are corrupt but also Bakhīt and ʿAdīla themselves prove easily corruptible. 
Like the naive and initially honourable Ragab character who in the films of the Ragab-trilogy 
was himself corrupted as he gravitated towards a ‘rotten core’, Bakhīt and ʿAdīla, too, have 
few scruples about throwing their principles overboard. ʿAdīla, who starts off as a primary 
school teacher at the beginning of the first film teaching her students high values and 
moral principles, has no moral scruples herself and takes the ‘bag of money’ and escapes to 
Cairo with Bakhīt. In many ways these films thus resemble the anti-modernism of the Ragab 
trilogy. While this lack of higher values in the films doesn’t prevent the ‘popular audiences’ 
identifying with the protagonists – on the contrary, as the box-office success would 
indicate, they are probably relieved at not being taught a lesson – many Egyptian critics had 
difficulties with the couple’s immorality and vulgarity. In the first Bakhit and Adila film, once 
they have money, the two indulge in excessive gourmandising, eating until they both throw 
up. They squander their money and, because each of them suspects that the other intends 
to cheat him, they readily pick fights with each other, throwing and breaking furniture and 
even shooting at each other. 
The first two Bakhit and Adila films both take place in an ‘anti-modernist climate’ in 
which everything is rotten and corrupt, and where there is no enlightened voice to elevate 
Bakhīt and ʿAdīla from corruption and vulgarity. On the contrary, the ‘core’ towards which 
they move is similar to that in the Ragab trilogy, thoroughly rotten. It is when they are 
‘back to zero’, when they are centrifuged back to the edge and with the morally tarnished 
money all gone, that they discover that they are happy and actually do love each other after 
all. They can look back at the capitalist dream of becoming rich and their incursion into 
immorality with a smile. Safely back at the bottom of the social hierarchy, they can once 
again take the moral high ground. So even though these films do not include any higher 
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values to elevate the ibn al-balad, they do still operate within the same value system as the 
modernist films. And although they invert the element of progress and the protagonists 
regress into corruption, the underlying ideology of the narrative remains one of 
modernism. The films expose how things are not supposed to be and by pointing out the 
‘vices’ the ‘virtues’ are, even if absent, implicitly understood. 
 The clearest statement of anti-modernism and vulgarity of the period was his 1999 
film Mahrous, the Minister’s Boy. This was ʿĀdil Imām’s first collaboration with Yūsuf Maʿāṭī, 
who was later to become his favourite scriptwriter. In this film ʿĀdil Imām is a poor, 
ignorant fallāḥ who, through connections becomes a minister’s right hand and personal 
adviser. He invades the minister’s life, driving him crazy. The whole film is a series of 
sketches ridiculing the minister. Maḥrūs, like Ragab, is a naive and ignorant fallāḥ who, as 
he moves to the centre of corrupt political life, learns his lesson fast and eventually ousts 
the minister and takes over his position. In the very last scene Maḥrūs – now himself having 
become the minister – sits in the garden of his spacious villa surrounded by his three 
wives.65 The point that Maḥrūs has not only taken the minister’s position, but has become 
the very same type of corrupt minister as his predecessor, and that the downward spiral of 
political life is going to continue, is made when the actor Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ, the minister’s new 
‘right hand’, comes in and stands behind them all. From Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ’s character – he was, 
with ʿĀdil Imām, one of the main troublemakers in The School of Troublemakers and has 
appeared with ʿĀdil Imām in several other films; in Ragab on a Tin Roof he was Bulbul, the 
pickpocket who cheated Ragab when he first arrived in Cairo – the audience is made to 
understand that the story – the corruption or inverted ‘elevation’ of the ignorant fallāḥ into 
a minister – is going to repeat itself. Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ is now Saʿīd, the Minister’s Boy66 and just as 
Maḥrūs, invaded the minister’s life and took over his position, Saʿīd is going to do the same 
with Maḥrūs. 
The film was again an enormous success at the box office. The critics, on the other 
hand, tended to agree that it was his worst. Several of them complained that the film had 
‘no positive characters’ (Khayriyya al-Bishlāwī, 1999, she said the same about Bakhit and 
Adila (al-Bishlāwī, 1995)), that it was escapist (ḥurūbī) and that it played on people’s desire to 
make fun of officials whom they think are in a position to tyrannise them (al-Bishlāwī, 
1999); also that he utilised the easy magic formula for success of mixing the needed 
elements of politics, comedy and sex (Khayr Allah, 1999) to ensure his box-office success. 
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Conclusion 
 
Looking at the group of films starting from the first Bakhit and Adila in 1995 and the last in 
2000, it can seem that the ‘change of paradigm’ from the centrifugal anti-modernist films of 
the 1970s into renewed modernism in the first half of the 1990s, was interrupted in the 
second half of the 1990s. Although not all of his films from this period are anti-modernist,67 
it is the anti-modernist comedies that scored highest at the box office. To the critics’ 
dismay, both the first two Bakhit and Adila films and Mahrous, the Minister’s Boy all broke 
previous records. As a result of the renewed vulgarity of these films, the gap between 
audience and critical reception of ʿĀdil Imām re-emerged, and the end of the 1990s was a 
period in which ʿĀdil Imām was much attacked in the local press. Al-Shinnāwī claimed that 
ʿĀdil Imām’s “remarkable success also has led to a remarkable fear of losing his position, 
and that he therefore gambles on what is secure (yurāhin ʿalā-l-maḍmūn) and avoids 
experimentation,” adding that ʿĀdil Imām “tries to give his audience what they want, not 
primarily in order to please the audience, but basically to please himself, who only cares 
about his sales at the box office” (al-Shinnāwī, 1997). It does indeed seem plausible that ʿĀdil 
Imām’s return to vulgarism was guided by commercial considerations. Ādil Imām maintains 
that his “role is to return to pure comedy. I have understood that people with the ever-
increasing pressures of life and all their financial and psychological problems are in need of 
such films” (cited from Sharīf Nādir, 1998).  ʿĀdil Imām seems to have concluded that the 
audiences weren’t prepared to pay to listen to admonitions. It also seems plausible that 
projections of social unity and patriotism were more relevant in times when the regime was 
under pressure. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, by the mid-1990s the 
regime had regained self-confidence, as it now definitely had the upper hand in its war 
against the Islamist terrorists. The regime was now sufficiently relaxed to allow the 
mocking of officials and the exposure of governmental corruption without necessarily 
incorporating it in nationalist or modernist rhetoric. Māgida Khayr Allāh suspects that ʿĀdil 
Imām’s films were so popular with audiences because he is “the only one enjoying relative 
freedom to make fun of the government (bahdalat al-ḥukūma),” and she claims that this is 
probably done in agreement with the government in order to project a picture of being 
democratic and ‘letting off some steam’ (Khayr Allāh, 1997). Although ʿĀdil Imām constantly 
claims that he is not an artist for the regime but for the people, and that his role is to be a 
comedian and not a politician, it seems clear that he had by then achieved a special position 
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vis-à-vis the regime: a position he was going to hold on to and further develop in the 
following years. 
 
ʿĀdil Imām – a ‘godfather’ of the nation 
 
After a period of wavering in relation to the nationalist and modernist message of his films, 
and the varied reception of them by both audiences and critics, ʿĀdil Imām returned in The 
Danish Experiment (2003). This film was considered a comeback for him (Shafik, 2007, p. 91) 
and it re-established his position as Egypt’s number one actor after several relative failures 
at the box office (his 1998, 2000 and 2002 films did not reach their expected sales). All ʿĀdil 
Imam’s films from then on, except for The Yacoubian Building (2006), were scripted by Yūsuf 
Maʿāṭī, and I would claim that thereafter they are all clearly nationalist and modernist 
again. 
 The new comedies scripted by Yūsuf Maʿāṭī differ from ʿĀdil Imām’s modernist films 
from the early 1990s in several ways. They are lighter: there is no suffering, predicament or 
humiliation in them. Also the class approach and subject matter have changed. There are 
few references to poor people and their sufferings (as was the case in his modernist films 
from the early 1990s), nor is there any reference to the dream of rapid social ascent (as, for 
example, in the Bakhit and Adila trilogy). After having been criticised for playing roles 
considered inappropriate to both his age (youth wanting to marry in the Bakhit and Adila 
trilogy) and physicality (action hero in A Message to the Ruler), ʿĀdil Imām changed his screen 
character. From then on he played father figures, or at least adults. His characters were now 
usually wealthy or at least had no financial predicaments. Several of these films, beginning 
with The Danish Experiment, have also changed focus from the lower- or middle-class 
common man’s predicament to negotiating contemporary Egyptian youth culture. 
ʿĀdil Imām’s role as a father enables him to comment on youth culture and negotiate 
youth / parent relationships. In the Danish Experiment he poses as ‘godfather’ of the Egyptian 
patriarchal family. In A Groom from the Security Apparatus he is an over-protective and jealous 
father who rejects everyone who asks for his daughter’s hand, but in the end he is outwitted 
by a clever State Security officer. In Morgan Ahmed Morgan he is a rich, but uneducated 
businessman who seeks his modern-educated children’s acceptance by re-entering 
university. 
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All his films focusing on contemporary youth culture also take place in an upper- or 
upper-middle class environment. ʿĀdil Imām has now changed his attire, and from now on 
mostly wears suits. In that sense it could be discussed to what extent he still embodies the 
predicament and wishes of the ‘common man’. But although he has changed his outer 
clothing, he has kept several traits from his previous figures. Although he is rich now, many 
of the characteristics of his lower-class identity are still present in varying degrees. He is in 
many ways still ‘simple’, vulgar and uneducated, but he is also generous, kind and in many 
ways likable. So even though his characters are no longer from the popular neighbourhood 
(al-ḥāra), he does still embody many of their values. The ʿĀdil Imām character of the 1970s 
had been a sympathetic, but naive and corruptible, hero who fell prey to the system, but he 
was also clever (fahlawī) and sometimes he achieved his desired social ascent while at other 
times he was outwitted by more powerful crooks. The ‘new’ ʿĀdil Imām that emerged at the 
turn of the millennium was in many ways the very same character, only thirty years later. 
The simple ‘common man’ of the 1970s had by then achieved his social ascent – although 
not always by honourable means – and was now being ‘outwitted’ or was at least in some 
kind of competition with the younger generation or his own children. 
An explanation of these changes in ʿĀdil Imām’s approach can possibly be found in 
certain structural changes that had taken place in the film industry in the 1990s. The 
condition of the old first- and second-class cinemas in central Cairo and Alexandria had 
been constantly deteriorating since their nationalisation in 1963. This decline in the 
standards of cinemas reinforced gender segregation, and audiences increasingly came to be 
lower-class male. The decline was reversed in the early 1990s. State-owned cinemas were 
leased or sold to private entrepreneurs and renovated, while at the same time an increasing 
number of modern first-class cinemas were built in Cairo’s more affluent suburbs (Shafik, 
2007, pp. 283-284). This structural change naturally led to a change in audiences. Shopping 
malls developed the potential for creating a new, less hostile, urban space, where women 
and youth could move about more easily, but they also reinforced social exclusiveness 
(Mona Abaza, 2001, p 108, cited from Shafik, 2007, p. 284). Thus the shopping malls seem to 
have facilitated a new, more gender-inclusive, but upper-middle-class youth culture that is 
linked to the films shown in the malls, and films designed by the producers for this 
particular audience are often labelled ‘shopping mall films’ (Shafik, 2007, p. 284).68 
Simultaneously a generational shift also took place both in the star system and in 
the audiences. A wave of young new comedians emerged in the late 1990s, and it seemed 
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that they were going to take over the show. As for ʿĀdil Imām, it appears that, after an 
absence of over a year, he tried to adapt to these new circumstances in his film Prince of 
Darkness (2002). In this film, which was directed by his son Rāmī Imām, he collaborated with 
the new generation of filmmakers and actors; but although it was heavily marketed the film 
flopped, failing with both critics and audiences. It was with The Danish Experiment that he 
seems to have found the new formula. The formula for success in Egyptian commercial 
cinema is often derogatively summed up by critics as ‘comedy, sex and a little bit of 
politics’. The Danish Experiment has all this, but I would say that ʿĀdil Imām’s ‘formula’ also 
includes a dose of Egyptian patriotism and varying degrees of pandering to the younger 
audiences. 
The Danish Experiment was followed up by A Groom from the Security Apparatus (2004) 
and later by Morgan Ahmed Morgan (2007). All three films could easily be classified as 
shopping-mall films. They are all scripted by Yūsuf Maʿāṭī and directed by ʿAlī Idrīs. I think 
that in these three films ῾Ādil Imām has adapted to the change in the social structure of 
cinema audiences. Revenues are now mainly drawn from the new, modern first-class 
theatres. While cinema audiences in the 1970s and 1980s were increasingly lower-class 
male, the new audience is more gender-inclusive, younger, richer and better educated, but 
probably morally just as, if not more, conservative. 
In the following two sections I will take a closer look at two of these films – The 
Danish Experiment and Morgan Ahmed Morgan. In analysing them I will show how, although 
they utilise very different strategies, both films present an enlightened modernist but 
conservative message. I have chosen these two films both because I think they are the most 
popular ones of the three and because they best illustrate my point. 
 
The Danish Experiment 
 
In The Danish Experiment Qadrī al-Minyāwī (ʿĀdil Imām) is the father of four adult sons. The 
opening shots of the film show Qadrī with his four sons jogging up a hill, as a harmonious 
family. The father and his sons are probably meant to be read as an allegory for the 
Egyptian nation. In his position as Youth Minister Qadrī has to receive a foreign guest, Anita 
Gutenberg. She is a self-declared ‘sex prophet’ who holds a Ph.D. in ‘sexual culture’, with 
‘sexual positions’ as her special field of study. Her mission is to implement ‘the Danish 
experiment’, which here means to improve Egyptian youth’s sexual awareness. When asked 
 77 
 
about the curriculum, she says: “the first year teaches ninety positions”. And very much as 
a diva in a ‘sexy video clip’, she descends from the plane at the airport. Her Barbie-like 
appearance, blue eyes and long blonde hair seduce everyone, and like a magnet she attracts 
every male around her. A groom receiving his bride at the airport divorces her on the spot. 
All men – Egyptians, Gulf Arabs and Africans – leave their luggage and female companions 
and follow her. Outside the airport chaos ensues, and on the way to Qadrī’s home they are 
followed by an ever-growing crowd of sex-starved men. 
In conservative and Islamic discourse the control of female sexuality is essential in 
order to ensure the integrity of society. ʿAmr Khālid claims that “If women stand erect, 
society will stand erect” (inn istaqāmat al-marʾa istaqāma al-mujtamaʿ). “Why?” he asks 
rhetorically, before he goes on and explains: “because one woman can easily entice one 
hundred men, but one hundred men cannot entice a single woman” (Khālid, 1999?). It is 
against the background of the importance attributed to female sexuality in conservative 
discourses that the dominant hostility and scorn against the wave of sexy video clips has to 
be interpreted. The video clips thus “rub salt in a particularly sore spot” (Armbrust, 2005), 
and their corrupting influence on society, and particularly youth, is widely feared by 
conservatives. I would suggest that The Danish Experiment is a comment on, and a reflection 
of, this discourse. But the film does not adopt the discourse. It rather negotiates it. In the 
film the one woman not only entices a hundred men, but seemingly is a threat to a whole 
nation. The film’s title also points in this direction. The word tajriba itself is here a double 
entendre carrying the meaning of both experiment and temptation.69 Thus the film’s title 
could also be read as The Danish Temptation. Social unrest that threatens national unity is 
commonly dubbed as fitna in Arab political discourse, but the same term in traditional 
Arabic literature is used to describe ‘chaos’ provoked by female sexuality (Shafik, 2007, p. 
91). 
 At home Qadrī has his hands full trying to enforce his parental control and keep 
‘temptation’ away from his sons. His sons have been raised traditionally under their father’s 
protection and close supervision. Their family name, al-Minyāwī, indicates that they are of 
southern-Egyptian descent. Their behaviour indicates that they have little experience –
especially in the sexual field. They are therefore completely incapable of resisting Anita, 
and the ‘temptation’ therefore causes fitna in ‘the Egyptian House’. Before Anita’s arrival, 
father and sons were together in all and everything under his patriarchal leadership. After 
Anita’s arrival this unity breaks down, as they all compete for her favour. 
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Not only the sons, but also Qadrī, the father who has been widowed for over twenty 
years and has devoted his entire life to his sons70, is eventually unable to resist temptation. 
His sons have been his destiny. He has only had sex with his wife five times: his four sons 
plus the wedding night, which he calls ‘the great setback’ (al-naksa). Eventually he manages 
to win Anita’s heart and intends to leave Egypt with her, forsaking his sons and duties. 
While he, the adult, has tried to prevent his sons, the youth, from falling for ‘temptation’ he 
himself falls for it. But at the very last minute, at the airport, with his sons present to bid 
him farewell, he realises his mistake. “I will not be able to live without those bastards (awlād 
il-kalb dōl). I love you. [But] I love Egypt,” he says. The closing scenes show Qadrī and his 
sons jogging up the same hill as in the opening sequence, but now with their wives and his 
grandchildren. The camera focuses on each of these happy families in turn, emphasising 
that Anita hasn’t succeeded in planting the seeds of fitna between father and sons after all. 
The unity of the Egyptian patriarchal family has been maintained and ʿĀdil Imām is the 
family’s godfather. 
Through its message of national unity the film lands in a middle position between 
the two – for the effect of comedy – exaggerated positions of a morally restrictive and 
backward East versus an absolutely permissive and developed West. The film is therefore 
not first of all a comment on the perceived ‘cultural threat’ that female sexuality through, 
for example, video clips and satellite television, poses for Egyptian youth and the 
conservative discourse against this threat. The film also wishes to be understood as a 
cultural and political allegory on globalisation, commenting both on the East-West 
encounter and the North-South relationship. 
The East-West encounter is highlighted through the gendering of the allegory. While 
the encounter with the external and internal other has usually been depicted as a male 
affair, signalling that the nation is to be defended by men from men, and the nation is thus 
indirectly coded as female, this is often reversed when the ‘other’ encountered is the 
‘western other’ (Shafik, 2007, p. 90). The western ‘other’ is usually, as in this film, imagined 
as female, thus re-coding the Egyptian nation as male.  And the encounter is presented 
through values. Qadrī̇ constantly reminds Anita that “We are an eastern country. You 
cannot do this in Egypt.” 
But the film also places Egypt together with other countries in the Third World. This 
is emphasised in the scenes where Anita arrives at Qadrī’s home. As mentioned above, a 
crowd of people has followed them from the airport. This crowd – in addition to Egyptians it 
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includes Gulf Arabs, Indians, South-East Asians and Africans – follows Anita and Qadrī all 
the way into the bedroom. Qadrī politely shows one man after another the exit. The Asians 
are the first to leave, reluctantly followed by the others. But a tall black southern-Sudanese-
looking dude remains. He points at the blonde girl (Anita) and says that he wants to marry 
her for 50 cows. When Qadrī refuses, he becomes violent. I would contend that this scene 
not only places Egypt amongst the third world nations, but also positions the country in a 
hierarchy of nations constructed around race, where developing Asian and Middle Eastern 
nations occupy a middle position of relative development between the white European and 
the black African.71  The North-South dichotomy is also elaborated by the juxtaposition of 
ignorance and barbarism with knowledge and civilisation. Qadrī and his sons are not only 
traditional; they are also ‘barbarians’. They eat exaggerated amounts of food, drink from 
barrels and are constantly engaged in fighting and furniture smashing. Their exaggerated 
machismo and violence are not only a sign of masculinity, which is presented as a contrast 
to Anita’s feminine sexuality, but also a sign of them being uncivilised. Anita several times 
reproves Qadrī when he tries to keep his sons in line by yelling at them, saying: “This is not 
a civilised way to discuss”, before finally declaring outright: “You are a barbarian!” (inta 
hamagī). Also Qadrī constantly calls his sons mules (baghl) and bastards (awlād kalb). 
I would suggest that through these different allegories the film is not only 
nationalist, but also projects the very essence of traditional Egyptian modernist discourse. 
Egypt is supposed to adopt the West’s and the developed world’s science, knowledge and 
technology, but not its morals. This is the trap of failed development into which Qadrī falls. 
As he learns from Anita, he forgets his own values and identity. But as he intends to leave 
the country with her, the sight of his sons at the airport reminds him of his true identity 
and duties. He takes the only correct modernist decision: he combines ‘western technology’ 
(i.e. the things he learned from Anita) and ‘oriental values’, and returns to his country and 
sons, thus contributing to their (his family’s and, as an allegory, his country’s) development. 
This is shown in the last scene, in which the extended family – now with wives and 
grandchildren – is seen harmoniously jogging together up the hill again. 
 
Morgan Ahmed Morgan 
 
Murgān Aḥmad Murgān (ʿĀdil Imām) is a rich and powerful businessman who believes that 
everything can be bought for money and that everyone can be bribed. For him, corruption 
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is no longer a necessity, but an art – an art he has mastered. But his son ʿUday (Sharīf 
Salāma) and daughter ʿAlyā’72 (Basma) are of a different opinion. They are students at a 
private university and are under the influence of Dr. Jīhān Murād, the modern, enlightened 
and incorruptible teacher of ‘civilisation and civilising studies’ (ʿilm al-ḥaḍāra wa-l-taḥaḍḍur). 
They are not only embarrassed by their father’s uncivilised and vulgar ways, but also feel 
humiliated and ashamed when the press accuses their father of being corrupt. In order to 
gain his children’s respect and win Dr. Jīhān’s heart – he falls in love with her at first sight – 
Murgān tries to ingratiate himself with them by proving that he is cultured and able to take 
a university degree. 
Several critics (examples are Khayr Allāh, 2007 and Munā al-Ghāzī, 2007) have 
connected this film with the shifting status of education in Egypt as represented by ῾Ādil 
Imām’s characters Disūqī Affandī and Bahgat al-Abāṣīri. Here, Disūqī Affandī represents the 
high esteem in which education was held in Egypt under ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, while Bahgat al-
Abāṣīrī – who in The School of Troublemakers argued that “learning cannot be measured in 
aubergines” (al-ʿilm lā yukayyal bi-l-bittingān)73 – becomes a symbol for the rapid 
deterioration of the status of education in the following decades. Al-Ghāzī (2007) therefore 
claims that Murgān Aḥmad Murgān represents an attempt to revive Disūqī Affandī’s 
‘country for the holders of certificates’, while Khayr Allāh (2007) sees Murgān Aḥmad 
Murgān as the very same Bahgat al-Abāṣīri only thirty years later – he has now become a 
successful businessman, but he has not received any education to speak of and is just as 
vulgar and ignorant as before. Translating this into the terminology of modernism and anti-
modernism, Murgān Aḥmad Murgān would represent a return to the modernism that 
dominated before The School of Troublemakers. 
The film is a comment on contemporary Egyptian society and utilises the traditional 
‘realist-reformist paradigm’ of ‘exposing the manners and customs’, by pointing out vices 
and virtues. ʿĀdil Imām confirmed this view when he explained that Morgan Ahmed Morgan74, 
although a comedy, would comment on positive and negative phenomena in society (cited 
from Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh, 2007). It is mainly two different phenomena that are being 
dealt with. One is the role of businessmen in society and politics, the other contemporary 
Egyptian youth culture. 
When Murgān Aḥmad Murgān – the rich but vulgar businessman whom several 
critics have compared with Bahgat al-Abāṣīrī from The School of Troublemakers – (re-)enters 
university and is squeezed through the modern education system in order to be reformed 
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and elevated into a responsible modern, educated man, he has to navigate between two 
contradictory ‘extremes’ of contemporary youth culture. Murgān ‘falls’ into both ‘extremes’ 
and exposes them as deviations. To win Dr. Jīhān’s heart there is only one way for him: by 
serious study, with no cheating or bribery. Thus the rich but still vulgar businessman is 
transformed by the university, ‘the modernist institution’, without being absorbed into the 
two contradictory deviations of contemporary Egyptian youth culture. 
Youth are in official discourse sometimes accused of being radical Islamists, while at 
other times, paradoxically, the same youth are deemed easily susceptible to the corrupting 
influences of Western culture. The juxtaposition of these two contradictory accusations 
reflects the rise of two phenomena in popular youth culture in Egypt: that of the lay 
preacher ʿAmr Khālid and that of the sexualised Arabic music video clips (Hossam Bahgat / 
Wesal Afifi, 2007, p. 70). 
Morgan Ahmed Morgan reflects this official discourse. When Murgān enrols at 
university it is to discover that the naughtiness of the youth of the early 1970s in The School 
of Troublemakers was nothing compared to the youth of the third millennium. The students 
are split between exaggerated emancipation and recklessness on the one side and a group 
of strict Islamists on the other. Each of these two ‘extremes’, or deviations, is connected in 
the film with their respective ‘phenomena’ – the spoiled reckless westernised youth with 
the video-clips and the Islamists, with ‘the new lay preachers’ (al-duʿāh al-gudud). 
The ‘westernised youth’ are represented by several caricatures of spoiled and 
reckless youth. One of these is Haytham Dabbūr. He speaks in a slang which is a mixture of 
English and Arabic, and functions as a caricature of the alleged careless attitude of 
contemporary youth, an attitude which is not very unlike that of the troublemakers thirty 
years earlier; and it may be because of these similarities that Murgān is attracted to them. 
Turning usual parent / youth relationships upside down, Murgān tells his son and daughter 
that he is going to study with a friend of his (the usual, and in many families the only, 
acceptable excuse for being out in the evening), only to go out and party with his new 
friends. In the discothèque they take drugs. Back in class the next morning Murgān is 
hardly able to keep his eyes open. In his imagination the teacher, Dr. Jīhān, turns into the 
Lebanese sex-pot Hayfāʾ Wahbī singing her infamous būs al-wāwā [kiss the owie], turning the 
scene into a comment on the dangerous lures that these sexual video clips supposedly 
represent. Again as in The Danish Experiment it is the father ʿĀdil Imām who, with his 
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traditional background, turns out to be most easily susceptible to the corrupting influence 
of contemporary youth culture. 
  In the film spoiled westernised youth and Islamist-oriented youth are connected to 
each other by showing that they both challenge patriarchy and practise deviant sexual 
morals. Egyptian society does not permit sex for unmarried youth, and especially for girls 
such relationships remain a taboo. The film equates the westernised youths’ boy-girlfriend 
relationships, in the film termed antama,75 with the Islamists’ alleged practice of ʿurfī-
marriages.76 Already on his first day in class Murgān discovers that his daughter ʿĀlyāʾ is 
mi’antima (i.e. is the girlfriend of) with a spoiled and not very masculine-looking boy. When 
he sees them flirting with each other in class he is furious. To the Islamist students’ loud 
acclaim and the spoiled westernised students’ horror Murgān, who with his traditional 
values is unable to accept that his daughter has a boyfriend, attacks the boy and gives him a 
beating. “This is the clash of civilisations,” one of the students comments. To Murgān’s 
surprise he learns that the university sanctions such relationships and that he has to 
apologise for having ‘hurt the boy’s feelings’. Here Murgān’s traditional masculinity and ‘ibn 
al-balad’ code of honour are contrasted with some of these westernised and spoiled youths’ 
lack of honour. Rather than hitting back, the boy complains to the university 
administration that his feelings have been hurt, and when Murgān asks him, “What would 
you do if you found out that your mother was my girlfriend?” he says “that he wouldn’t 
mind, but Ma already has a boyfriend.” Horrified, Murgān exclaims that “this is no 
university. This is a nightclub.” 
When Murgān attacked the boy in class, he had appealed to the Islamic feeling of 
morality, adopting or imitating an Islamist style of rhetoric and shouting: “Verily, they are 
inviting to a hostile belief and encouraging sinful and vicious acts” (innahum yadʿūna ilā 
daynin77 ladīd yaḥuththu ʾalā al-fujr wa-l-radhīla wa-l-fisq) and “Verily, this is the trial, Brother 
Maḥmūd” (innaha al-fitna yā akh Maḥmūd). He is now invited to join the university’s Islamist 
group, The Family of the Light of Truth (Usrat Nūr al-Ḥaqq), in order to form a front against 
dissolution (inḥilāl) and laxity (tasayyub). On the surface his traditional values seem more in 
accordance with those of the Islamists, but he is soon to learn that these Islamist youth 
practise a similar kind of antama and thus constitute the very same challenge to traditional 
patriarchy. “What about morals?” (al-akhlāq) Murgān asks. “You see how the girls at 
university are doing – blouses are on their way up and trousers down.” “There is no 
solution but marriage” (lā ḥalla siwā al-zawāg) Maḥmūd, the Islamist leader, explains. 
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“Marriage protects the boy and girl from falling into disobedience” (al-zawāj yaṣūn al-fata 
wa-l-fatāh min al-wuqūʿ fī l-maʿṣiya). In Egypt it is widely feared that what is addressed as the 
‘marriage crisis’ (azmat al-zawāg), i.e. delayed age of marriage, causes sexual frustration 
which ultimately threatens to break down the social structure of society. Murgān, reflecting 
traditional patriarchal control, asks, “But how can they marry while they are students and 
still dependent on their parents?”, to which Maḥmūd explains that “marriage in secret is 
much better than public abomination” (al-qabīḥa fi l-ʿalan). The Islamist students marry 
secretly (ʿurfī-marriages), behind their parents’ backs, with an Islamic blessing, prompting 
Murgān to exclaim: “So you are practising boyfriend-girlfriend relationships (mi’antimīn) 
too. What’s the difference?” Both ‘extremes’ of contemporary youth culture thus practise 
the same moral deviation of ‘free’ boyfriend-girlfriend relationships that threaten 
traditional patriarchal values. 
A closer look at the Islamists in Morgan Ahmed Morgan will show that they differ from 
those presented in earlier films by ʿĀdil Imām in several ways. The Islamist leader Shaykh 
Maḥmūd has no beard, and unlike the ‘terrorists’, he is not dressed in a white salafī-
jallābiyya. His style resembles more that of the ‘new preachers’ (al-duʿāh al-judud). Like ʿAmr 
Khālid, he wears jeans and a shirt, and when he speaks – often, unlike ʿAmr Khālid, in 
classical Arabic – he always smiles. So while these ‘new’ fundamentalists’ style is different, 
criticism of them displays several similarities with the way they are portrayed in other ʿĀdil 
Imām films. It is again their alleged hypocrisy which is the focus.  The new fundamentalists’ 
focus is on personal piety and bodily modesty. The film’s fundamentalist character, Shaykh 
Maḥmūd, explicitly makes the point in a scene in which he criticises Dr. Jīhān for being 
improperly dressed. This focus on piety is undermined in the film by the Islamists’ alleged 
hypocrisy in practising indecency under the cover of religion in the form of ʿurfī-marriages. 
When the university’s Islamist newspaper attacks Murgān for having bribed his way to the 
prize for the university’s best actor, Murgān easily manages to bribe Shaykh Maḥmūd, and 
the next day he preaches that: “We shouldn’t let our malice incite us against those enjoying 
success”. This is reminiscent of ʿAmr Khālid, whose message Asef Bayat (2003) claims has 
become so popular among the rich and affluent because it assures them “that religious 
worship and piety can fit with modern lifestyles and [...] allowed the Egyptian rich [to] feel 
good about their fortunes.” ʿĀdil Imām has criticised these new lay preachers on several 
occasions, both because of their lack of credibility as a result of not having the required 
religious schooling (Wahbī Zāhī, 2003) and because of the large amounts of money that the 
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daʿwa brings them. He joked that if he were to quit acting he would perhaps start as a 
preacher, adding that: “once you earn money from religion it is over [with your credibility]” 
(cited from ʿAmr al-Laythī, 2009). 
By putting up these two irreconcilable extremes – Islamic fundamentalists and 
spoiled and reckless westernised youth – in themselves a picture of the schizophrenic 
cultural state of contemporary Egypt, torn between westernisation and islamisation, 
characterising both as deviations, he is able to carve out a modernist middle position 
represented in his Egyptian identity elevated through the ‘modernisation’ efforts of Dr. 
Jīhān. 
Murgān’s ‘vices’ are that he is uneducated and vulgar and that he uses bribery to 
achieve his aims. In an endeavour to ingratiate himself with Dr. Jīhān and his children, he 
publishes a collection of poetry (he has, of course, bought these nonsense poems from a 
street poet) and wins a national literary prize through bribery, and, again through bribes, 
he obtains a place at university. There he not only bribes his way through all the exams but, 
by bribing the other teams and the judges, he and his new friends win the university’s 
football championship and, although he is unable to memorise a single line,78 he even wins 
the award for best actor at the university theatre. Everybody is bribable. He even tries to 
bribe God himself. He kneels down to pray and orders his assistant to distribute blankets to 
the poor and send some twenty employees on a pilgrimage. Only Dr. Jīhān refuses to take a 
bribe. She claims that she is the last of all Egypt’s 72 million who would be willing to accept 
a bribe, whereupon Murgān self-confidently informs her: “Don’t worry I have already 
bribed the rest of the 72 million. There’s only you left.” But having bribed all the professors, 
he still has to pass Dr. Jīhān’s exam. Failing both to buy the exam and to cheat, he has no 
choice but to sit down and study. The film ends with the graduation ceremony three years 
later. The students, including Murgān, all get their diplomas. Through hard work they have 
been transformed into educated and responsible citizens and Murgān wins Dr. Jīhān’s heart. 
While the film thus carries the message that not everything can be bought for 
money – in the end Murgān achieves his university certificate and wins Dr. Jīhān’s heart 
through sheer hard and honest work – the film also represents a normalisation of 
corruption. While corruption and negligence were confronted in his films from the early 
1990s, it has become the normal state of things in Morgan Ahmed Morgan.79 People are not 
suffering under corruption. On the contrary, it seems that everybody is just waiting for his 
chance to be bribed. It is just everywhere and people seem to have adapted to it and 
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accepted it. It is only Dr. Jīhān who resists, and Murgān tries to bring her down to earth by 
explaining that “I am not corrupt; on the contrary, I care about people. Here [at university] 
you don’t care about anything. The government employee who earns between three and 
four hundred pounds a month, how is he going to live? Food, drink, healthcare, schooling 
and a lot of other things – from where is he going to pay all that? He either has to steal, beg 
or kill himself. And the government knows this very well. Don’t tell me the government is 
giving him this small salary not knowing from where he is going to eat.” The film can thus 
give the impression that corruption is no longer a pure evil threatening the nation but has 
rather become the natural state of things. Could it be that these films, by adapting to new 
socio-political realities in Egypt, represent an attempt to come to terms with the infitāḥī 
business class of the 1970s and integrate it into the national mould? Al-Ghāzī (2007) asks 
whether “this film is an attempt to legitimise business people’s presence in politics, to show 
that the business class, with its wealth, is able to solve [the country’s] problems?” The film 
ends with Murgān marrying Dr. Jīhān. Business marries education/culture or culture gives 
business its needed legitimacy. While, through culture and western education, Egyptian 
modernism elevated the common Egyptian ‘ibn al-balad’, here it elevates the new rich: the 
class of ‘common men’ who have achieved their social ascent in the decades when 
modernism was absent. The film could thus reflect the regime’s increasing reliance on the 
private sector to implement government policy and the new government’s appointment of 
businessmen to the cabinet. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It seems, then, that the films scripted by Yūsuf Maʿāṭī represent a more permanent return 
to the dominant ideology of Egyptian modernism. Although The Danish Experiment and 
Morgan Ahmed Morgan differ from the films scripted by Waḥīd Ḥāmid in the early 1990s, they 
are both modernist, and The Danish Experiment is also explicitly nationalist. If it is true that 
the regime resorted to a strategic use of nationalism in the face of the ‘Islamist threat’ in 
the early 1990s and that this was reflected in ʿĀdil Imām’s films, it is not unlikely that at the 
turn of the millennium the regime was again in need of support. The US-led ‘War on 
Terrorism’ and western focus on the lack of democracy in the Middle East contributed 
toward putting the regime’s growing crisis of legitimacy in the forefront. The ‘Islamist 
threat’ had enabled the regime to postpone promised reforms, but this situation became 
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increasingly difficult to maintain, and, starting from the turn of the millennium, the regime 
had to face increasing pressure both from internal and external forces to go ahead with its 
promised democratic reforms. 
 
Politics the official way 
 
Al-Shinnāwī (2005) points out that ʿĀdil Imām could easily combine his role as a 
spokesperson of ‘the government’ while at the same time representing ‘the man in the 
street’ – and I would add the ‘cultural elite’ – when confronting terrorism. Terrorism was 
‘the useful enemy’ – an enemy everybody agreed was a threat. According to al-Shinnāwī, 
terrorism was the main concern of all ʿĀdil Imām’s films in the first half of the 1990s. 
Although not everybody agreed upon the reasons behind this terrorism and the exact 
definition of the phenomena, terrorism was an area of congruence on which the cultural 
elite, the state and supposedly also the people agreed. 
But how are political topics dealt with by ʿĀdil Imām where there seems to be no 
such congruence? How is he able to speak on behalf of both the government and the people 
in films dealing with topics in which the regime’s policy apparently runs counter to the 
majority’s will? In this chapter I will concentrate on the film The Embassy is in the Building 
(2005). This political satire takes the controversy of normalisation (of Egypt’s relations with 
Israel) – in Arabic known as taṭbīʿ – as its subject. But in representing the various shades of 
opinion on the subject to be found in Egypt the film moves beyond the issue of 
normalisation, and becomes a portrait of contemporary politics in Egypt. In the following 
chapter I will first show how this film supports and legitimises the official government 
policy on the issue of ‘normalisation’. I will show how the film utilises patriotism and 
necessity (i.e. there is no other viable choice) to legitimise this official position, which at 
first seems to contradict the position of the ‘people’. Thereafter I will look at how this film 
legitimises the regime not only in regard to its position vis-à-vis Israel, but also in its 
conflict with the internal political opposition. I will conclude the chapter by looking at 
some of the political views that ʿĀdil Imām has recently expressed in public and how he has 
increasingly come to represent and support the regime on crucial issues. 
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ʿĀdil Imām and Normalisation 
 
Egypt’s relations with Israel are of a complex nature. On the one hand Egypt had a peace 
agreement with Israel since 1979. This agreement not only stipulated an end of aggression 
and the establishment of diplomatic relations but, on Israel’s insistence, also the 
‘normalisation’ of economic and cultural relations. This contractual peace is, however, 
rejected by the vast majority of Egyptian society, largely due to continuation of Israeli 
aggression in Palestine. The government, on the other hand, is officially committed to 
normalisation, and also encourages it in some areas, but partly due to public opinion and 
partly to the political tension that often arises between the two states, it is reluctant to give 
its full endorsement to normalisation (Iman Hamdy, 2006, p. 7).80 
The Embassy is in the Building was not the first time that ʿĀdil Imām had aroused 
controversy with his views about peace with Israel. Very much like the regime’s own 
position, ʿĀdil Imām has been ambiguous on the issue, and made contrary statements. In 
1996 he was invited to speak as guest of honour at the Cairo International Book Fair. He 
spoke about normalisation and the need to deal with ‘reality’. By the nationalist press his 
statements were interpreted as a willingness to go to Israel, and he was severely criticised. 
ʿĀdil Imām was forced to respond and clarify his position, and he claimed that he had been 
misquoted,81 and again he used patriotism to back up his view: “I will not agree to visit 
Israel. Only in one case would I do so: if my country’s interests so demand. I am prepared to 
do anything that serves the people (al-nās) and the country (al-balad),” before he goes on to 
describe refusal to deal with ‘reality’ as ‘convulsiveness’ (tashannuj) (cited from Saʿd, 1996). 
It seems that there were cracks in the ‘anti-normalisation’ position at the time. In 
1998 some prominent intellectuals in Cairo established the Cairo Peace Society.82 Amongst 
the founders was Luṭfī al-Khūlī, who had been a staunch opponent of al-Sādāt’s peace 
initiative at the time. That same year al-Khūlī (1998) wrote a series of eulogies for ῾Ādil 
Imām in al-Ahrām, and because this was a period when ʿĀdil Imām was much attacked in the 
press, these eulogies were interpreted by some as an attempt by these intellectuals to bring 
ʿĀdil Imām into the normalisation camp (N. N., 2008b).83 
The Ministry of Culture has refused to push for cultural normalisation. Positioning 
itself as a protector of the cultural field, it claims that ‘cultural normalisation’ is a decision 
that should be left to society and the professional syndicates. As society is naturally against 
such normalisation, the Ministry can thus give its position a democratic aura. While there 
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have been few signs of normalisation in the cultural field, other fields have recently seen 
some movement towards normalisation. After relations had been strained to the limit since 
the outbreak of the intifāḍa in September 2000 there were several indications that in 2004 
things were on the move again: Israel was on its way to pulling out of Gaza and Egypt had 
accepted a role in guarding the border. In December 2004 Egypt had signed a so-called QIZ-
agreement.84 The same year also saw the release of ʿAzzām ʿAzzām85 and an agreement about 
exporting Egyptian natural gas to Israel was signed. But against the background of a still 
ongoing intifāḍa, with continuous Israeli aggression and a virtual standstill in the peace 
process, these developments were no more popular in 2004 than they would have been 
before. It is against the background of this increasing polarisation between a de facto 
normalisation with Israel in several fields and a public opinion that totally refuses any 
contact with Israel, that the film The Embassy is in the Building came to reconcile the poles 
into a shared position of ‘cold peace’. Morality and patriotism are utilised to carve out this 
middle position as the only responsible and viable policy that serves Egypt’s interests. 
 
The Embassy is in the Building 
 
In the film Sharīf Khayrī (i.e. the good, honourable) (ʿĀdil Imām), a model of the apolitical 
Egyptian, is an oil engineer who has been away from Egypt for over twenty years, working 
in Dubai. Dubai seems to have been chosen in order to increase the feeling of being removed 
from all political currents. His character is drawn up in these first parts of the film, which 
take place abroad. He is so absorbed in the trivial concerns of life that he has never heard of 
Kofi Annan and does not know what a UN resolution is. He is a womaniser, and when his 
affair with his boss’s wife is exposed, he is expelled and has to return to Egypt. The comedy 
in the film is derived from placing this person in the political context of contemporary 
Cairo. Upon his return he learns that his new neighbour is the Israeli Embassy. The security 
measures to protect the embassy make life impossible. He can no longer come and go as he 
pleases, bags have to be searched and visitors, including his girlfriends, must have advance 
permits and register with their passports. 
Throughout the film different positions on Egypt’s relations with Israel are 
presented. ʿĀdil Imām (cited from Ḥamdī Basīṭ, 2005) as usual announced that the film was 
going to present the popular (al-shaʿbī) and not the government’s view on the issue, 
reiterating that he is an artist for the people and not for the regime. Thus the popular 
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refusal of any contact with Israel naturally makes itself felt everywhere in the film. A few 
examples are the taxi driver who takes Sharīf from the airport to the building where the 
embassy is. Thinking Sharīf is a traitor working for the embassy, he criticises him, saying: 
“May our Lord guide you on the right path” (rabbina yihdīk). When Sharīf wants to order a 
home delivery the local fiṭīr-seller refuses to deliver to his address; and when Sharīf 
despairs and tries to sell his flat, the estate agent refuses even to try. “The flat is worthless 
as long as it is next to the embassy,” he says. Even the prostitute, when she finds out that 
Sharīf lives next to the embassy, calls him a traitor and refuses to take any money. Sharīf 
himself, when he learns about the embassy’s presence in his building, is initially shocked 
and takes the same stand on a purely emotional ground, but having the Israelis next door 
means that he, like Egypt, has to adapt to this new reality. Sharīf, who represents the 
‘common apolitical Egyptian’, can thus also be read as an allegory for Egypt itself. 
The government’s position is presented through the officers responsible for the 
security of the embassy. Rāshid Bēh, the officer responsible for both the embassy’s and 
Sharīf’s security, explains to him that Egypt has “a peace agreement with those people [i.e. 
the Israelis], so we [i.e. Egypt] have diplomatic relations with them. This is the policy of the 
country you live in, and you have to adapt to reality. Although some people, or maybe even 
most people, are of a different opinion, this is the state’s ‘higher interests’ (maṣāliḥ al-dawla 
al-ʿulyā), and you wouldn’t like to be against the state’s ‘higher interests’, would you?” When 
Sharīf objects and demands that also his ‘lower interests’ (maṣāliḥī anā al-suflā) should be 
taken care of, he goes on to explain that “You don’t need to give them a hug when you see 
them [….]. Just mind your own business. Live your life and adapt to circumstances, and if 
you need anything I will be there for you.” The regime is thus not friends with Israel but is 
adapting to circumstances and reality and wants the people to do so too. The security 
officers are therefore at Sharīf’s service and trying to minimise the inconveniences he 
suffers from having the embassy next door. So when he comes home, he not only finds a 
banquet ready and waiting for him, but also the fiṭīr-seller who had initially refused to 
deliver to his address calls him up again and says he is at his service. Sharīf has only to call 
the officer to be assured of whatever he wants (even hashish!) and after terrorists (probably 
Islamists) targeting the embassy blow up his flat with a rocket, the regime restores the flat 
to its former state over night.86 The government is thus presented as being all-powerful and 
all-knowing. 
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Between government and people there are several other ‘players’. Sharīf, of course, 
understands nothing of this and is simply tossed from one position to another. Illustrative 
of his ignorance and confusion is a scene in which, one evening, he sits with his friends 
smoking hashish. On TV a debate on the al-Jazīra channel about normalisation attracts their 
attention. First Muṣṭafā Bakrī87 appears on the screen agitating against normalisation, 
whereupon Sharīf responds: “By God, what he says is really great” (wallāhi il-rāgil da 
biyitkallim kalām zayy il-full). When his counterpart, ʿAlī Sālim,88 comes on the screen arguing 
in favour of the opposite position, Sharīf acclaims his views in the same way; and when, 
bored with politics, they switch channels and the ‘vulgar’ video clip Put the dots on the letters 
[ḥuṭṭ al-nuqaṭ ʿala al-ḥurūf], by Būsī Samīr,89 appears, they all similarly acclaim what she has 
to say. 
But gradually Sharīf becomes involved in the anti-normalisation movement. When 
he sees an anti-normalisation demonstration being led by a beautiful girl, Dāliyā Shuhdī 
from the ‘progressive left’, he spontaneously joins in, not for the sake of the cause but 
because of her, for him just another beauty he intends to add to his collection of girlfriends. 
She thinks she has found a new comrade in the cause against normalisation (taṭbīʿ) while he, 
misinterpreting the terminology, thinks they are speaking about dating (taẓbīṭ). 
The rudimentary and stereotypical representation of Dāliyā Shuhdī and her family, 
who in the film represent the anti-normalisation leftist opposition, was perceived as 
offensive by many who identified with the political and intellectual left. The family and the 
leftist opposition are represented in the film as being out of touch with reality, believing in 
hollow slogans and speaking in an ideological and incomprehensible language. They are 
connected with communist symbols.90 Morally they are liberal – a common prejudice 
against communists – and they are represented as being overly fond of alcohol.91 The leftist 
family also lacks traditional Egyptian family values. To Sharīf’s surprise, the family takes 
Dāliyā’s arrest by Central Security with considerable calm; any ‘normal’ Egyptian family 
would have been hysterical had their daughter been arrested. But Dāliyā has been raised to 
be ‘independent’, so there is no need to worry for her. In fact, both she and her brother, 
because their parents have spent most of their time in prison, have been raised by their 
maiden-aunt turned-comrade – yet another impossibility in a society like the Egyptian, with 
its rigid class hierarchy. Presumably as a result of having been brought up in this bohemian 
atmosphere, Dāliyā’s brother seems neither to know nor to care about basic Egyptian 
manners. When Sharīf visits the family, he remains seated with his nose in a book and with 
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the sole of his shoe in Sharīf’s face. When Sharīf asks him what he is reading, he responds: 
Love in the Time of Cholera by Gabriel Garcia Marquez.92 The title, together with the foot in 
Sharīf’s face – a grave insult – makes Sharīf feel disgusted. 
In fact it was the film’s disrespect for ‘cultural symbols’ that most offended the 
‘intellectuals’. Several intellectuals, among them Ṣunʿ Allāh Ibrāhīm, signed a declaration in 
which they demanded an apology from ʿĀdil Imām for insulting them, claiming that the film 
makes more fun of them than of Israel. They accused this supposedly anti-normalisation 
film of supporting normalisation, and called it ‘an unjustified insult’ of cultural symbols and 
intellectuals generally (N. N., 2005b). It was especially ʿĀdil Imām’s lampooning of Amal 
Dunqul’s anti-normalisation poem known as Make no conciliation (lā tuṣāliḥ) that offended the 
intellectuals. The poem, which was written in 1976, i.e. before al-Sādāt made peace with 
Israel in 1979, has become a symbol for rejectionists and leftist intellectuals in general. In a 
scene in which Sharīf sits with his friends smoking hashish, he recites this highly esteemed 
poem but turns it into the gobbledegook of a stoned hashish smoker altering the ‘two 
jewels’ (jawharatayni) which in the original poem were meant to symbolise the eyes of the 
martyr, into ‘two pipefulls of hashish’ (ḥagarayni).93 It is not surprising that secular 
intellectuals, probably many of the same who praised ʿĀdil Imām in the early 1990s for his 
position as a defender of freedom and tolerance against the ‘birds of darkness’, were unable 
to accept it or treat it humorously when it was their own, and not the fundamentalists’, 
symbols that were being made fun of. 
 The film not only presents different stereotypes of the pro- and anti-normalisation 
camps but the narrative also takes the audience through several successive stages of 
development. When his friend the lawyer decides to take Sharīf’s case to court and demands 
that the embassy be expelled, the apolitical Sharīf turns into a popular hero overnight – a 
hero of steadfastness (baṭal al-ṣumūd), representing the people’s stand against 
normalisation. He joins anti-normalisation rallies, but when he has to speak, he finds 
nothing better to say than to sing like a parrot Shaʿbān ʿAbd al-Raḥīm’s I Hate Israel [ana 
bakrah Isrāʾīl]94, which he had heard on the radio.95 
But this honeymoon between people and opposition through Sharīf is not to last 
long. The ‘empty slogans’ and the disturbances are in conflict with both the interests of the 
state and also Israel, and it is the Israeli embassy that consequently sets a trap for him. They 
arrange for him to be filmed in bed with a prostitute, and then blackmail him into dropping 
all charges against the embassy. Just as he had become a popular hero overnight, Sharīf now 
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becomes a traitor. Abandoned by everyone, Sharīf is contacted by an old friend, Walāʾ 
Ghānim. Even though this friend is from a poor background – Sharīf says he used to be “a 
smelly and despicable vagabond” (da inta kunt garbūʿ wi muʿaffin) – he has become a wealthy 
businessman, according to himself because he has put aside all conscientious objections. “I 
did business and put aside (shilt min dimāghī) all that nonsense, which never brings 
anything” (il-kalām illi la yiqaddim walla yi’akhkhar). When they enter the dining room it 
becomes clear what ‘conscientious objections’ he has put aside to become rich, as the Israeli 
ambassador is waiting for them there. Walāʾ Ghānim is dealing with the Israelis in a so-
called joint venture, bringing in Israeli experts and capital to develop agricultural 
production. This form of normalisation is refuted by Sharīf. First morally, when he 
exclaims: “Now I see why fruit neither smells nor tastes of anything anymore” – what is 
stained by illicit money has a bitter taste – and then on nationalist grounds when he says 
that “for seven thousand years we have been cultivating our land and now you [i.e. the 
opportunistic businessmen] bring in them [i.e. the Israelis] to cultivate it for us!” 
The film thus rebuts both the two extremes of pro- and anti-normalisation. The pro-
nationalisation camp is portrayed as unpatriotic and opportunistic while the anti-
normalisation leftist opposition is mocked as out of touch with reality and convulsive. The 
Islamists, on the other hand, are irrelevant; they are intruders coming from outside, trying 
to hijack the cause. Having exposed the different political forces in Egypt as deviations, the 
film prepares for reconciliation and projection of the straight and patriotic middle road. 
Sharīf has by now gone through three successive stages of development. The first 
stage is one of political unconsciousness. This is followed by a ‘false awakening’, in which he 
becomes a popular hero driven purely by emotion and hollow slogans. In the third stage 
Sharīf is ostracised and labelled a traitor, although in his heart he is still a true nationalist. 
The chronology of these stages corresponds to the changing regimes that have ruled Egypt. 
I therefore feel tempted to suggest that – since Sharīf in many ways represents Egypt – 
these stages could be interpreted as corresponding roughly with Egypt’s own development 
towards ‘political maturity’. The first stage could be seen as representing the monarchy: 
unconsciousness, womanising and being totally preoccupied with the small pleasures of life. 
The second stage would then be ʿAbd al-Nāṣir’s regime: emotional nationalism and hollow 
slogans. The third stage would thus represent the al-Sādāt era: circumstances force Egypt to 
make peace, and as a result – according to her own version – she is unjustly labelled as a 
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traitor and expelled from the Arab League, just as Sharīf in the film unjustly becomes a 
pariah. 
If this interpretation is accepted, the final scenes of the film would represent a 
fourth stage: the Mubārak era and the middle position between the two previous 
stages/positions – the anti-normalisation position (the leftists) and pro-normalisation 
(business). Here Sharīf or Egypt is again reconnected with the Palestinian cause. For Sharīf’s 
sake this connection had been implicit from the beginning of the film in Sharīf’s Palestinian 
friend in Dubai – the child Iyād, whose dream had been to return to Palestine to take part in 
the Intifāḍa. Iyād is now employed to bring forth the final awakening in a highly symbolic 
scene, paving the way to reconciliation of the Egyptian nation. 
The ambassador, who is holding a reception, asks Sharīf to open his flat (read: his 
land) for him because the number of guests is more than expected.  When Sharīf refuses, 
the ambassador hints at the compromising videotape on which they have recorded Sharīf in 
bed with a prostitute. Forced to give in, Sharīf finds his flat slowly being flooded with guests 
until there is no longer room for him. This scene could be taken as an allegory both of 
Palestine which is invaded by Jewish immigrants or settlers and of Egypt. The guests would 
in the latter case represent Israeli business ‘invading’ Egypt and threaten local business. 
Regardless of whether Sharīf here represents Egypt or Palestine, he is still squeezed out and 
compelled to leave. The embassy’s private guards open the exit door, and once he is outside, 
turn their backs on him, shutting him out as if they had been waiting for him to leave. Like 
a refugee – downtrodden and humiliated – he has to accept the shame and descend the 
stairs in silence. But when he reaches ‘the bottom’ (both of the physical stairs and, 
allegorically, of humiliation), the final awakening (the intifāḍa) takes place. The security 
guards on the ground floor are absorbed in watching the funeral of yet another martyr on 
television. As the funeral procession draws closer, Sharīf recognises the picture of the 
young martyr covered in Palestinian flags. “Noo!” he screams “It’s Iyād! It’s my friend, Iyād! 
He is a hero!” Beside himself with anger, Sharīf runs back up the stairs. He forces his way 
through the guards blocking the entrance and throws the ‘guests’ (the Israeli occupiers) out 
of his flat, shouting: “Out! All of you get out of here!” (Note here that he only threw them 
out of his flat and not out of the neighbouring embassy. I interpret this as clear support for 
a two-state solution). 
Honour having thus been re-established, Sharīf again demonstrates against 
normalisation, first alone, but gradually, like small streams flowing into a large river, other 
 94 
 
demonstrators gather around him96, and finally also Dāliyā rejoins him. This time the 
slogans are not hollow. Sharīf has himself seen (on TV) and experienced (in his flat) what 
Israel is about. His consciousness is now based on ʿilm (knowledge). The slogans have been 
carefully chosen and are of a kind everybody can agree with: “Down with the Israeli 
occupation,” “Down with the enemies of Peace” (there are enemies of peace in both camps), 
and “Down with child murderers” (although it was the Israelis who murdered the child [i.e. 
Iyād], also child murderers are to be found in both camps). And when the demonstration is 
confronted by the riot police, the popular hero ʿĀdil Imām alone steps forward, only to be 
felled by the police. But the officer Ṭāriq Zakī, who had previously been guarding the 
entrance of the building housing Sharīf and the embassy, and who is now an officer in the 
riot police (in an earlier scene, when taking farewell with Sharīf, he had said to him – or was 
it to ʿĀdil Imām this time? – that “if everybody would have loved their country like you do, 
we would be the best country in the world”) intervenes and orders his soldiers to make way 
for the demonstration. The demonstration thereafter goes on, with all parts of the nation 
united. The state, represented by Ṭāriq Zakī, smilingly waves to the demonstrators and 
gives them its blessing. Sharīf and Dāliyā stand side by side in the front, with the people 
behind them; and the Islamists are, of course, not present. 
 Even though ʿĀdil Imām and the scriptwriter Yūsuf Maʿāṭī claim otherwise, the film 
fits neatly into the official position on normalisation. Yūsuf Maʿāṭī (cited from Ḥusām Ḥāfiẓ, 
2005) claimed that “the film cannot possibly represent the official point of view. While the 
government signs the QIZ agreement and exports natural gas to Israel, the film rejects 
normalisation.” This seems to understate the regime’s ambiguous position on normalisation 
outlined above. Moreover, the regime is presented as the responsible part and acting for the 
good of the nation. The film explains the regime’s position of ‘cold peace’ in terms of 
necessity and morally justifies it as being in the interest of the nation. At the same time the 
film rejects any ‘warm peace’ as long as the Palestinian issue remains unresolved. This is 
made clear through the anti-normalisation stand at the end of the film and the fact that the 
‘awakening’ is linked to the killing of Iyād. The leftists and nationalists, who reject relations 
with Israel, are represented as ‘hotheads’. They are sincere in their resistance, but in a 
situation like this ‘mind’ has to take precedence over ‘heart’, and ‘mind’ is represented by 
the regime. The opposition, which has ‘heart’, as its deepfelt resistance indicates, is in need 
of guidance (i.e. to be taken back in under the regime’s wing). The Islamist opposition, here 
again represented as terrorists, is naturally not part of this. The Islamists are only 
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disrupting intruders who have nothing to contribute. The position of the pro-normalisation 
camp – here represented by the rich businessman – is refuted on the basis that it is immoral 
and unpatriotic. The regime represents the ‘middle road’ between ‘hotheads’ and ‘traitors’, 
and it is thus the regime that represents the nation, is truly patriotic in the sense that it acts 
for the best of the nation and is the holder of truth and morality. 
 
Has ʿĀdil Imām become a spokesman of the regime? 
 
The film’s release in the summer of 2005 coincided with a period of political turmoil and 
calls for reform in Egypt. In May 2005 the people were asked to vote on constitutional 
changes designed to pave the way for multi-candidate presidential elections. These 
elections were to be held in September 2005 and to be followed by parliamentary elections 
in three rounds in November and December of the same year. The film team naturally 
denied that the film should have anything to do with the internal political situation. Yūsuf 
Maʿāṭī claimed that he had had the script ready long before anyone had any idea that the 
constitution was to be changed and before anyone had even heard of the Kifāyā movement 
(cited from al-Asyūṭī, 2005). 
The protest movement known under the name Kifāyā (Enough) first came to public 
notice in the summer of 2004, and gained momentum throughout 2005. It was a grassroots 
coalition drawing support from across Egypt’s political spectrum to oppose Mubārak’s 
presidency and the possibility that he might seek to transfer power to his son Gamāl. The 
movement’s origins can be found in earlier strands of political protest, especially pro-
Intifāḍa demonstrations in 2000 and the protests against the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Protests, and increasing domestic and international pressure on Egypt for reforms, 
may in turn have aroused a need for the support of public figures like ʿĀdil Imām, and this 
time not only against the Islamic threat, but on a whole range of issues. At a press 
conference during the filming of The Embassy is in the Building ʿĀdil Imām stated that he was 
against the demonstrations and that they were destructive and not in the nation’s interest. 
He added that “there is a big difference between demonstrations that serve the nation and 
demonstrations that are against the nation” (Muḥammad Samīḥ, 2005). These and other 
similar statements clearly put ʿĀdil Imām on the side of the regime in its conflict with the 
opposition, and support a reading of the film as a comment on the political landscape of 
contemporary Egypt. 
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ʿĀdil Imām had a reputation for being reluctant to give interviews. He used to 
envelope himself with a kind of mystique and reveal very little about himself to the public 
(al-Bāz, 2007). Neither did he care much about prizes. He used to claim that the only ‘prize’ 
he cared about was that people loved his films and went to see them. But starting from the 
late 1990s ʿĀdil Imām seems to have changed this attitude (ibid), and now he appears on 
television quite regularly giving longer interviews. These interviews tend to be just as 
much, if not more than, about him and his political views and analyses, as about his acting 
and films, and he increasingly gives the regime his support on crucial issues. In a third-
world country like Egypt, an artist cannot rely solely on his popular support. Naturally, the 
state also has its say (al-Shinnāwī, 2006). The state controls enough assets to enable it to 
enforce its will on an artist. Not only can it censor films and deny an artist access to the 
media –  not only to state media but also to privately owned media outlets in Cairo – it 
always has the possibility to exert pressure on an artist by following up unpaid taxes; it is a 
well-known ‘secret’ that taxes are paid from stars’ official wages, which differ from their 
real wages (ibid).97 Al-Shinnāwī (ibid) claims that ʿĀdil Imām is very well aware of these 
conditions and that he therefore not only undertakes a careful reading of the political 
situation but also sometimes even outdoes the regime in his support. His position on the 
demonstrations is only one such example. Whereas the regime seems to have tolerated a 
certain degree of peaceful and controlled anti-government demonstration activity, which at 
one stage may even have served to uphold its image of tolerance, ʿĀdil Imām came out with 
an outright denunciation and de-legitimation of the same demonstrations (ibid). 
In his film Morgan Ahmed Morgan (2007)ʿĀdil Imām (here as Murgān) explains that: “If 
you want to survive in this country, you have to secure your position from above and from 
below so that if those above let you down, those beneath will catch you; and if those 
beneath turn against you, those above will protect you.” Even though this sentence is 
Murgān’s, it could also be taken as an illustration of how ʿĀdil Imām to varying degrees 
plays on both strings in order to secure his position. ʿĀdil Imām is not only an artist who has 
gained a broad popular base, he seems also to have worked hard to gain access to, and 
ingratiate himself with, official circles (ibid). Starting in the late 1980s and up to the mid-
1990s, he used to invite both prominent officials, including ministers, and cultural figures to 
official pre-launch performances of his films at the Cairo Opera House. These events were 
not only good advertisements but also gave him an aura of official sanction and support. In 
addition to ministers and people from the regime, other public figures, such as the political 
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writer Muḥammad Ḥasanayn Haykal – who currently is outside the regime but who, 
because of his relationship with ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, enjoys national credibility – was always 
invited, and ʿĀdil Imām was always careful to remain on good terms with prominent 
opposition figures (ibid). 
ʿĀdil Imām takes care to maintain good, direct and personal relations with both 
officials and the president. While several of his films in the early 1980s encountered 
problems with the censorship, I have not found any examples of films that have been 
stopped or scripts that have had to be radically rewritten in my period of study. On the 
contrary, it seems that ʿĀdil Imām even occasionally makes use of his personal relationship 
with the president to help him through the bureaucracy of censorship. It seems that this is 
what happened with both The Bucket and the Teapot and The Embassy is in the Building. ʿĀdil 
Imām explains that as State Security had some objections to the latter film, it was the 
president who gave him the go-ahead, adding that “he [i.e. the president] is my support” 
(huwwa sanadī) (cited from al-Laythī, 2009). This direct support enables ʿĀdil Imām to 
venture into previously forbidden territory in his films, deal with controversial themes and 
push the borders of the sayable. But while ʿĀdil Imām’s films are sometimes bold in the 
thematic, or include sarcastic political comments or scenes – Egyptian critics often note 
these comments and tend to exaggerate their importance – they always generally remain 
firmly within the dominant official discourse and support it. 
 ʿĀdil Imām’s support for the government’s position is still more clearly stated in 
interviews he gives than in his films. He has recently supported President Mubārak in the 
elections and has expressed his ‘optimism’ with regard to the new generation of politicians, 
which in this context means the President’s son Gamāl Mubārak. Similar to what can be 
observed in his films, he always underpins his views by invoking ‘national interest’, reason, 
responsibility and modernity. 
In 2000 the High Commissioner appointed ʿĀdil Imām as a UNHCR Goodwill 
Ambassador98 with focus on refugee issues in Africa, something which added to his official 
role. On the UN’s Egyptian website it says that ʿĀdil Imām “in the course of his rich career 
[....] mixed humour with sadness to portray ordinary people victims of injustice and 
poverty. He courageously denounced corruption, religious fanaticism, terrorism and 
dictatorship. He has always defended human dignity, promoted tolerance, democracy and 
human rights” (UN in Egypt, 2007). 
 98 
 
Throughout this thesis I have shown how ʿĀdil Imām has ‘denounced corruption, 
religious fanaticism and terrorism’ and that, by denouncing fanaticism, he has seemingly 
‘promoted’ its opposite, which is ‘tolerance’. But in interviews when ʿĀdil Imām speaks 
about democracy, which, according to the UN, is one of the things he has promoted, it 
becomes clear that he speaks about a ‘democracy’ of the government – a government which 
is not known for being democratic, but whose discourse remains one of democratic reform. 
Like that of the regime, his discourse is one of ‘reform from above’. It is not the regime that 
stands in the way of implementation of democracy, but apparently ‘the people’. 
“Democracy will not come by itself. We [the people] have to act in a democratic way too. 
The opposition is not democratic. What is being said and all the insults have nothing to do 
with democracy. What has Ḥusnī Mubārak done to be insulted like this? The man has done 
us a lot of good” (cited from al-Laythī, 2009). Asked about whether he sees that there is ‘a 
crisis of trust’ between government and people, ʿĀdil Imām answers that indeed there is. 
“People are always against the government, seemingly without reason. But to be honest, 
this is connected with a lot of different factors: culture (thaqāfa), education (taʿlīm) and tact 
(dhōʾ). I quite often would like to see some more tactfulness (ana kull shuwayya baftaqid al-
dhōʾ). We [i.e. the Egyptians] are no longer able to address each other in a proper way” 
(ibid). Not unlike in The Embassy is in the Building, in which people and opposition were 
described as ‘hotheads’ while the government embodied responsibility, he here asks both 
people and opposition to ‘behave themselves’. While the ‘hotheads’ in the film needed 
guidance, the people here need to be elevated or civilised in order to be able to act in a 
‘democratic’ manner.  In the same interview he describes the opposition press in Egypt as “a 
retard given a drum (habla wa-massikūha ṭabla),” which means a lot of noise for nothing. The 
President, on the other hand, is described as very tolerant and patient in accepting all these 
‘insults’. “I have never seen a president being insulted (biyitshitim) like that without 
replying” (ibid). It sounds as if the regime is the ‘victim’ of a ‘people’ that is just too difficult 
to elevate. The ‘higher civilisational level’ to which the people should be elevated is one 
where both people and opposition should act as a harmonious complementary unit with the 
government. The opposition should be polite, supportive and constructive and its role – 
akin to what ʿĀdil Imām did in his ‘anti-corruption’ films – is to make the government aware 
of its mistakes in order to help it improve. It may sound as if, for him, democracy is a state 
of harmony in which people and regime pull in the same direction and not, as is the case at 
present, one in which the people frustrate the regime in its efforts to elevate them. The 
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tolerance, human rights and democracy that ʿĀdil Imām, according to the UN, has always 
defended is therefore not one of pluralism but of harmony, with focus on duty and not on 
rights. Even though the modernist discourse that ʿĀdil Imām utilises, both in his films and 
in his argumentation, is a discourse of ‘reform’, it reinforces hegemony and legitimates 
status quo; and although his rhetoric is one of ‘exposing’, I would argue that it covers up 
more than it exposes. 
It is not only in internal political matters that ʿĀdil Imām has offered the regime his 
support. He is also increasingly contributing towards reinforcing Egypt’s position 
regionally. Egypt’s regional legitimacy is increasingly being challenged by the so-called 
‘radicals’ – i.e. Iran, Ḥizb Allāh and Ḥamās. In the latest Gaza War (Dec. 2008 – Jan. 2009), as 
Egypt’s official position became increasingly difficult to defend and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt accused the regime of having common interests with Israel in the 
defeat of Ḥamās, ʿĀdil Imām stepped in and announced that Ḥamās only had itself to blame 
for Israel’s attack. His argument here is again very similar to that seen in his films. Ḥamās 
and their supporters are criticised on two levels. Firstly, they lack reason. “When you send 
rockets, you can’t expect the enemy to send you flowers” (ibid), and “when you are going to 
war, you have to take into consideration the power of the enemy” (cited from Ṣalāḥ, 2009); 
and secondly, they lack values. He accused Ḥamās of trading in martyrs and using their 
people as human shields while they themselves were allegedly “sitting in air-conditioned 
suites” doing nothing but claiming that the catastrophe was victory (ibid) while “we [i.e. 
Egypt] sacrificed our souls and wealth for Palestine – and now they are only insulting us” 
(ibid). Again, as in The Embassy is in the Building, Egypt’s official ‘moderate’ position becomes 
the only morally viable position that can be defended by reason. 
In his argumentation, be it in regard to the regional situation reinforcing Egypt’s 
position vis-à-vis its Arab neighbours or when he comments on the internal political 
situation, in a typical modernist way he compares Arab backwardness and emotionality 
with western reason and development. Making fun of the emotional demonstrations in 
support of Gaza, he said that “I have never heard anyone shout ‘with our blood and our soul 
we will sacrifice ourselves for you, Sarkozy’ or ‘dear England’” (cited from al-Laythī, 2009), 
and “Israel (i.e. a western and developed country) is not loudmouth (ḥangūrī) like us (i.e. 
the Arabs); when they say something, they do it” (cited from Ṣalāḥ, 2009). 
 ʿĀdil Imām’s recent statements on the Gaza War were not well received by many of 
his audience and fellow artists – especially not by those from other Arab countries, and they 
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even earned him another death threat, this time from Abū Muṣʿab ʿAbd al-Wadūd, the leader 
of al-Qāʿida in Algeria. This threat was again – and Maḥmūd Ṣalāḥ’s article in Akhbār al-
Ḥawādith is an example of this – exploited by the official media to express solidarity with 
their ‘national hero’ and recall his long history of confrontation with ‘the forces of 
darkness’. As the regional struggle for hegemony in the Arab World intensifies, and the 
regime needs to win public opinion for its ‘moderate’ line, ʿĀdil Imām has become ever 
more confrontational in his language. He concluded the press conference at the opening of 
the shooting of his latest film, Bobbos (2009), with a salute to “Egypt – the mother of the 
Arabs, who only insult her” (maṣr umm il-ʿarab illi biyishtimūha) (cited from N. N., 2009), and 
it has already been announced that his coming film, The Nagi Atallah Gang, which is currently 
under production, will deal with this internal Arab-Arab conflict. In this film ʿĀdil Imām will 
be an Egyptian ex-officer working in Israel. There he decides to rob an Israeli bank, together 
with former colleagues. Dressed in Israeli uniforms, they escape to Lebanon, where they are 
kidnapped by Ḥizb Allāh. Consequently, the film will take them to Syria and Iraq, before 
finally, when they think it is over and they are on their way back to Egypt, their plane is 
hijacked and they are flown to Somalia (al-Laythī, 2009). The film will probably expose the 
‘resistance movements’ and factions and land on reinforcement of Egypt’s role as the 
natural and only ‘leader’ of the Arab world. Through this we can see that ʿĀdil Imām is 
growing increasingly responsive to the current needs of the regime. For him, Egypt, the 
regime and the people are one and the same thing, and his defence of the regime is dressed 
up in a nationalist language whereby an attack on the current regime is an attack on the 
honour of Egypt itself. 
 
The Yacoubian Building and reformist cinema 
 
With its 30 million EGP budget, The Yacoubian Building (2006) was the biggest production of 
Egyptian cinema until then. The film is based on the eponymous 2002 bestselling novel by 
ʿAlāʾ al-Aswānī. The novel itself aroused controversy. Since the mid-1990s ʿAlāʾ al-Aswānī 
has been a regular contributor to the main Egyptian opposition or independent 
newspapers, notably al-Shaʿb, al-Dustūr, and al-ʿArabī (Jacquemond, 2008, p. 233), and his 
novel was turned down by government-owned publishers three times before being 
accepted by Merit Publishing House (Ingrid Wassmann, 2008). The novel is a portrait of 
various inhabitants of a previously grandiose building in downtown Cairo and acts as a 
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mirror of society. It mercilessly exposes political and moral corruption in contemporary 
Egypt. While the novel was perceived as being very bold in its ‘exposing’, it was criticised on 
the literary level for presenting little new and rather taking the Arabic novel back to the 
conventional realism of the 1940s and 50s and failing to realise ideals of aesthetic 
innovation (Jacquemond, 2008, p. 235). The popular success of the novel only increased and 
reconfirmed the criticism that it was speculative, a product of a ‘winning formula’ and not a 
true work of art (ibid). 
While the novel and its writer in many ways were associated with dissidence and 
bold criticism of both regime and society, the same could no longer be said of the film team. 
As has been shown, ʿĀdil Imām was by now firmly positioned as a supporter of the regime. 
This is also true of the rest of the film team. The film was produced by Good News 4 Film, 
owned by the Egyptian media mogul ʿImād al-Dīn Adīb, who was seen as the mastermind 
behind President Mubārak’s election campaign in 2005 (ʿAṭiyya, 2005) and who is also the 
publisher of the independent daily newspaper Nahḍat Miṣr, a paper widely seen as being 
allied to the Gamāl Mubārak wing of the ruling NDP. In April 2005 he also held a 
meticulously produced six-hour, three-part television interview with the President that was 
shown on four TV channels simultaneously.99 The reworking of the novel into a film script 
was done by Waḥīd Ḥāmid who, not unlike ʿĀdil Imām, in several political articles and 
interviews had announced his support for the President’s son Gamāl Mubārak on condition 
that he would be elected democratically (Samīr Farīd, 2006), while the director of the film 
was Waḥīd Ḥāmid’s son Marwān Ḥāmid, who had directed a 15-minute Mubārak 
promotional film shown on Egyptian state television and who, according to Farīd (ibid), was 
the election campaign’s ‘official’ director. 
That this group of people, who all were involved, in varying degrees, in the bid for 
President Mubārak’s re-election, simultaneously were working on the filmatisation of a 
popular novel associated with political and social criticism and dissidence whose author is 
an active member of the Kifāyā movement,100 was to be a riddle that that seems to have 
perplexed several commentators.101 The film was going to be just as, if not more, 
controversial than the novel, and it evolved into the bestselling Egyptian film that year. The 
film was also noticed in the west, not only because it was based on a famous novel102 but also 
because it was assumed again – not unlike Terrorism and Barbecue earlier – that it said 
something that could not have been said before. 
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 I would contend that there is no riddle at all. The filmatisation of a popular novel 
like The Yacoubian Building, written within the traditional realist-reformist paradigm of 
Egyptian literature and ‘boldly’ exposing the flaws of contemporary society, not only fits 
perfectly into the oeuvre of ʿĀdil Imām, but is also in line with the regime’s agenda at the 
time. Like most of ʿĀdil Imām’s films, starting from Playing with the Grownups, also The 
Yacoubian Building’s concern is to point a finger at all that is wrong, to expose a whole range 
of deviations, judge them morally and thus call for their reform. Moreover, the controversy 
occasioned by the film and the parliamentary campaign initiated by the conservative pan-
Arab nationalist independent MP Muṣṭafā Bakrī in order to have the film censored,103 only 
confirmed the regime’s ‘enlightened’ position and enabled the regime, who refused to yield 
to the campaign’s pressure (it licensed the film uncut, only giving it an ‘Adult Only’ seal), to 
pose as a protector of art and freedom, while the conservative parliamentary opposition, 
who lost the battle, became the ‘birds of darkness’ attempting to curb this freedom. The 
roles of government and opposition were again turned upside down. The government press 
could once again – as they had with Terrorism and Barbecue 14 years earlier – take pride in 
the ‘extraordinary’ level of freedom that the country was enjoying. Samīr Ragab, for 
example, writes “[The film] is a testimony to the freedom and democracy that this nation is 
enjoying, and which has reached a degree we can be proud of. Especially since I am sure 
that, after September 11th, not even the USA herself licenses bold films like this” (Ragab, 
2006).     
Although, in general, the film keeps very close to the original novel, several 
important changes have been made. I would assert that several of these changes are not 
merely artistic but that they are systematic and contribute to turn the narrative pro-
government enough to fit into the regime’s ‘reform’ agenda. Through these changes the 
narrative is altered from one of dissidence to one of hegemonic reform. In general I would 
claim that the film has depoliticised the narrative, and I will point to three major changes 
from novel to film that account for this depoliticising and ensure that politically the film 
remains firmly within the accepted limits. 
The first of these changes is both how the film represents the Islamists and the role 
they play in the narrative. The representation of the fundamentalists has been altered in 
order to conform to the usual stereotypical representation of the fundamentalist in ʿĀdil 
Imām’s films. In the novel there are two sheikhs – Shaykh Shākir and Shaykh al-Sammān. 
Each of them represents his own particular ‘brand’ of Islamic fundamentalism. The first 
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represents the anti-regime radicals and the second the pro-regime conservatives. The novel 
gives Shaykh Shākir ample opportunity to voice the political discourse of the radicals, 
especially how the ‘infidels’ (i.e. the US-led coalition in the Gulf War) are killing innocent 
Muslim children in Iraq and how al-Azhar and the official religious establishment are in the 
hands of the regime and provide it with religious legitimation for its ‘anti-Islamic’ policy. In 
the novel, Shaykh al-Sammān, who represents this official religious establishment, confirms 
the radicals’ complaints. He is totally preoccupied with defending the regime’s position on 
the Gulf War, and he even legitimises abortion. In the film, on the other hand, Shaykh al-
Sammān’s role as a regime-friendly sheikh has been omitted altogether.104 The ‘radicals’’ 
political discourse has also been toned down. Neither Iraq nor al-Azhar are mentioned in 
the film. While Shaykh Shākir’s inflammatory speech at the university in the novel is a 
complete Islamist argument about the current regime’s illegitimacy and ends with a call for 
jihād, his speech in the film is shortened, focusing on the claim that the regime earns illicit 
money from gambling, alcohol and tourism.105 The film thus excises most of the important 
arguments that could ‘legitimise’ the radicals and compromise the regime. By adding the 
argument of ‘illicit money earned through tourism’ – a source of income a large number of 
Egyptians are dependent on – the Islamist speech is turned into one that de-legitimises the 
radicals rather than compromising the regime. 
Secondly, all Zakī al-Disūqī’s political views have been omitted. In the novel he 
criticises ʿAbd al-Nāṣir and the whole post-revolutionary order. The dialogue in which he 
criticised ʿAbd al-Nāṣir has been omitted altogether.106 Both novel and film agree that Egypt 
is in a state of decay. But while in the novel Zakī al-Disūqi explicitly blames the revolution 
for this decay, the film refuses to blame ʿAbd al-Nāṣir. As in Playing with the Grownups the 
national narrative towards progress has ‘somewhere’ gone astray, but it is left unclear who 
is to blame. Criticism of certain aspects of ʿAbd al-Nāṣir’s regime is generally 
unproblematical in Egypt, and Egyptians are divided between supporters of ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 
and al-Sādāt. But questioning the very legitimacy of the revolution, as Zakī al-Disūqī does in 
the novel, is to question the legitimacy of the current regime. Mubārak draws his legitimacy 
from representing a continuation of the republican system of both ʿAbd al-Nāṣir and al-
Sādāt, and has strategically refused to take sides between the regime’s left and right wing, 
which are associated with ʿAbd al-Nāṣir and al-Sādāt. In the novel Zakī al-Disūqī also claims 
that the reason for Egypt’s calamity is lack of democracy. This dialogue too has been 
omitted in the film.107 But while most of his political views are muted in the film, Zakī al-
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Disūqī retains his role as the ‘commentator’, commenting on the general state of decay in 
contemporary society. But all his comments in the film are basically moral and only 
indirectly political. 
The third, and maybe most important, change is the absence of ‘The Big One’ (al-rajul 
al-kabīr) in the film, and it is probably this absence that led to rumours that the film had 
been censored.108 The story of al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām (Nūr al-Sharīf) and Kamāl al-Fūlī is similar to 
the book. Kamāl al-Fūlī obtains a place in parliament for al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām for one million 
EGP, and when al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām signs a contract with a Japanese company Kamāl al-Fūlī 
demands a quarter of the profit. Also in the film Kamāl al-Fūlī is only a delegate; “I am only 
a delegate, and I swear that I am the kindest of them all,” but, contrary to the novel, there is 
no mention of any boss, and al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām is not granted any meeting with those that 
Kamāl al-Fūlī represents. Also in the novel the meeting with ‘The Big One’ is absurd, but by 
omitting it completely the Presidency is definitely left out of the range of criticism109 and 
criticism is lowered to the level of the corrupt minister and parliamentarian. Popular 
readings of both the novel and the film liken Kamāl al-Fūlī to the NDP powerbroker Kamāl 
al-Shādhilī,110 who is one of the most powerful ‘members’ of the so-called ‘Old Guard’ within 
the ruling NDP. Exempting the President from criticism and focusing on the moral decay 
and corruption of an individual, although very powerful, politician who, through the 
‘popular reading’ of the novel was already associated with the ‘Old Guard’, is very much in 
line with the call for reform that I have shown is present in most of ʿĀdil Imām’s films, and 
which the film shares with the so-called ‘Young Guard’ led by the President’s son Gamāl 
Mubārak, whom most of those involved in the film support. 
I would therefore claim that the above-mentioned changes have been made not only 
in order to adapt to the limits of the sayable and squeeze the novel into a film in accordance 
with the ‘law of decreasing freedom’, but rather that these changes account for an 
appropriation of a novel of ‘dissidence’ by turning it into a film of ‘hegemony’ that no 
longer represents any threat to the regime and possibly even supports it. This is done first 
by muting all the political anti-regime statements that the novel contains and by exempting 
the Presidency from criticism. Thereafter the film strengthens the focus on morality. It 
condemns the moral decay of individuals both in society and government and calls for 
reform. 
The film focuses heavily on values. Its main characters each represent a set of values. 
Ḥātim Rashīd and Zakī al-Disūqī (ʿĀdil Imām) each represent ‘western’ values. Zakī 
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represents positively charged western values such as knowledge and enlightenment, while 
the homosexual Ḥātim represents decadence and negatively charged western values. 
Negatively charged traditional Egyptian values are represented by al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām. These 
three characters are all in a relationship with ‘common’ Egyptians (Zakī-Buthayna / 
ʿAzzām-Suʿād / Ḥātim-ʿAbd Rabbuh), who initially all represent positively charged 
traditional values. Of these relationships there is only one possible positively evaluated 
combination. The unification of Buthayna al-Sayyid and Zakī al-Disūqī thus represents the 
re-envisioning of the imagined modernist alliance between Egyptian cultural heritage and 
western cultural influences. Buthayna and Zakī al-Disūqī constitute the two poles who, if 
combined, form Egyptian modernism. Drowned in a corrupt environment where all the 
other characters are either victims, perpetrators or both, these two poles are drawn 
towards each other. Zakī extends Buthayna protection and guidance and elevates her out of 
her humiliation. Through their combination, the ‘purity’ of Egyptian values is retained. He 
saves her from being ‘corrupted’ by the likes of Ṭalāl – the Syrian shop owner who takes her 
to his storage room and masturbates on her garments. Buthayna, on the other hand, 
provides Zakī with a firm anchorage in the Egyptian heritage and identity, thus putting an 
end to his marginal existence. 
While the Buthayna-Zakī axis represents modernism, Ḥātim Rashīd’s homosexual 
relationship with Upper-Egyptian conscript ʿAbd Rabbuh and al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām’s marriage to 
his second wife Suʿād represent its negation. ʿAbd Rabbuh and Suʿād both represent the 
same sound traditional values as Buthayna, but they are humiliated and corrupted. Ḥātim 
‘elevates’ his lover into decadence and corruption. Al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām deprives Suʿād of her 
most basic right – the right to be a real wife and have children – and when he divorces her 
after having killed her fetus, he humiliates her by giving her ‘all her rights’ as stipulated by 
the sharīʾa. The initial relationship between Buthayna and Ṭāhā is also deemed to fail. The 
combination would not have been able to ‘elevate’ them. After his humiliation Ṭāhā chooses 
fundamentalism – modernism’s main competitor. The film therefore speaks a modernist 
language and its gallery of characters moves within a modernist universe in which western 
/ eastern and positively / negatively charged values are combined in different positively 
and negatively evaluated combinations, with the ‘alternative modernity’ – fundamentalism 
– ‘the wrong alternative’, lurking on the sideline. 
Most, if not all, of the film’s comments describing the state of general decay and 
defining Egyptian identity are uttered by Zakī al-Disūqī and Buthayna. The other characters 
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‘act’, but Buthayna and Zakī also ‘comment’. The downtrodden and humiliated Buthayna 
gives the audience the feeling of how it is to be the humiliated common man; “Egypt has 
become too cruel to its people. That’s why everybody wants to leave. It’s not that we hate 
her, but people are unable to endure her injustice” 111 Zakī, on the other hand, comments 
from ‘above’. He describes the Egyptians’ ‘backwardness’ as compared to foreigners – 
“Foreigners know how to appreciate alcohol. Here we appreciate hashish. There is a big 
difference between the two”112 – and the current state of decay as compared to the past, and 
he ‘objectively’ points his finger at all that is wrong. As in Playing with the Grownups and to a 
similar effect, Zakī’s main ‘outburst’ of frustration over the deterioration of Egypt is placed 
under the statue of Ṭalʿat Ḥarb.113 He is drunk and Buthayna leads him home across Ṭalʿat 
Ḥarb Square. Beneath the statue he starts to explain that “This country was better than 
Paris, the latest fashions used to arrive here before they reached Paris, the streets were 
clean, the shops were grandiose and people were polite.”114 Gradually he becomes more and 
more agitated, and when Buthayna begs him to calm down because people are looking, he 
starts shouting: “Why should they look? They should look at the country that has been 
ruined! At the buildings that were better than those in Europe. Now they [look like] 
dunghills on top and are disfigured and ugly from below (mazābil min fō’ wa min taḥt maskh).” 
He then looks up at the statue of Ṭalʿat Ḥarb and shouts: “We are in the age of degeneration 
(zaman al-maskh).” 
The film gave rise to controversy mainly because of its sexual aspects. Modest 
female nakedness for the sake of seduction and which retains the traditional gender 
relationship is the rule rather than the exception in Egyptian cinema, but in The Yacoubian 
Building several scenes were deemed repulsive. Both the scene in which Ṭalāl masturbates 
on Buthayna’s clothes and the one in which Ṭāhā is raped in prison by police officers were 
condemned. But it was especially the homosexual relationship between Ḥātim Rashīd and 
ʿAbd Rabbuh that resulted in protests. Homosexual characters in Egyptian films usually only 
play the role of an object of ridicule or act as a negative mirror reconfirming traditional 
masculinity. The Yacoubian Building was different in that respect. The film represents Ḥātim 
in a realistic, not, as usual, comical way. But even though the film goes far in explaining his 
homosexuality and gives it a ‘human’ face – in a lengthy scene after ʿAbd Rabbuh has left 
him, he blames his parents for the ‘cold’ upbringing he received – the way the matter is 
dealt with remains very traditional and moralistic. Heavenly wrath is wreaked on them 
both, first through the sudden illness and death of ʿAbd Rabbuh’s son and then through 
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Ḥātim being killed and robbed on a one-night stand.115 Also the other deviations are 
punished, Ṭāhā kills the officer that ordered him raped in prison, and is himself being killed 
in the same incident. In the scene where, after al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām sends women to perform an 
abortion on Suʿād, he is also punished for his crime. Kamāl al-Fūlī now threatens al-Ḥāgg 
ʿAzzām,116 and when he finally yields and agrees to give al-Fūlī 25% of his profits, the price 
has been raised and he now has to pay 50%. 
Despite the unprecedented dealing with homosexuality in the film – a subject which 
Egyptian popular cinema, with very few exceptions, had refused to deal with seriously 
before – The Yacoubian Building remains a thoroughly conservative film. The flaws in society, 
including homosexuality, are all condemned on a moral basis, and although at first sight the 
film may seem to be an aggravating representation of Egypt in the Mubārak era, it is far 
from threatening the system or questioning any dominant concepts. ʿĀdil Adīb, 
representative of the production company, confirms this and claims that “any fair look at 
the film would confirm that it is not against the regime (al-niẓām). But we have laid before 
its eyes flaws (akhṭāʾ) that really are present and that we must get rid of.” I would therefore 
tend to agree with Samīr Farīd (2006) when he claims that while the novel was an 
expression of anger, the film is an expression of “the cinema of political reform which is 
being directed by the Policy Committee in the ruling NDP led by Gamāl Mubārak” (Farīd, 
2006). Even the way homosexuality is dealt with in the film is, according to Farīd, in line 
with, and only confirms that the film belongs to this political reform trend, for which the 
support for freedom of expression is one of the important components. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
In summing up the findings of this survey I will conclude that ʿĀdil Imām has increasingly 
become a proponent of dominant ideology. This is to be detected both in his films and from 
his real life appearances, where he increasingly surrounds himself with an aura of 
‘officialdom’ and where he speaks on behalf of the nation as a whole. 
Concerning his films, I would suggest a division of ʿĀdil Imām’s oeuvre over the last 
twenty years into three distinct periods. There is congruence between these periods and 
the scriptwriters ʿĀdil Imām co-operated with. But this congruence is only partial and I am 
therefore still able to conclude that we are dealing with periods and not only with the 
personal preferences of different scriptwriters. The first half of the 1990s was a period of 
renewed and combative modernism.117 The second half of the 1990s and possibly the first 
years of the new millennium compromise a second period.118 This period is characterised by 
a return to vulgarism and a partly submergence of the explicit modernist message. This was 
followed by a third period,119 which started around the turn of the millennium, when 
nationalism and modernism again returned in ʿĀdil Imām’s films, and this time seemingly 
more permanently. 
I have attempted to explain the changes behind this classification of his films into 
three distinct periods through the changing political circumstances in Egypt on the one 
hand and the changing structure of the target audience on the other. Modernism, social 
unity and nationalism returned in ʿĀdil Imām’s films in the early 1990s, probably mainly in 
response to the ‘Islamist threat’. This ‘first’ return was bold, combative and confrontational. 
Once the immediate threat had disappeared the modernist rhetoric seems to have been 
submerged and ʿĀdil Imām returned to a kind of vulgarism. This renewed vulgarism could 
indicate that the return to modernism at that time was somewhat premature and forced. 
This is where the second explanation comes in. The state of Egypt’s cinemas had been 
constantly deteriorating since their nationalisation in 1963, and audiences gradually 
became increasingly lower-class male (Shafik, 2007, pp. 283-84). This trend started to 
undergo a reversal in the early 1990s, reaching its fulfilment in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. The increasingly lower-class identity of the audiences throughout the 1970s and 
1980s was definitely an additional factor that contributed to the rise of anti-modernism. It is 
therefore not unlikely that ʿĀdil Imām’s return to this anti-modernist formula and vulgarity 
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in the latter half of the 1990s was a return to his ‘natural’ target audience and was guided by 
commercial interests. This periodification of ʿĀdil Imām’s films roughly corresponds to the 
general trend in Egyptian cinema of an increasingly clearly stated modernism, beginning in 
the mid-1990s. Through the films scripted by Waḥīd Ḥāmid, ʿĀdil Imām may have been one 
of the earlier exponents of this trend and it is possibly for that reason that, in the later 
1990s, he felt the need to return temporarily to his earlier formula in order to compete 
commercially. 
On the other hand, the possibly permanent return to modernism that in ʿĀdil Imām’s 
films started in the early 2000s was different from that of the early 1990s. It was not 
primarily brought about by a regime or an elite that felt itself threatened, but was 
accompanied by a change in the target audience. The lower-class male audience had lost 
importance for film producers through the emergence of more expensive theatres at 
shopping malls. Because both explanations equally account for this ‘second’ return, I feel 
tempted to claim that the ‘return’ this time is of a more permanent nature. As in the early 
1990s, the regime again has a problem of legitimacy. The state is again in need of support. 
The internal and external pressure for democratic reform is increasing. Simultaneously 
Egypt’s position as a ‘moderate’ state in the Middle East is being challenged by ‘radicals’ (i.e. 
Iran, Ḥizb Allāh and Ḥamās). The regime’s need for support is thus one explanation, the 
other being that this modernism is a shared ideology internalised by both producers and 
this new upper-middle-class audience. The dynamics of the audience’s changing class 
structure could also be taken as an additional indication of the fact that modernism – the 
imagined alliance between the western-educated man and the common ibn al-balad – is an 
alliance primarily imagined by the ‘westernised’ and educated middle class, while it does 
not necessarily have the same relevance for the common, uneducated ibn al-balad. 
Modernism is the ‘philosophy of the ruling class’. It is internalised and has partly become 
the ‘philosophy of the masses’ who ‘accept its morality, customs, and institutional rules of 
behaviour’, but they probably still feel relieved by the ‘anti-modernist’ films which don’t 
blame them for failing to live up to the moral standards demanded of them by the 
‘modernising elite’.  
The difference between the films of the first and second ‘modernist period’ is mainly 
one of style, subject matter and class approach. I would relate these differences partly to 
the different class structure of the audiences in the early 1990s when compared to that of 
the 2000s, and partly to a difference between the personal styles of Waḥīd Ḥāmid and Yūsuf 
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Maʿāṭī. While the films scripted by Yūsuf Maʿāṭī are milder, relying more on comedy than 
drama, and often give the impression of being built up of several separate sketches sewn 
together into a film, the political and social criticism is in many ways similar. I would say 
that most of ʿĀdil Imām’s films, and indeed many other Egyptian films, share a certain 
structure in their criticism. Common to all of them is that they expose deviations. After 
having exposed the deviations or flaws, the modernist films tend to follow one of two 
strategies, and many of them follow both. 
The first strategy is to point out a middle road between deviations justly distributed 
over two parties. This can be observed, for example, in The Embassy in the Building, where 
ʿĀdil Imām exposes both the pro- and the anti-normalisation camps, or in Morgan Ahmed 
Morgan, where he exposes both the fundamentalist and the westernised version of popular 
youth culture. In both cases he arrives at a ‘middle position’, which in the case of The 
Embassy is in the Building is conveniently in line with the regime’s position of ‘cold peace’, 
while in the case of Morgan Ahmed Morgan it confirms traditional dominant patriarchal 
values. 
The other strategy is the re-envisioning of the imagined modernist alliance. The 
‘middle road’ is pointed out through the combination of two poles, where one of the poles 
represents the common man and traditional (usually, but not always, sound) Egyptian 
values, and the other knowledge and enlightenment. This is what happened in Sleeping in 
Honey when Magdī Nūr (ʿĀdil Imām) – the representative of enlightenment – led the ‘people’ 
in a demonstration to parliament, and it is the same ‘alliance’ that is re-envisioned through 
the relationship between Zakī al-Disūqī and Buthayna al-Sayyid in The Yacoubian Building, 
and when Murgān marries Dr. Jīhān in Morgan Ahmed Morgan. ʿĀdil Imām can play both 
poles. In Playing with the Grownups he is the common man who allies himself with the 
government representative. In Terrorism and Barbecue and Sleeping in Honey he is the one 
giving voice and elevating the people. In The Terrorist he is elevated by the enlightened host 
family, in Morgan Ahmed Morgan by Dr. Jīhān and in The Yacoubian Building it is he who 
elevates Buthayna. 
The ‘modernist alliance’ is one in which sound values are combined with knowledge 
and enlightenment. Therefore the ‘deviations’ that are criticised always tend to lack one, or 
both, of the two components that make up the ‘alliance’. It is usually either the values of the 
‘common man’ (the ibn al-balad) or the knowledge of the ‘modern educated man’ that is 
lacking. And this is how the criticism tends to be based on values. The attack on the ‘evil’ 
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infitāḥī capitalist in the early 1990s, for example in Playing with the Grownups and The 
Forgotten One, was heavily based on such values, while the widespread negligence in 
Terrorism and Barbecue and Sleeping in Honey was confronted with knowledge. The criticism of 
the fundamentalist follows the same logic. Fundamentalism is caused either by egoism and 
opportunism (i.e. the values are lacking) or by ignorance (i.e. education and enlightenment 
are lacking). The last variant can be ‘cured’ – as in The Terrorist – through the 
fundamentalist’s presence in an ‘enlightened’ environment. 
The following table illustrates the ‘value system’ that ʿĀdil Imām’s films utilise. 
 
 1: Negatively charged 2: Positively charged 
A: ‘Western’ Opportunism, egoism, decadence Knowledge, science, high-culture 
B: ‘Egyptian’ Ignorance, superstition, 
backwardness, vulgarity 
Ibn al-balad, rootedness 
 
The modernist alliance is the combination of 2A with 2B. 2A elevates 2B or reforms 
1B. The absence of 2A and 1B’s ‘elevation’ by 1A would account for an absence or inversion 
of modernism. The ‘flaws’ that are represented by 1B can be cured by a dose of 2A. 1A, on 
the other hand, is more difficult to cure and is therefore ‘othered’ and confronted. All ʿĀdil 
Imām’s films operate within this value system. The Yacoubian Building utilises it fully, having 
a main character for each set and combining them in different combinations. In The Danish 
Experiment Qadrī and his sons embody both 1B and 2B, while Anita Gutenberg represents 1A 
and 2A. The encounter results in the ‘Egyptian family’ receiving knowledge and science 
(2A). They are ‘modernised’. But Anita has to take her ‘decadence’ (1A) back with her to 
Denmark. Also when the ‘middle road’ strategy is utilised, the road projected is always one 
that combines reason (2A) with sound values (2B). In The Embassy is in the Building, the 
regime’s position of ‘cold peace’, is, for example, legitimised through being the only 
possible position that is based both on sound patriotic feelings and reason. The pro-
normalisation camp is therefore refuted because of its values, while the anti-normalisation 
camp needs guidance. The exposing of deviations based on the above value system is a 
shared aspect of both ʿĀdil Imām’s modernist and anti-modernist films. The difference 
between the two types of film is that the anti-modernist films don’t follow up by pursuing 
one of the two strategies of projecting a middle road or a modernist alliance. They only 
criticise, but without projecting any alternative. 
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Since the political criticism in ʿĀdil Imām’s films always follows a certain structure, 
which in turn is based on morality in accordance with the above-mentioned value system, 
the criticism never turns against the system itself. This does not necessarily mean that his 
films have not been bold. Most of them include comments and scenes which are definitely 
jabs in the side of the regime, and which, if viewed separately, could be understood as 
challenging hegemony. But the structure of his criticism, seen as a whole, does indeed 
reproduce the values on which the system is based, i.e. ‘dominant ideology’, and only 
criticises deviations from this system. “It is not about the system/regime (al-niẓām),” ʿĀdil 
Imām explains, “I am criticising situations (mawāqif)” (cited from al-Laythī, 2009). What 
ʿĀdil Imām calls ‘situations’ here, in this thesis I have called ‘vices’ or ‘deviations’. His films 
are concerned with pointing out or exposing these ‘vices’ and his modernist films also point 
out the ‘virtues’. This is done in accordance with a value system – a value system which is in 
line with that of the rulers, but which is internalised by the majority and dealt with as 
‘common sense’. 
While his films – at least within the period of study – have therefore never been 
‘truly’ critical in the sense that they challenge dominant concepts and hegemony, always 
directing their criticism at immoral individuals or deviations from the ‘straight path’, there 
has, on the other hand, undeniably been a gradual liberalisation and widening of the limits 
of the sayable in all fields, and writers now enjoy a greater freedom of expression than they 
did at any previous stage during the 20th century (Jacquemond, 2004, p. 41). Although 
Terrorism and Barbecue and The Yacoubian Building were both films that basically reproduced 
traditional value systems reconfirming and supporting dominant ideology, it probably 
remains equally true that neither of them could have been made ten years earlier. But in 
the case of ʿĀdil Imām, it seems that his boldest and most confrontational films also in many 
ways are those most supportive of the regime. It may seem that ʿĀdil Imām’s films deal with 
previously political taboo topics only in the most supportive manner, and only at moments 
of history when this is in line with the regime’s interests and needs. This was most likely 
the case with his cinematic attack on fundamentalism in the first half of the 1990s, 
sectarianism in 2008 and the way he dealt with Egyptian-Israeli relations in The Embassy is in 
the Building in 2005. 
So while there has definitely been a gradual shift in the limits of criticism on the one 
hand, and this criticism has gradually crept closer to the centre of power, ʿĀdil Imām has on 
the other hand taken upon himself the role of a disseminator of official views and positions. 
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This is not only done through his films, but maybe even more clearly in his increasingly 
frequent real-life appearances at different events and in television interviews, where he 
lends the regime his support on crucial issues and often even overbids its declared and 
undeclared positions. Unlike the regime’s officials, he is, after all, an individual and free to 
hold his own opinions. He is therefore in a position to state the regime’s views more boldly 
and straightforwardly than the regime itself can do, and it is indeed not unlikely that ʿĀdil 
Imām, as an individual close to the regime, is consciously being utilised by the regime to 
express support in a popular and humouristic way. As an embodiment of the ‘common man’ 
he is in a position to express both popular and less popular opinions as if these were the 
views that represent the nation and the people. I would therefore contend that ʿĀdil Imām 
has become an important institution close to the regime and a voice representing its official 
ideology. It is therefore likely that, for Mubārak’s regime, he has attained a role similar to 
that ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ḥāfiẓ had for that of Gamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir. ʿĀdil Imām belongs to the same 
generation as President Mubārak. He ascended to the throne of the entertainment industry 
with Ragab on a Hot Tin Roof in 1979, only one year before Mubārak became president. His 
name will therefore always be associated with the Mubārak era. But while ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm 
Ḥāfiẓ was singing the praises of a youthful forward-storming revolutionary nation, ʿĀdil 
Imām’s role has rather been to defend an aging regime that is struggling to stay in power 
internally and regain its position regionally. 
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Notes
                                                 
1 In chronological order the films are: Playing with the Grownups [al-Laʿb maʿa al-Kibār] (1991), The Forgotten One 
[al-Mansī] (1992), Terrorism and Barbecue [al-Irhāb wa-l-Kabāb] (1993), The Terrorist [al-Irhābī] (1994), Bakhit and 
Adila [Bakhīt wa ʿAdīla] (1995), Birds of Darkness [Ṭuyūr al-Ẓalām] (1995), Sleeping in Honey [al-Nawm fī l-ʿAsal] 
(1996), Bakhit and Adila II: the Bucket and the Teapot [Bakhīt wa ʿAdīla: al-Jardal wa-l-Kanaka] (1997), A Message from 
the Ruler [Risāla min al-Wālī] (1998),  Mahrous , the Minister’s Boy [al-Wād Maḥrūs bitāʿ al-Wazīr] (1999), Hello America 
[Hālū Amrīkā] (2000), Prince of Darkness [Amīr al-Ẓalām] (2002), The Danish Experiment [al-Tajriba al-Dinimārkiyya] 
(2003), Groom from the Security Apparatus [ʾArīs min Jiha Amniyya] (2004), The Embassy is in the Building [al-Sifāra fī 
l-ʿImāra] (2005), The Yacoubian Building [ʿImārat Yaʿqūbīyān] (2006), Morgan Ahmed Morgan [Murgān Aḥmad 
Murgān] (2007) and Hassan and Murqus [Ḥasan wa Murquṣ] (2008). His latest two films, Bobbos [Būbbūs] (2009) and 
The Naji Atallah Gang [Firqat Nājī ʿAtā Allah] (to be released later in 2009), are not part of this thesis as I have not 
had the chance to see them yet. I will from now on only use the English titles of these films. 
2 The bestseller list at www.fineartfilm.com (accessed 21.05.2009), the only website I know of that sells only 
Arabic DVDs, reveals that four of ʿĀdil Imām’s plays are on the top 10 list (ranked nos. 5,6,8 and 9), while only 
two of his films are on the same list (as no. 1: The Embassy is in the Building (2005) and no. 2: The Yacoubian 
Building (2006)). This source is, of course, problematic; I would guess that the customers probably are mainly 
expat Arabs and that few Egyptians order from this site. It nevertheless affords an indication of the popularity 
of these plays. 
 3 Ibn al-balad (plur.: awlād al-balad), which can translated as ‘a son of the town/place’, is the real Egyptian. The 
term can apply both to ‘a specific group of Egyptians’ – those who live in a traditional quarter (ḥāra), work at 
certain occupations (usually independent trades) and wear a traditional robe (jallābiyya), but the term also 
applies to certain ‘behavioural characteristics and norms’ (el-Messiri, 1978, cited from Armbrust, 1996, p 25). 
The term ‘ibn al-balad’ is usually positively charged and carries a strong sense of self-identity - it can mean ‘the 
salt of the earth’ but also a ‘rough diamond’ (Armbrust, 1996, p. 25) that, from the modernist point of view of 
the elite, needs to be polished or elevated through education and high-culture in order to become a true focal 
point of identity. 
4 Egyptian producers often finance their productions by raising production loans from domestic and foreign 
distributors. The amount of the loan will depend on the status and popularity of the leading players (Shafik, 
2007, p. 210). 
5 In a similar way, asked whether ʿĀdil Imām had demanded any changes to the scenario of Murgān Aḥmad 
Murgān, Yūsuf Maʿāṭī, one of ʿĀdil Imām’s scriptwriters, explained that “We are together from the very 
beginning and we are continuously in contact with each other during the writing of the scenario. I have never 
gone to ʿĀdil Imām with a finished scenario. The continuous dialog about the scenario makes ʿĀdil Imām 
present in every bit of it. That’s why he didn’t demand any changes” (Khālid Nāgiḥ, 2008). 
6 The choice of Shirīn as his female co-star in the Bakhit and Adila trilogy (1995, 1997 and 2000), for example, is 
attributed to him (Irīs Naẓmī, 1995). 
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7 Accordingly maximum freedom is accorded to books, their censorship in advance of publication having been 
abolished in 1977. Less freedom is allowed to audiovisual media such as theatre, cinema, and audio and video 
cassettes, all of which have to be submitted for advance censorship by the Ministry of Culture (Law No 38 of 
1992) (Jacquemond, 2008, p. 39). Thus while, for example, the poems of Aḥmad Fuʾād Nigm are available in 
most bookshops in Cairo, the same poems when sung by al-Shaykh Imām are, as far as I know, only available 
on home-copied cassettes sold through the leftist tagammuʿ party. 
8 The film’s name ‘Ghazal al-Banāt’ can mean both Candy Floss and The Flirtation of Girls. 
9 Although these films were not really a trilogy, their titles indicate that they were intentionally linked. In all 
of the films the protagonist bears the name of an Islamic month, in itself a sign of lower-class or fallāḥī 
identity, and he is always on, or below, something indicating that he is in trouble. 
10 Gate Five is the only film in which ʿĀdil Imām co-stars with Nādiyā al-Gindī, his main rival at the box office in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. The film is also the only ʿĀdil Imām film ever to have been completely banned from 
cinema. ʿĀdil Imām jokes that this was a result of the superstitious Nādīyā al-Gindī’s exaggerated use of 
talismans and incense during the filming (cited from Sarḥān, 2006). The film was re-released on cinema in 
1994. 
11 Other examples of films by ʿĀdil Imām which were actually censored because they ‘damaged Egypt’s 
reputation’ are Hamada and Toto Gang [ʿIṣābat Ḥamāda wa-Tūtu] and Antar carries his Sword [ʿAntar shāyil Sēfu] 
(both from 1982). In the first, both a scene where ῾Ādil Imām robs a school, dressed as a sheikh, and another 
including a homosexual character, had to be removed before screening was permitted (Zaynab ῾Abd Allāh, 
1999). The second film was taken off screen only to be re-released after several scenes had been removed 
(ibid). 
12 One of the few examples of films with ʿĀdil Imām to be censored for purely political reasons is The Ghoul [al-
Ghūl] (1983). The end scene in which ʿĀdil Imām kills the ‘evil’ business man, was according to the censors, too 
similar to the recent assassination of al-Sādāt and had to be cut before the film was granted a licence (ʿAbd 
Allāh, 1999). 
13 My DVD (released by Rotana) gives the English title as The Big Game. In the text I will stick to the title Playing 
with the Grownups, which is a better translation of the title. 
14 My DVD (released by Fine Art Film) gives the English title as Fast Asleep. In the text I will stick to the title 
Sleeping in Honey, which is the correct translation of the title. 
15 ʿĀdil Imām had previously starred in several films scripted by Waḥīd Ḥāmid (Man lives only once [al-Insān 
yaʿīsh Marra Wāḥida] (1981), Vote for Dr. Sulayman Abd al-Baset [Intikhibū al-Duktūr Sulaymān ʿAbd al-Bāsit] (1981), 
The Ghoul (1983), The Worthless [al-Halfūt ] (1985) and Certified Dangerous [Musaggil Khaṭar] (1991)). But most of 
these films fit into the old picture of anti-modernism. Certified Dangerous, the last ʿĀdil Imām film scripted by 
Waḥīd Ḥāmid before ‘the quartet’, for example, is about three criminals who get to know each other in prison. 
One of them, Muṣṭafā, had to confess to a crime he didn’t commit in order to cover for his companions, so that 
they could take care of his sick wife. When they get out of prison they all return to crime, but Muṣṭafa 
discovers that his companions have let him down and that his wife is dead. He and his new friends from prison 
then take up the fight against his old comrades. 
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16 Birds of Darkness differs from the other four in several ways. The character of ʿĀdil Imām is not, as in the 
others, the unambiguous ‘good hero’. Although similar to the others, all in all this film carries a modernist 
message, the character of ʿĀdil Imām being rather the unscrupulous fahlawī who indulges in corruption, as in 
many of his films of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The general atmosphere in the film is one of failed 
modernism, with very few bright patches. Although the film includes many of the same actors, I have not 
noticed any intertextual ‘signs’ that could connect it with the others. The Forgotten One and Sleeping in Honey 
are connected with Terrorism and Barbecue, which in turn is connected with Playing with the Grownups through 
such signs. Another indication is that the film wasn’t a part of the plan. The artistic trio had already decided 
that Terrorism and Barbecue should be followed up by Sleeping in Honey, the last film of the ‘quartet’.  But when 
ʿĀdil Imām went to Waḥīd Ḥāmid he was presented with the scenario for Birds of Darkness and grew so 
enthusiastic about it that he decided to postpone the scheduled filming of Sleeping in Honey (ʿĀdil Imām, cited 
from Maḥmūd ʿAlī, 1995). I have therefore chosen to discuss this film in the next chapter, which will deal with 
the way ʿĀdil Imām’s films deal with Islamic fundamentalism. 
17 The characters’ names could be interpreted as being additional hints to their respective roles. Ḥasan Bahlūl 
could be translated as ‘the good fool’ (i.e. the decent but uneducated ‘common man’), while Muʿtaṣim al-Alfī 
(Muʿtaṣim meaning ‘the guardian’) would be the ‘modernist institution’ guarding public interest. 
18 This song Egypt speaks about herself [Miṣr tataḥaddath ʿan nafsiha] from 1951 (qaṣīda by Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm) is, even 
though it is from before the revolution, one of Umm Kulthūm’s most popular nationalist songs. The text – the 
first line goes: “All mankind were watching as I built the foundations of my glory alone” (waqafa l-xalqu 
yanẓurūna gamīʿan  kayfa abnī qawāʿida l-magdi waḥdī) – supports the narrative of Egypt’s glorious past. 
19 It is along the railway line that Ghāda enters al-Mansī’s world as she tries to escape the party where she was 
being forced to prostitute herself. It was the same way that the belly dancer Dīna, in an earlier scene, came in 
one of al-Mansī’s sexual fantasies, and it is along the railway line that Asʿad Bēh comes with his bullies – reality 
catches up with al-Mansī and drags him out of his dream – to bring her back to the villa. And finally, it is along 
the railway line that the last confrontation between al-Mansī and the evil capitalists takes place. 
20 Mayy al-Tilmissānī (1993) writes that the protagonist in The Forgotten One, as in a fairytale, tries to 
compensate for his deprivation by separating himself from reality and escaping into dreams. On his regular 
way to his nightly job as a railway signalman, he first has to take a minibus. The bus is full of women dressed 
in black who, as a kind of warning of the evil to come, start to wail once the bus starts. Thereafter he has to 
walk for some distance before crossing a narrow waterway on a small boat, as the dead cross the river into the 
afterworld, thus separating himself not only mentally but also physically from reality. 
21 In this scene there is an ‘intertextual reference’ to Terrorism and Barbecue, which was released the year 
before. Ḥasan Bahlūl (ʿĀdil Imām), together with a friend, goes to the Cairo Film Festival to watch nude scenes. 
It was well known that the Cairo Film Festival at the time used to show uncensored foreign films and that the 
main reason most people went there was in the hope of seeing such nude scenes. Ḥasan and his friend’s 
disappointment is therefore great when they find that the film is the historical film 1492 – Conquest of Paradise 
and does not include any such scenes at all. As they sit down waiting for the film to start, an equally sexually 
deprived and overweight youth squeezes in next to ʿĀdil Imām.  ʿĀdil Imām looks at him and asks:  
ʿĀdil Imām:  Have we met before? 
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ʿAlā’ Walīy al-Dīn: I don’t know. 
ʿĀdil Imām:  Do you go to the Mugammaʿ 
ʿAlā’ Walīy al-Dīn: Yes, but I’ve been there only once 
The audience recognises him as Samīr Basyūnī (ʿAlāʾ Walīy al-Dīn); one of the other frustrated and 
marginalised citizens who, in the previous film (which will be discusses in the second section of this chapter),  
had joined in and helped the ‘terrorist’. 
22 In the ‘speech’ ʿĀdil Imām makes fun of fake democracy: “We are practising the most beautiful form of 
democracy. People have the right to protest: we have nothing to say about that. The law ensures for them that 
right. But I too, I have the right to put them in prison”; failed five-year plans: “Everybody will find food to eat! 
In the next five-year plan people will stay at home unemployed and their salaries will reach them at home. I 
shall get the country moving by remote control! As if there is anything to do at work anyway. What have we 
done at work?”; and finally, the idea of confrontation – which is central in both films – itself: “But we have to 
confront and confront. We have to get used to confrontation, because that’s the right path. But let us question: 
for how long are we going to confront in the coming period? That’s the question that we have to confront.” 
23 Khayriyya al-Bishlāwī (1991) for example writes that, ”it seems that the film has not been able to liberate 
itself from the grip of ʿĀdil Imām, the clown,” and that, “the film includes several scenes that only can be 
describes as ‘clownish’. These scenes are ‘parasitical’ and not needed by the film – exaggerations that only can 
be explained through the wish to exploit commercially the character of ʿĀdil Imām”. 
24 His name could be translated as Aḥmad the Door-opener, or, with a few changes of vowels: iḥmid fatḥ al-bāb, 
which could mean ‘Praise the opening of the door’. If read that way, his name could be interpreted as a 
sarcastic comment on the changes that continuous liberalisation has caused: changes that neither improved 
Aḥmad’s situation, nor the citizens’, but since Aḥmad is loyal, he praises them nevertheless. 
25 The Mugammaʾ (or the Combine) is a concentration of government departments and agencies in one large 
twelve storey building on Taḥrīr Square in Cairo. With its thousands of underpaid clerks and bureaucrats, 
unlabelled doors and narrow hallways, it has become the very symbol of oversized and dysfunctional 
bureaucracy. 
26 ‘To sleep in honey’ (nāyim fi l-‘asal) is a phrase commonly used in colloquial Egyptian to refer to someone 
who is completely unaware of, or does not care about, what is going on around him. 
27 The film basically shares the same idea as Gamāl al-Ghīṭānī’s novel Incidents in Zaafarani Alley (waqāʾiʿ Ḥārat al-
Zaʿfarānī) from 1976. This did not pass unnoticed by the author who, when he learned that Waḥīd Ḥāmid had a 
script based on the same idea, protested (he wrote an article in al-Akhbār in which he threatened to take legal 
action) and accused Waḥīd Ḥāmid of having stolen the idea from his novel. Waḥīd Ḥāmid, for his part, claimed 
that he had known nothing about Gamāl al-Ghīṭānī’s novel and he claims that his film was inspired by real 
incidents. He asserts that the film’s real inspiration is an incident that took place a few years earlier when 
several girls fainted for an unknown reason. He had just changed the ‘collective fainting’ into a ‘collective 
impotence’ for the meaning this gives (Usāma Salāma, 1995).  It is not uncommon in Egypt that accusations of 
having violated the protection of intellectual property are levelled at film scripts. Three years earlier the 
Syrian writer Muḥammad al-Māghūṭ had claimed that Terrorism and Barbeque had been taken from his script 
for The Traveller (al-Musāfir), a Syrian film that was under production; and again in 1997 the same writer 
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claimed that the film A Message to the Ruler derived from his play The Clown (al-Muharrij) (N. N., 1998a). A 
Message to the Ruler was also taken to court by another writer, Nabīl Fārūq, who maintained that the film was a 
‘copy’ of his novel The Mission [al-Muhimma] published in 1995 (N. N., 1997). 
28 ʿĀdil Imām’s visit to Asyūṭ has become one of his most famous ‘performances’. It is an ever-returning topic 
in most of his interviews. The whole trip was filmed by the prominent Egyptian TV director Yaḥyā al-ʿAlamī, 
and the TV interview with ʿĀdil Imām by Hāla Sarḥān (2006) was, for example, juxtaposed with scenes from 
the trip and longer sequences of his speech edited with the accompaniment of emotional music. 
29 In ʿĀdil Imām’s Ramadan on the Volcano (1985) there is an implicit connection with Islamic Investment 
ventures (Armbrust 1998, p.296) such as the infamous Rayyān Company. The government had accused this 
company of running a pyramid scheme, but many believed it was closed down because of its connection to the 
Islamists (ibid, p. 296). In the film there is a scene in which Ramaḍān sits at his desk taking in money from 
unsuspecting customers while uttering pious phrases. On the wall behind him hangs a framed Qur’anic verse, 
and the camera zooms in on the prayer beads Ramaḍān fingers with, as he induces people to trust him with 
their money (ibid, p. 297). One year later the connection between Islamic investors as swindlers was made 
more explicit in Portable Police-Post [̇Karākōn fī al-Shāriʿ]. The Qur’anic verse on the wall was more elaborate and 
the swindler now had a beard and wore a jallābiyya. The scene also featured a stern female secretary in ḥijāb 
(ibid, p. 299: footnote 14). 
30 The series, which consists of approximately thirty episodes, followed the lives of the inhabitants of a 
residential building in a middle-class suburb of Cairo, where one of the families was cast as the guardian of 
Egyptian values and customs, with the father portrayed as an upright character who sets out to reveal the 
falsehood of the Islamists (Ismail, 2003, p. 67). 
31 This was a televised series of public confessions by former members of Islamic groups. These ‘repentants’, 
known as al- tā’ibūn, were not only made to repent publicly for their own actions but also to condemn the 
actions of the militants generally. Their ‘star’ was ʿĀdil ʿAbd al-Bāqī, who had been an amīr (leader) of an 
Islamist cell within the al-Shawqiyyūn group and had close contacts with prominent Jihād figures. His 
televised ‘interview’ was broadcast over three consecutive evenings (Ismail, 2003, p. 67) 
32 In an interview with Walter Armbrust Nādir Galāl denied that there was any such deal (Armbrust, 2002a, p. 
930: footnote 23). 
33 This could actually be suspected of several of ʿĀdil Imām’s films. Terrorism and Barbecue (1992), Prince of 
Darkness (2002), The Danish Experiment (2003), A Groom from the Security Apparatus (2004) and The Embassy is in the 
Building (2005) list ʿIṣām Imām, ʿĀdil Imām’s brother, as their producer, and Playing with the Grownups (1991), 
The Forgotten One (1993), Birds of Darkness (1995) and Sleeping in Honey (1996) were produced by Waḥīd Ḥāmid’s 
own production company, Aflām Waḥīd Ḥāmid. 
34 Armbrust (2002a: footnote 24) notes that “the match was instantly recognisable. Egypt had in reality won 2-
1, but the world soccer officials determined that the behaviour of the Egyptian crowd had intimidated the 
visitors to the point that it had to be replayed on a neutral field (Lyon). The match ended 0-0 and as a result 
Egypt did not make it to the World Cup Finals.” 
35 A ḥisba lawsuit is a lawsuit based on the Islamic injunction of ‘al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar’ (to 
enjoin good and forbid evil). This legislation in Islamic jurisprudence enabled individual Muslims to defend 
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matters of faith in the public arena and hold fellow citizens and the state accountable for the upholding of 
religious virtue. In Egypt, ḥisba gives all Egyptians the right to file lawsuits in cases where they perceive that 
an exalted right of God has been violated. The ḥisba legislation has become a tool in the hands of Egypt’s 
conservative religious establishment to enforce orthodoxy. 
36 In 1993 the notorious ḥisba lawyer Shaykh Yūsuf al-Badrī attempted to enforce morality in the public space 
by filing a lawsuit against billboard advertisements which he and his group deemed morally offensive. The 
question of religious orthodoxy was fought out in a case brought by ḥisba lawyers against Yūsuf Shāhīn’s film 
The Emigrant [al-Muhāgir] (1994). The lawyers sought to ban the film on the grounds that its portrayal of Joseph 
strayed from the Text and that the depiction of prophets was in any case illicit. 
37 The football appears several times throughout the film, and in the final scene the two ‘teams’, now both in 
prison together, kick the ball out of the prison yard, over the skyline and right into the viewer’s face, 
smashing his TV screen. 
38 An example of this use is when, after a terrorist attack in Sharm al-Shaykh in 2005, ʿĀdil Imām held an 
improvised speech from the stage after his play The Bodyguard, which made the audience, to a large extent Gulf 
Arabs, respond and shout after him “Down with terrorism, down with the birds of darkness, down with the 
enemies of humanity!” (N. N., 2005a). 
39 In 1984 ʿĀdil Imām was sued by the lawyers’ association for his film The Lawyer [al-advūkādū] on the ground 
that it had ruined the profession’s reputation and he was initially sentenced to a year in prison. The case 
circulated in the court system for several years before ending in a settlement. It is therefore quite 
understandable that, when he decided to make another film about lawyers, ʿĀdil Imām should take 
precautions.  
40 Waḥīd Ḥāmid had previously been involved in a dispute with this lawyer (Tāmir Samīr Sarāj, 2006). With this 
background in mind it could be that the film was written by Waḥīd Ḥāmid as a kind of ‘answer’ to, or 
‘counterattack’ against these lawyers, not unlike Yūsuf Shāhīn’s film Destiny [al-Maṣīr] (1997) which, with its 
message that ‘words can fly and thoughts can’t be stopped’, was interpreted as a direct response to the 
Islamists’ pressure to ban his 1994 film The Emigrant. 
41 Yūsuf al-Badrī claimed that the film had defamed him and demanded that it be banned and that he be 
awarded one million Egyptian pounds in compensation. In the film ʿAlī al-Zinātī sues the governor, the 
Minister of Culture and the censorship authorities in order to have illicit cinema posters removed from the 
streets. Since Yūsuf al-Badrī was the only Islamist lawyer who had filed such a case, he maintained that ʿAlī al-
Zinātī must be him.  
42 Bakhit and Adila II: The Bucket and the Teapot (1997), Hello America (2000), The Embassy is in the Building (2005), 
The Yacoubian Building (2006) and Morgan Ahmed Morgan (2007) all include fundamentalist characters. 
43 This alleged Iranian involvement may be the reason why the fundamentalist characters in The Terrorist and 
Birds of Darkness are both named ʿAlī. ʿAlī is, of course, a common Egyptian name, but it is also a name 
historically connected with Shia Islam. 
44 The claim that the fundamentalists’ aim is to forbid everything is taken to the point of parody in Bakhit and 
Adila II. In his election campaign, Bakhīt (ʿĀdil Imām) adapts the Brothers’ ‘enforcing of public moral’ and 
‘curbing of basic freedoms’ agenda, and in an attempt to overbid them he announces that: “We demand the 
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closure of all schools and universities because they corrupt the youth. We demand the prohibition not only of 
beer and alcohol, but also of mineral water, soft drinks and juice, and especially sugar-cane juice. And we 
demand the prohibition of cinema, theatre and television, in addition to salmon and pastrami. And we should 
avoid eating broad beans because it corrupts the intellect.” 
45 The journalist is clearly meant to resemble the Egyptian anti-fundamentalist journalist Farag Fūda, who was 
assassinated in 1992. Although in his lifetime he was not celebrated by the government, he was posthumously 
declared a martyr of freedom of thought and became the very symbol of how this freedom was under threat 
by the fundamentalists. ʿĀdil Imām was one of the few public figures who showed up at the hospital when 
Farag Fūda was assassinated. Maḥmūd Ṣalāḥ recalls that “when I rushed to the hospital where the doctors 
were trying to save his [Farag Fūda’s] life, I was surprised to find only ʿĀdil Imām and my friend the journalist 
ʿĀdil Ḥamūda outside the operating theatre” (Ṣalāḥ, 2009). He was also the only member of the filmmaking 
establishment to attend Farag Fūda’s funeral (Armbrust, 1996, p. 250). 
46 His name is an additional indication that he is a ‘true’ fundamentalist. Al-Ẓāhir is one of the asmā’ al-ḥusnā 
(the 99 names of God mentioned in the Qur’an) and means ‘The Manifest’. In that sense ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir is just a 
common name meaning ‘Servant of God’. But in normal use ẓāhir also means ‘what is apparent’ or ‘visible’, and 
God is The Knower of what is visible and invisible (al-ʿĀlim bi l-ẓāhir wa-l-khafīy). In that way ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir 
could become ‘ʿAlī the Servant of the Visible’, thus turning his name into a subtle statement of his, and the 
fundamentalists’, superficial understanding of the Text. 
47 The point of the ‘true’ fundamentalist’s stupidity is also made Hassan and Murqus (2008) we have a similar 
scene in which the Coptic preacher (ʿĀdil Imām), now confused with a sheikh, is placed in a situation in which 
he has to deliver fatwa in an Upper Egypt mosque. The audience uncritically accepts whatever he says. 
48 This sentence (lā tujādil wa lā tunāqish ya akh ʿAlī) has become one of the famous quotations from the film and, 
according to al-Ḥasan (2007), it has entered daily language. 
49 Also the television series The Family tried to criticise this kind of literature, which had become a favourite 
subject for many popular preachers. In a dialogue with the Islamist amīr and his followers in a mosque, the 
father of the family and the voice of sound Egyptian values, questions the idea of torment of the 
crypt/punishment in the grave.  But in the series these utterances, which aimed at questioning widespread 
ideas about the afterlife, backfired. They became the subject of public controversy and required the 
intervention of al-Azhar to clarify the matter (Ismail, 2003, pp. 67-68). 
50 Both of ʿĀdil Imām’s sons have entered the cinema industry. Muḥammad Imām, the younger of the two, had 
his first major role in The Yacoubian Building, as Ṭāhā al-Shādhilī. In Hassan and Murqus (2008) he played Būlus’s 
(ʿĀdil Imām) son. Also his elder brother Rāmī Imām has collaborated with ʿĀdil Imām in several films. He 
played Magdī Nūr’s (Ādil Imām) son in Sleeping in Honey (1996). In 1999 he had his first job as assistant director 
in Mahrous, the Minister’s Boy. To date he has directed six films, two of which are ʿĀdil Imām’s (Prince of Darkness 
(2002) and Hassan and Murqus (2008)). He is currently directing ʿĀdil Imām’s Nagi Atallah Gang [Firqat Nāgī ʿAṭā 
Allāh], which will possibly appear in 2009. 
51 In the novel (p. 162) it says that he intended to give her the book Hijab before Judgement (al-ḥijāb qabla al-
ḥisāb). In the film he comes with a whole pile of books, and some of the titles are recognisable (How to follow the 
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correct Sunni path [kayfa tasluk ṭarīq al-sunna] and The Foundation of Islamic Conception [al-asās fī al-taṣawwur al-
islāmī], and the book he intends to give Buthayna has the title Niqab [al-niqāb]). 
52 In the novel (p. 200-202) Ṭāhā is arrested in his room after the demonstrations. In the film, on the other 
hand, he is arrested after a chase at the demonstration. While the film gives Ṭāhā a leading role in these 
demonstrations, the book only mentions that he took part in them. After the demonstrations he went home 
and made posters to be put up at university the next day, but he gets arrested that same night.   
53 In the novel (p. 215) the book in question is The Charter for Islamic Action [mīthāq al-ʿamal al-islāmī], which is 
the ‘constitution’ of the Egyptian Islamic Group [al-Gamāʿa al-Islāmiyya]. In the film the officer looks through 
the books before questioning Ṭāhā. One of the books, How to follow the correct Sunni path, is the same as that 
Ṭāhā had with him earlier. The officer claims that “at your (i.e. Ṭāhā’s) home we found all the books upon 
which all the groups are based”. 
54 In Morgan Ahmed Morgan there are several fundamentalist women in niqābs, moving around without saying a 
word: they flit about in their black niqābs like blind bulldozers and Morgan (ʿĀdil Imām) has to jump out of 
their way so as not to be run down. 
55 In the novel (pp. 307-312) Ṭāhā is allowed to see Raḍwā unveiled in the presence of her sisters before they 
marry, and a kind of relationship develops between them (pp. 317-321). In the film Ṭāhā seems never to have 
seen Raḍwā before their marriage, and she does not utter a word throughout the whole film. 
56 ʿAbd al-Bāqī spoke of how female members whose husbands have been branded apostates by the emirs were 
forced into divorce. The women were then made to remarry without observing the ʿidda, - a sharīʿa stipulation 
requiring a four month waiting period before a divorced woman can remarry (Ismail, 2003, p. 67). Salwa Ismail 
also has the impression that people considered the revelations regarding sexual improprieties to be the most 
damning and the ones likely to attract the attention of the viewers (Ismail, 2003, p. 193: footnote 19). 
57 The text goes:  yā wāsh yā wāsh yā Murgīḥa    Slowly, slowly! Swing! 
matkhuḍḍahāshi ya Murgīḥa  Don’t scare her! Swing! 
dī ṣabiyya ḥilwa wa-malīḥa  She is a nice, sweet girl 
lākin yā ʿaynī munkasira wa-garīḥa but, poor girl, she is broken and hurt 
‘Murgīḥā’ (Swing) in the song is the name of a boy, which is why the verb (matkhuḍḍahāshi) is conjugated in the 
2nd person masculine, even though the word ‘murgīha’ is feminine. In the film, the song is used allegorically, 
the girl becoming Egypt and the swing, or boy, those who exploit her. The song was allegedly written by Badīʿ 
Khayrī, but it is possibly older. It was later sung by Fuʾād al-Muhandis and Nādiyā Luṭfī in a 1965film about the 
life of the famous oriental dancer Badīʿa Maṣābinī. It therefore also becomes a means of recalling the ‘good old 
days’. 
58 The throne verse (āyatu al-kursī): verse 255 of the second sūra of the Qur’an. The verse is often recited for 
safety in times of danger. 
59 This is implicit in the title which alludes to an older Egyptian play, Hassan, Murqus and Cohen [Ḥasan wa-
Murquṣ wa-Kuhēn] (1945), with Nagīb al-Rīḥānī that was reproduced for cinema, with the same title, although 
without Nagīb al-Rīḥānī, in 1954. This play was about three friends, one from each religion, including Cohen, a 
Jewish character. The title thus makes us ask, not only where Cohen has gone, but also what is going to 
happen with Murquṣ if national unity fails to keep the ‘two elements of the nation’ together. 
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60 ʿĀdil Imām’s eldest son’s name is Rāmī and he is therefore addressed here as Abū Rāmī in order to give an 
impression of intimacy. 
61 In the course of only one week the film brought in 2 260 000 EGP, a sum which the first Bakhit and Adila film 
had needed nine weeks to achieve (῾Alī, 1997). 
62 The word ‘gardal’ (bucket), when said about a person, takes on the meaning ‘dolt’ or ‘sucker’, while ‘kanaka’ 
(teapot) calls to mind the Egyptian expression ‘ḥammūk fi kanaka?’ (Did they bath you in a teapot) which is 
used to rebuff someone who has said something nonsensical or absurd. 
63 The case was known as ‘the scandal of the drug MPs’ (faḍīḥat nuwwāb al-kayf ) in the local media. Three MPs 
were expelled from parliament. 
64 Amongst those under investigation in the case known as the case of the loan MPs (nuwwāb al-qurūḍ) in the 
local media, were businessmen and bank directors (Lāshīn, 1997). This last scene could therefore have been a 
direct comment on this famous corruption case. 
65 Each wife represents a sector of society. The fallāḥīn are represented by his original wife, the ex-minister’s 
ex-wife – who he has married – represents the workers, and Mihētab, the ex-minister’s mistress, represents 
the new private sector (al-khaṣkhaṣa). The film thus ends in a parody of ‘social reconciliation’. 
66 ʿĀdil Imām has on several occasions stated that Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ is one of his best friends. It is well known in Egypt 
that Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ has long been very ill and that he is unable to take any film roles. Many would therefore 
interpret this last scene against this background, seeing Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ’s guest appearance in the film as a gesture 
of goodwill on ʿĀdil Imām’s part towards his old friend. On the other hand the director, Nādir Galāl, confirmed 
the intertextual use of Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ in the film, saying that  “his person is close to that of ʿĀdil Imām, we can 
imagine the next film, Saʿīd, the Minister’s Boy” (cited from Jīhān Maḥmūd, 1999). 
67 ʿĀdil Imām’s film A Message to the Ruler from 1998 may seem to be an attempt on his part to take up again the 
thread of consciousness rising from his previous collaboration with Waḥīd Ḥāmid and Sharīf ʿArafa. The film 
combines nationalism and vulgarity, but it failed with both critics and audiences, leading many to ask if this 
was not the end of ʿĀdil Imām’s dominance in Egyptian cinema. In A Message to the Ruler ʿĀdil Imām explicitly 
utilises al-Muwayliḥī’s technique. It is 1807 and the coastal town Rashīd (Rosetta) is being attacked by British 
troops. The brave but vulgar (there is not one female in the film whose bottom he doesn’t pat) Mameluke 
warrior Ḥarfūsh Ibn Barqūq al-Rākibdār (ʿĀdil Imām) is dispatched to Cairo to deliver the ‘Egypt is in danger’ 
message to the ruler. But on his way to the capital a time-switch takes place and, not unlike al-Muwayliḥī’s 
pasha, the brave Mameluke suddenly finds himself in the Cairo of today, exposing its manners and customs, 
only to realise that his Ottoman rulers have become history and that Egypt is now ruled by an Egyptian 
president who, according to the film, was elected by the Egyptian people because he was a hero in the October 
war and won over the Israelis. Also the last Bakhit and Adila film, Hello America, in which Bakhīt and ʿAdīla travel 
to America and expose the falseness of the ‘American dream’, differs from the first two parts. Back at zero 
again (we are told that they have been expelled from Parliament because of their ‘honesty’), the couple try 
their luck with Bakhīt’s cousin, who lives in New York. Much as in The Terrorist, Bakhīt and ʿAdīla are stranded 
in the bourgeois milieu of Bakhīt’s uncle. But unlike in The Terrorist, in which ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir was ‘elevated’ 
out of his fundamentalism through his contact with middle-class values, Hello America turns these values 
upside down. Although the couple is just as vulgar as in the other Bakhit and Adila films, their ibn al-balad 
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lower-class identity and values become the embodiment of Egyptian identity contrasted with the ‘other’, here 
represented by Bakhīt’s uncle, who has lost touch with all traditional Egyptian values. Rather than being 
elevated as in The Terrorist, Bakhīt is, if anything, corrupted by this environment. While the film is based on 
the same principle of rapid social ascent – through different circumstances Bakhīt becomes a pivotal player in 
the U.S. presidential elections –  the contrast with the ‘other’ and the value system built up around it makes 
Hello America a very identity-charged and value-based film. 
68 It also seems that these structural changes, which started in the early 1990s, are behind the sudden boom 
both in cinema going and in film production that took place in the late 1990s. While Egypt at the end of the 
1960s had produced over 150 films per year, the deteriorating state of both production facilities and cinemas 
led to a gradual decline, first in the quality of films but then also in the quantity. The decline in production 
reached its nadir in 1997 with a meagre 16 films. The trend has since reversed and production is now up to 
more than 40 films per year. 
69 Shafik (2007, p. 91) points to this double meaning by claiming that it appears when the title is read in 
classical Arabic with a slightly different vocalisation: by changing the vocalisation from tajruba (experience, 
experiment) into tajriba (temptation).  Shafik here has gone unnecessarily far in explaining the point. Both in 
Modern Standard Arabic (Wehr cites only tajriba) and Egyptian Arabic (according to Badawi/Hinds it can be 
pronounced as both tagruba and tagriba) the word carries both the meanings without any change in 
vocalisation. 
70 One of the film’s titles before ʿĀdil Imām decided on The Danish Experiment was Qadri wa awlādu (Ḥasan ʿAbd 
al-Fattāḥ, 2003) meaning Qadrī and his sons, or by changing a vowel, My Destiny (qadarī) and its Children. 
71 This construct very much reflects Egypt’s position as what Eve Trout-Powell has called the ‘colonized 
colonizer’. “The idea of colonization that threatened Egyptians was also a racial construction in which they 
[i.e. the Egyptians] were deemed un-equals. Nationalists fended off any association with those who were more 
‘properly’ the subjects of European imperialism, and who were, in their minds, Africans” (Trout-Powell, 2003, 
p. 197, cited from Shaun Lopez, 2008, p. 298). In this way Egypt adopted the racist colonial discourse and 
consequently wrestled with its positionality within this discourse. But it must be added that the comedy in the 
scene with ‘the tall black southern-Sudanese dude’ is not necessarily derived from his ‘blackness’ but from his 
extreme tallness. He is tall and stupid (ṭawīl wi ahbal). In Arabic (as in other cultures) there is a connection 
between being tall and being simple-minded or oafish. Being short, on the other hand, is connected with 
slyness and cunning. This is in Arabic, for example, expressed in the saying kullu ṭawīlin habīl wa kullu qaṣīrin 
makkīr (every tall man is stupid and every short man is sly). 
72 His son and daughter bear the names ʿUday and ʿAliyāʾ because Murgān made his money as an entrepreneur 
in Arab countries in close collaboration with the governments there. They are named after Ṣaddām Ḥusayn’s 
son and the queen of Jordan. 
73 A twisting of the saying “Learning cannot be measured in gold” (al-ʿilm lā yukayyal bi-l-ḏahab). 
74 There has been some speculation on who Murgān Aḥmad Murgān was supposed to portray. ʿĀdil Imām tried 
to close the door on all such speculation by stating that this film has nothing to do with politics and that it 
doesn’t aim to represent any specific person (ʿĀdil Imām, cited from ʿAbd Allah, 2007). But the similarity in 
names leads one’s thoughts to ʿUsmān Aḥmad ʿUsmān (1917-1999), the founder of the Arab Contractors (al-
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muqāwilūn al-ʿarab), the largest Arab contracting firm in the 70s and 80s. ʿUsmān was a close friend and 
political ally of Sadat and it is said that he was the second most powerful man in Egypt during Sadat's 
presidency. On the other hand the film’s opening scenes showing Murgān’s business empire had some 
similarities to a TV advertisement for ‘Ḥadīd ʿIzz’, leading others to connect the character to the NDP 
politician and business tycoon Aḥmad ʿIzz. 
75 ’antama’ is the verbal noun (maṣdar) of ’antīm’. The word is derived from English ‘intimate’. My girlfriend 
would be termed antimti, and a girl in a relationship mi’antima. 
76 ʿUrfī-marriages are usually clandestine marriages in which a man and a woman draft their own marriage 
contract without registering it with the authorities. This type of marriage has allegedly become popular 
amongst youth as a means of legitimising sexual relations without the financial and parental obstacles that a 
traditional Egyptian marriage presents. As these marriages are rooted in Sunni Islam, they are far from illegal, 
but they are frowned upon by society, because  “by their very definition [they] challenge deeply held norms 
and beliefs as youths use them to escape parental control and authority” (Bahgat / Afifi 2007, p. 79). 
77 For me it seems that Murgān here mispronounces the word ‘dīn’ (belief/religion). He seems to think that the 
long vowel ‘ī’ in Egyptian becomes the diphthong ‘ay’ in classical Arabic. 
78 The line he is unable to memorise, ‘We have fallen into the trap’ (wa-la-qad waqaʿna fī l-fakhkh), itself becomes 
a comment on what corruption has done to Egypt. As he stands on stage, unable to say the line correctly, his 
mobile phone rings. It is his assistant calling to try to whisper the line to him. Murgān tells his assistant that 
he can say it directly to the actor to whom he was supposed to say it, and hands the phone over to him. In the 
end everybody, apart from Murgān, has memorised the line, and the whole audience is chanting ‘We have 
fallen into the trap’. The scene also recalls a stunt by the popular lowbrow singer Shaʿbān ʿAbd al-Raḥīm, 
whose phone rang while he was on stage. He answered the phone and thereafter continued the play. The 
audience found this so funny that from then on the stunt became a part of the play. 
79 The film’s intended title was allegedly Playing with the Thieves [al-Laʿb maʿa al-Luṣūṣ]. This title would have 
linked the film to the nationalist anti-corruption film Playing with the Grownups. The title was changed to 
Morgan Ahmed Morgan at ʿĀdil Imām’s insistence (ʿAbd Allāh, M., 2007). 
80 Moreover, different ministries often follow different policies (Iman Hamdy, 2006, p. 16). It is, for example, 
known that the Ministry of Agriculture has long been the most pro-normalisation body, while the Ministry of 
Culture, at least since, in 1978, Fārūq Ḥusnī took over the position of minister, has refused to open up for any 
kind of normalisation in the cultural field. His refusal is in line with the consensus amongst the ‘cultural elite’ 
over a cultural boycott of Israel, a ‘cultural boycott’ which often boils down to the question of whether a 
person is willing to visit Israel or not, and as a result of which ‘cultural players’ who do visit Israel have been 
labelled traitors – not by the state but by their colleagues. 
81 Maḥmūd Saʿd in an interview with ʿĀdil Imām emotionally writes: “I couldn’t believe that ʿĀdil Imām had 
said something like that! The son of al-Ḥilmiyya should go and visit those who killed, and still, kill our sons!!?” 
(Saʿd, 1996). 
82 Cairo Peace Society: Founded in 1998 by some prominent Egyptian intellectuals as a counterpart to the 
Israeli Peace Now (See Hamdy, 2000, p. 80) 
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83 Questioned about normalisation again in connection with these eulogies, ʿĀdil Imām again answered 
ambiguously. “Everybody is free to think what he likes,” he said. ”As long as the government has a peace 
agreement with Israel and has exchanged ambassadors, it is the citizen’s right to follow the government as 
much as it is his right to oppose it. This is an issue open to discussion, but what is not acceptable is to vilify an 
intellectual just because he is pro-normalisation, as they did with ʿAlī Sālim, who was expelled from the union. 
It’s a question of personal freedom” (cited from N. N., 1998b). 
84 QIZs (Qualified Industrial Zones) are industrial parks to be set up in Egypt and Jordan from which goods can 
be exported duty-free to the US on condition that goods produced in these zones should have a minimum 
percentage of Israeli components. The QIZ initiative was launched by the US in 1996 to support the Middle 
East peace process. Egypt had rejected the idea for years, arguing that it was too politically sensitive, but 
finally signed an agreement in December 2004. 
85 ʿAzzām ʿAzzām (b. 1963) is an Israeli Arab convicted in Egypt of spying for Israel and jailed for eight years. 
86 Upon this incident Sharīf sarcastically comments: “They eradicated the traces of the aggression” (azālū āthār 
al-ʿudwān). To ‘eradicate the traces of aggression’ was the expression commonly used to mean to re-establish 
the pre-1967 status. 
87 Muṣṭafā Bakrī is an Egyptian politician, an independent Member of Parliament and editor of al-Usbūʿ. He is 
known for his staunch nationalist and anti-normalisation position.  It was also he who, a year later, was going 
to lead the parliamentary campaign to have ʿĀdil Imām’s film The Yacoubian Building censored, claiming that 
the film’s portrayal of homosexuality damaged Egypt’s reputation. 
88 ʿAlī Sālim (b. 1936) is a once-prominent Egyptian playwright. He wrote the play School of Troublemakers.  In 
1994 he visited Israel and the same year published the book My Journey to Israel.  He was labelled a sellout by 
fellow writers and expelled from the Writers’ Union. He has since been unable to get his plays staged. He is 
now most famous for being a supporter of normalisation. 
89 Būsī Samīr is a vulgar Egyptian popular singer and belly dancer. Her first video clip, Put the dots on the letters, 
aroused controversy because of its seductiveness and vulgarity. Her second clip, It’s him I love (baḥibbu huwwa), 
was dropped by most TV channels for the same reason. 
90 The name Shuhdī itself evokes the famous Egyptian communist Shuhdī ʿAṭiyya (1912-1960) and so adds to 
the family’s communist aura. When Sharīf befriends the family, he surrounds himself with outdated leftist 
symbols like Lenin and Mao in order to ingratiate himself with them. Moreover, they seem to lack a real cause. 
Sharīf’s journalist friend writes for a newspaper called lā (No), a paper that is opposed to everything as a 
matter of principle, and Dāliyā’s uncle cites Gorky, explaining to Sharīf that “we are born to protest” (khuliqnā 
li-naʿtariḍ). 
91 One of several examples is a scene in which Sharīf thinks he is going to meet Dāliyā for a date. He brings 
with him a bottle of whisky. But Dāliyā, who understands their relationship differently, takes him to an anti-
normalisation rally. Unprepared, and still with the bottle in his hand, he finds himself in the awkward 
situation of having to deliver an anti-normalisation speech. He points at the bottle, shouting: “We must 
boycott goods of this kind,” before throwing the bottle away. But rather than boycott, one of the audiences 
catches it and disappears with the bottle under his arm. 
 126 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
92 When the family later visits Sharīf in his flat, they bring him another book as a present – this time, City of the 
Beasts by Isabel Allende. For Sharīf the title is just as disgusting as the previous one, and he throws the book 
straight out of the window. 
93 The original lines of the poem are as follows: 
a turā ḥīna afqaʿu ʿaynākī (I wonder, when I gouge your eyes out) 
wa-uthabbitu jawharatayni makānahumā (and put two jewels in their place) 
hal turā? (Could you still behold?) 
hiya ashyāʾu lā tushtarā (Such cannot be bought) 
But ʿĀdil Imām recites: 
afqaʿu ʿaynayka (I’ll gouge your eyes out)  
wa aḍaʿu makānahumā ḥagarayni (and put two stones (i.e. pipefulls of hashish) in their place) 
wa-lākin ayna hashtarī hādhā l-ḥagarayni? (but where should I buy those two stones (pipefulls)?) 
94 Shaʿbān ʿAbd al-Raḥīm: popular Egyptian shaʿbī-singer. His song I hate Israel [ana bakrah Isrāʾīl]” with the 
catchy refrain “But I love ʿAmr Mūsā” (wa baḥibb ʿAmr Mūsā) became an instant hit, and is said to be the reason 
why ʿAmr Mūsā (b. 1936), probably the most popular politician from within the regime, was removed as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and appointed to the position of Secretary-General to the ‘impotent’ Arab League 
(Ḥanān Shūmān, 2005). 
95
 In the middle of all this, the Islamic fundamentalist terrorists enter the scene in their usual stereotypical 
way, only as a disturbing element. They are not part of it. Again they come from the ‘edge of society’ to exploit 
the situation for their own ends. In a scene sarcastically criticising suicide-bombers, they kidnap Sharīf, put on 
him an explosive belt and force him to blow himself up at the embassy, saying “Your place is not here. Your 
place is up there with the martyrs,” to which Sharīf sarcastically responds: “Am I supposed to go up there 
alone while you stay here? Why don’t you go up there and leave me alone here?” 
96 The demonstration gathers people from the Lawyers’ Syndicate (niqābat al-muḥāmīn) and then the Press 
Syndicate (niqābat al-ṣuḥufiyyīn). Both have been ‘hot spots’ of, and are associated with, anti-regime 
demonstrations. Not many months before the release of the film, on the 25th of May 2005, pro-regime thugs 
had maltreated and sexually harassed demonstrators and journalists in front of the Press Syndicate. Pictures 
of the incident circulated in the international press. The use by the film of these places as starting points for 
the popular anti-normalisation (but not anti-regime) demonstrations could thus account for a channelling of 
these protests into nationalist and pro-regime support. 
97 ʿĀdil Imām indirectly confirms this. Asked whether it is true that he received 8 million EGP for his role in 
Morgan Ahmed Morgan and now 15 million for his role in the coming film Bobbos (2009), he denied having done 
so, only to burst out laughing and say that what he received was actually much more. He then grew serious 
again and explained that “an artist will never tell you how much he has received. We consider it a hidden 
charity (ḥasana makhfiyya), and a blessing from God (rizq min ʿand rabbinā)” (ʿĀdil Imām, cited from al-Laythī, 
2009).  
98 The Egyptian UN Goodwill ambassadors, all actors, are: ʿĀdil Imām (UNHCR from 2001), Maḥmūd al-Qābil 
(UNICEF from 2003), Maḥmūd Yāsīn (WFP from 2004), Yusrā (UNDP from 2006) and Khālid Abū al-Nagā 
(UNICEF from 2007) (UN in Egypt, 2007). 
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99 The production was directed by Sharīf ʿArafa, a soundtrack was provided by the celebrated composer 
῾Ammār al-Sharīʿī and a lot of war and historical footage was used. The interview focused on Ḥusnī Mubārak’s 
role in history, and through a series of anecdotes and narratives the President gave the viewers an 
unprecedented insight into his character and life, with ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Adīb trying to underline the President’s 
unique qualities as a leader of the nation. Although in the interview the President claimed that he had not yet 
made up his mind on whether he would nominate himself or not, many observers suspected the production to 
be the opening of his campaign for re-election, which started in September the same year (Nevine Khalil, 
2005). 
100 News agencies wrote after the premiere of The Yacoubian Building at the Cairo Opera House that the author 
ʿAlāʾ al-Aswānī was barred from attending the opening. ʿAlāʾ al-Aswānī told AFP that “a bunch of ministers and 
dignitaries of the regime were invited, but that I was undesirable”, adding that “it was not the producers, but 
the authorities who rejected my attendance because I am a member of the opposition movement Kifāyā” 
(cited from N. N., 2006c?). 
101 ʿAbd al-Ghanī Dāwūd in al-ʿArabī asks whether ʿImād al-Dīn Adīb’s intention with the film was to show that 
he is not only able to support the regime but also to do the opposite (Dāwūd, 2006), and in al-Mūjaz 04.07.2006 
there is an article with the headline “ʿImād al-Dīn Adīb’s riddle: He adopts the state’s and the opposition’s 
position simultaneously” (N. N., 2006b). 
102 In Egypt it can seem that the novel had less to do with the film’s success. A questionnaire distributed to 50 
individuals from the audience revealed that only 14% could identify ʿAlāʾ al-Aswānī as the writer of the novel 
(half of them had read it), while 66% answered that Waḥīd Ḥāmid wrote the novel and 20% said ‘don’t know’ 
(Amānī Ḥāfiẓ al-Ḥifnāwī, 2006). The film was heavily marketed in Egypt. Promotion focused on it being Egypt’s 
biggest cinematic production ever, and the most important film of the century, and that it contained an 
unrecorded number of stars. The film premiered at the Berlin International Film festival a few months before 
it was released in Egypt. Although it failed to win an award, its positive reception in the West was exploited in 
its local promotion. 
103 The campaign was supported by a total of 112 MPs, both conservative Islamists and MPs from the ruling 
NDP. They demanded that several scenes, especially the scenes of homosexuality, that according to Bakrī, 
were "spreading obscenity and debauchery,” should be censored (cited from N. N., 2006a). 
104 In the film he appears once. Al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām visits him at his Islamic Charitable Society to seek his advice on 
what to do about his ‘wet dreams’, and the sheikh advises him to take a second wife (pp. 74-75). But in the 
novel the sheikh appears a second time (pp. 242-247). The novel relates how he is busy justifying the liberation 
of Kuwait by US troops. Al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām again needs the sheikh’s help. His second wife, Suʿād, is pregnant and 
al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām takes the sheikh with him to try to convince her to have an abortion. This scene – much more 
compromising for ‘official’ Islam – has been omitted in the film. 
105 The bulk of Shaykh Shākir’s speech in the film is taken directly from the novel (pp.132-138). Both in the film 
and in the novel (p. 134) the Shaykh says: “Our leaders claim that they rule us by the laws of Islamic sharīʿa 
and that they implement democracy and God knows that they are lying on both counts. Islamic sharīʿa is 
suspended in our afflicted country.” The film omits that “We are ruled by French secular law that legalises 
drunkenness, adultery and homosexuality.” Film and novel then continue with “and the government earns 
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money from gambling and the sale of alcohol,” but the film adds “from insolent tourism” (wa min al-siyāha al-
wāfida al-fāgira) before both go on to say that this illicit money is then turned into government salaries, 
feeding people from illicit sources and afflicting them with the curse of the illicit. 
106 The dialogue in the novel criticising ʿAbd al-Nāṣir (pp. 228-229), and which probably is the dialogue Ṣabrī 
Ḥāfiẓ alluded to in his article, goes as follows: 
Zakī al-Disūqī: ʿAbd al-Nāṣir was the worst ruler in the history of Egypt. He ruined the country and gave us  
defeat and poverty. The damage to the Egyptian’s personality that he caused will take years 
to repair. ʿAbd al-Nāṣir taught the Egyptians cowardice, opportunism and hypocrisy. 
Buthayna: Why do people love him then? 
Zakī al-Disūqī: Who said that people love him? 
Buthayna: A lot of people I know love him. 
Zakī al-Disūqī: Those loving ʿAbd al-Nāṣir must either be ignorant or profiting [from him]. The free officers  
were a bunch of kids from the scum of society ...  destitutes sons of destitutes .. al-Naḥḥās 
Bāsha was a good guy. He sympathised with the poor and allowed them to enrol at the 
Military Academy, and the result was the coup d’état in ‘52. They ruled Egypt, robbed and 
plundered the country and made millions. Of course they love ʿAbd al-Nāṣir. He was the 
leader of the gang (al-ʿiṣāba). 
107 The dialogue (p. 282) goes as follows: 
Zakī al-Disūqī:   Do you still hate the country? I am unable to understand your generation. In my day  
patriotism was like a religion. A lot of young people died fighting the British. 
Buthayna: You were demonstrating to throw out the British? They left ... Does that mean that the  
country is okay now? 
Zakī al-Disūqī: The reason for the deteriorating state of the country is the lack of democracy. If there had  
been real democracy, Egypt would have been a great power. Egypt’s tragedy is dictatorship, 
and dictatorship only leads to poverty, corruption and failure in all fields. 
108 I have not been able to find any source confirming that parts of the film have been censored or scenes cut. 
On the other hand I have heard rumours that the film was censored, and most of these rumours mention the 
absence of ‘The Big One’. The cinema version of the film is about 165 minutes long, as is my DVD. ʿĀdil Adīb, 
representative of Good News, confirms that another 45 minutes had been removed, but that this was done in 
order to make the film suitable for screening in cinemas (cited from Muḥammad al-Miṣrī, 2006), as there in 
Egypt are three hours between each show. 
109 Another example on how the President is omitted from criticism in the film is when Ṭāhā is refused 
admittance to the Police School on the ground that his father works as a doorman (bawwāb). In the novel he 
writes a letter of complaint to the President (pp. 86 and 96-97). This complaint has been omitted in the film. 
There is also no mention of the fact that Ṭāhā could have been admitted if he had paid a bribe of 20,000 EGP. 
110 There are a lot of rumours around Kamāl al-Shādhilī and The Yacoubian Building. Some people claim that the 
novel was the reason why half of his portfolio was abruptly taken away from him. Moreover, it is rumoured 
that the film angered him and that he held that it should have been forbidden because it damaged the 
reputation of the NDP. Allegedly Kamāl al-Shādhilī was angry with Ṣafwat al-Sharīf because he had licensed 
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the film and a dispute between the two NDP tops erupted. It is also rumoured that Kamāl al-Shādhilī himself 
was the ‘hidden hand’ behind the parliamentary campaign to have the film censored.  
111 This sentence, especially “Egypt has become too cruel to its people (maṣr baʾit ʾasya ʾawi ʿala ahlaha),” was one 
of the famous statements. The dialogue is taken from the novel (p. 193), but her statement has been heavily 
altered and this sentence is not present in the novel. In the novel her statement ends with “Then you would 
understand why we hate Egypt.” In the film she does not love Egypt, but she doesn’t say directly that she hates 
her country. When, in the novel, Zakī asks Buthayna if she hates her country, she answers: “Of course.” When 
asked the same question in the film she answers: “Has it [i.e. the country] given me anything to make me love 
it?” (wa-na shuft minha ḥāga ḥilwa ʿashān aḥibbaha?). 
112 The dialogue in which this statement appears is similar to that in the novel (p.191), but the point of making 
a comparison between Egypt and foreign countries is more clearly stated in the film. Zakī al-Disūqī wants to 
offer Buthayna a drink. When she refuses, he says: “What a pity”. In the novel he goes on to explain that to 
drink is something pleasant and that foreigners know the value of alcohol. In the film, on the other hand, he 
goes on: “I pity the difference that is between us and foreigners. Foreigners know how to value alcohol.” He 
then adds the comparison that “here we value hashish. There is a big difference between the two,” i.e. not 
only between alcohol and hashish but also between Egyptians and foreigners. The sentence which appears to 
be one of the more memorable in the film actually seems to have been subverted by some audiences. While 
the hashish in the statement is presented as a ‘negative’ marker, audiences who reportedly were clapping the 
comment (Duʿāʾ Sulṭān, 2006), subverted it into a ‘positive’ marker taking pride in not drinking alcohol. To 
make the comparison between positively charged western and negatively charged Egyptian values clearer, the 
scene starts with al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām and is followed by him too. The above-mentioned dialogue starts when Zakī 
and Buthayna see al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzam on television, where – like many conservative and reactionary MP’s – he is 
complaining about what all the ‘nakedness’ on TV does to our girls and women. After the dialogue between 
Zakī and Buthayna, the camera shows crowded streets in central Cairo to the music of an Edith Piaf song, 
before we are taken into the flat of al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām, where he smokes hashish. The contrast between Zakī’s 
elevated western values and al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām’s corrupted version of eastern values is thus made clear. 
113 The novel insists on using the old pre-revolution name of the street and the square, Sulaymān Bāshā. After 
the revolution, the old statue of Sulaymān Bāshā was replaced with one of the national hero Ṭalʿat Ḥarb, and 
both the street and the square were renamed accordingly, but the old name remained in popular use, 
especially among the elderly and people who refused to accept the new revolutionary order. 
114 This monologue is partly taken from the conversation between Zakī al-Disūqī and Buthayna at the Maxim 
Restaurant in the novel (p. 228). 
115 This has been changed from the novel. In the novel (pp. 326-338) Ḥātim finds ʿAbd Rabbuh again and brings 
him back. They agree to have sex one last time, and the novel clearly gives the impression that also ʿAbd 
Rabbuh enjoys this. But when he, Ḥātim, thereafter breaks the agreement and desperately begs ʿAbd Rabbuh 
to stay, they start to fight. Ḥātim threatens him and in anger ʿAbd Rabbuh kills him. In the film ʿAbd Rabbuh is 
more passive than in the novel. While in the novel he actively takes part in the homosexual relationship and 
enjoys it, the film focuses more on him as a victim corrupted by Ḥātim. After he has been punished by God 
through his son’s death, he returns to his original life. Ḥātim has therefore to be punished by a third party. 
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116 Because of the absence of ‘’The Big One’, al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām’s story from here on differs from that in the novel. 
Al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām only yields to al-Fūlī’s pressure after the Drug Squad raids his business and confiscates drugs. 
When al-Ḥāgg ʿAzzām becomes more compliant al-Fūlī closes his police file. 
117  Playing with the Grownups (1991), Terrorism and Barbecue (1992), The Forgotten One (1993) and Sleeping with 
Honey (1996), all scripted by Waḥīd Ḥāmid, and The Terrorist (1994), scripted by Līnīn al-Ramlī, all firmly belong 
to this period. Birds of Darkness (1995), scripted by Waḥīd Ḥāmid, has a foot both in this and in the following 
period. With the exception of The Terrorist, which was directed by Nādir Galāl, all these films were directed by 
Sharīf ʿArafa. 
118 This period includes the Bakhit and Adila trilogy (1995, 1997 and 2000) by Līnīn al-Ramlī, The Message to the 
Ruler (1998) and ʿĀdil Imām’s first film scripted by Yūsuf Maʿāṭī, Mahrous, the Minister’s Boy (1999). All these 
films were directed by Nādir Galāl.  
119 This period includes all the films scripted by Yūsuf Maʿāṭī (2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008) with the exception 
of Mahrous, the Minister’s Boy (1999). It also includes The Yacoubian Building (2006). Prince of Darkness (2002), 
which was probably an experiment in which ʿĀdil Imām collaborated with the younger generation of film-
makers holds an intermediate position between this and the preceding period. In this period ʿĀdil Imām 
collaborated with various directors (ʿAlī Idrīs (2003, 2004 and 2007)), his son Rāmī Imām (2002 and 2008), Sharīf 
ʿArafa’s son ʿAmr ʿArafa (2005) and Waḥīd Ḥāmid’s son Marwān Ḥāmid (2006)).   
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